Greek authorities have been in contact with their  Albanian counterparts and are closely following and monitoring the developments related to an incident in the Albanian village of Bularat where a Greek citizen allegedly opened fire on Albanian police with a Kalashnikov as they were attempting to apprehend him.

A short while ago, we were formally informed that Konstantinos Katsifas was killed during an exchange of fire with Albanian police.

We express our deep sorrow on the death of the Greek expatriate, as well as our condolences to his family.

In any case, it is unacceptable that the operation led to the loss of human life.

We await for the Albanian authorities to provide complete clarification about the conditions under which the Greek citizen lost his life, and we shall proceed with all necessary action immediately.

Source: With notes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic

As part of this year's Oxi Day commemoration events for October 28, two formal Memorial Ceremonies in Honour of the Fallen Greek Soldiers of the Greek-Italian War of 1940-1941 are going to be organised on Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. at the Military Cemetery of Këlcyrë, and at 12:00 p.m. at the Historical Military Cemetery of Bularat, Albania.

This year's commemoration events in Albania are taking place following the completion of the recent search, exhumation, identification and official burial of 673 fallen Greek soldiers who have been laid to rest in the aforementioned Military Cemeteries.

The remains of the 673 Greek soldiers were found in the Dragot region. The search for other fallen Greek soldiers will continue throughout various locations in southern Albania.

For the first time in history, the memorial ceremony will be organised in collaboration with the Albanian government as per the stipulations of the Inter-State Agreement of Cooperation between Greece and Albania “on the search, exhumation, identification and burial of Greek soldiers who fell in battle in Albania during the Greek-Italian war of 1940-1941 and the construction of cemeteries on the territory of the Republic of Albania for their burial.” 

​The Agreement was implemented following the meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece and Albania in Crete, in November 2017, and in Korçë in January 2018.

Source: With notes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic

Amidst international expectations of a renewed push to jump-start Cyprus settlement talks, PM Alexis Tsipras and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed the full range of bilateral relations during a one-hour meeting today on the sidelines of the 73rd UN General Assembly in New York.

The two countries’ foreign ministers, Nikos Kotzias and Mevlut Cavusoglu were present at the meeting, as was Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar, who was serving as chairman of Turkey’s Joint Chiefs of Staff when he was tapped for the cabinet post.

This was the first meeting between the two leaders since Ankara released two Greek army officers that had been incarcerated in a Turkish prison for over five months, after being arrested in the Evros border region. The incident had heightened tensions between the two countries.

However, beyond the niceties and broad smiles, there were indications of a gradual normalisation of the two countries’ relations, as Erdogan invited Tsipras to Istanbul for talks.

Greek analysts and pundits have expressed the view that the crisis in US-Turkey reations has pushed Erdogan to seek to draw closer to the EU, and that Greece can play a key role in promoting that objective.

Aside from the prospect of renewed Cyprus talks, energy issues and Turkey’s hostile activity in Cyprus, the EEZ and the Aegean, Greek government sources said that Aegean tensions and implementation of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement were high on the agenda.

The Greek PM’s office publicised the meeting with a tweet: “Μeeting with the President of Turkey, Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on the sidelines of the 73rd UN General Assembly # UNGA”.

Source: To Vima

ATHENS — The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said he very much welcomed seeing the Eastern Mediterranean region “through a Greek lens” as he finished consultations with his counterpart, Greek navy Adm. Evangelos Apostolakis, the chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff.

Marine Corps Gen. Joe Dunford told reporters traveling with him that the bilateral relationship between the two NATO allies “is probably as good as it has been in many, many years.”

Dunford and Apostolakis discussed the situation in the region. Greece looks north into the Balkans, east to the Middle East and south into Libya and the rest of North Africa. “[He] shared some thoughts about the region, and I greatly benefited from the perspective of the Greeks, who have a regional view,” the chairman said.

Increased Cooperation

The Greeks are open to increasing military cooperation with the United States, he said. “[They] made a general overture saying they would be willing to consider that, and I certainly was enthusiastic about the possibility,” Dunford said.

U.S. European Command and the State Department will work with Greek ministries to continue these conversations, he said.

“If you look at geography and you look at current operations in Libya and current operations in Syria, [and] you look at potential operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, the opportunities here are pretty significant,” the chairman said.

Dunford said hearing directly from the Greek military about their experiences with the refugee crisis gave him a better appreciation of the scope of the problem and the capabilities they brought to bear on it. “They also have some interesting perspectives on the Russian naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, as well,” he said. “I think we both agreed that we are seeing something we haven’t seen since the 1980s in terms of the operational patterns of the Russians in the area.”

The two leaders talked about the importance of sharing information and intelligence particularly in the area of counterterrorism, the chairman said.

Expanded Base Access

Dunford said the Greek defense chief “expressed interest in expanding our access to their bases.”

This access can be used to move personnel and equipment in and out of theater.

“We … have taken advantage of Souda Bay -- it’s a critical piece of infrastructure here in the region, and Greece has also been open to expanding training opportunities for our forces that are stationed in Europe, in particular for U.S. Army units to do training with helicopters,” he said.

The two men talked about deepening relationships through the International Military and Training program. This program increases military-to-military engagement through service member exchanges. Young Greek service members attend U.S. professional military education schools and young Americans attend Greek schools. He noted that Apostolakis attended the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Warfare School -- then the Amphibious Warfare School -- earlier in his career and the Greek army chief of staff attended a school in Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Finally, Greece also plays a unique role in the region in terms of bringing together multinational exercises. The United States is certainly amenable to participating in those exercises, Dunford said.

The U.S.-Greek relationship is in “a very positive place” today, a senior government official said here on background today, and the foundation to this turn of events has been the defense relationship between the two nations.

Regional Concerns

Greece has suffered through an economic crisis from which the country is still recovering. Yet the nation continued to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense -- a benchmark for NATO members.

“The Greeks live in this neighborhood and they have been looking around and seeing the same instability that we have,” the official said.

Greece is nervous about NATO ally Turkey and want that country to remain firmly rooted in the West, the official added. They also confronted the refugee crisis with limited resources, but see the possibility of it continuing.

“They are deeply concerned with what is happening in Libya and Africa, because even if Syria stabilizes, you’ve got Africa that is right on their doorstep,” the official said.

The Greeks, too, are worried about what the Russians are up to in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, the official said. “They are looking around, and the U.S. is still the best partner available to them.”

On the security front, more is happening. In addition to NATO forces, U.S. European Command, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Special Operations Command use the facilities at the Naval Support Activity in Souda Bay.

The U.S. Air Force is now operating MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles at Greece’s Larissa Air Force Base. The unarmed UAVs will focus on information-gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance in the region.

Both Dunford and the official said the United States is not looking for large bases in Greece. The U.S. footprint in the country will remain light. But there will probably be more American service members rotating in and out of the country for training, education and exercises.

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff

Anton Aldemir lives in Switzerland since June 2011. At the beginning of this year, he went to the Turkish Embassy in Bern to obtain a new passport. The Consular office of the Embassy took his old passport but told him that he would not receive a new one because Turkey had issued a warrant for his arrest on sight.

Anton Aldemir as he was growing up was raised by his family as a Muslim. As a result of inquiries, he found out from his father named Manav that on his mother’s side [Anton] was a Greek. He was born and reared in the center of Izmit (ancient Nicomedia) Province and learned through a DNA testing in 2012 that he is not an ethnic Turk from Central Asia, but Anton’s ancestors have lived in Asia Minor for thousands of years.

A tradition that attracted his attention led him to search for his identity. The fact that the Cappadocia Greeks played in folk songs using spoons just like they did in Anton’s family and realizing that his ancestors played “defi”, [an instrument] made from animal skin and a few other traditional characteristics led him to his [ethnic] identity. He learned that his grandmother's brother (Pehlivan Çakıcı İzzet of Izmit) was Greek speaking or Hellene.

Anton read many works written in this subject as books, articles, etc. and learned about the anguish that occurred in this land a hundred years ago. Similar tragedies happened to Armenians, Syriacs [Assyrians] and Greeks or Hellenes and he started discussions exchanging information with others about the matter.

2011 Haziran ayından itibaren İsviçre’de yaşayan Anton Aldemir, bu yılın başında Türkiye pasaportunu uzatmak için TC Bern Büyükelçiliğine başvurur. Konsolosluk eski pasaportunu alır ancak yeni pasaport alamayacağını söyler. Nedenini soran Anton’a ise Türkiye’ye hakkında yürütülen bir dava olduğunu, arandığını, görüldüğü yerde tutuklanması gerektiğini söyler.
​
Anton Aldemir çocukken ailesi tarafından Müslüman olarak yetiştirilmiş. Ailesi okulda kim olduğunu sorarlarsa biz baba tarafından Manav, anne tarafından Rumeli muhaciriyiz diye söylersin şeklinde telkinlerde bulunurmuş. İzmit Merkez ilçesinde doğan, çocukluğu ve gençliği de burada geçen  Anton 2012 yılında DNA testi yaptırır ve Orta Asya kökenli yani etnik Türk olmadığını öğrenir. Test sonuçları Anton’un atalarının binlerce yıldır Küçük Asya’da yaşadığını gösterir.
​
İlgisini çeken bir gelenek onu kimlik arayışına yönlendirir. Kapadokya Rumlarının kaşıkla oynadıkları halkoyunlarının neredeyse benzerini ailesindeki büyüklerin de oynuyor olması, hayvan derilerinden ‘def’ yapıp müzikler çalınması ve diğer kimi geleneksel motiflerden yola çıkarak soyunu araştırmaya yönelir.
Babaannesinin ağabeyinin (Pehlivan Çakıcı İzzet/ İzmit) Rumca/Helence konuştuğunu öğrenir.
​
Bu konuda yazılmış bir çok eseri, kitap, makale vb. okuyan Anton her şeyden önemlisi yüz yıl önce bu topraklarda yaşanmış acıları fark eder.  Benzer acıları yaşayan Ermeni, Süryani ve Rum/Helenlerle tanışır, sohbet eder, bilgi alış verişinde bulunur.

Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, has published its analyses of the situation in the Western Balkans in 2017 and in the first quarter of 2018.

The annual analysis points to a 92 per cent drop in the number of illegal border-crossings by migrants from outside of the Western Balkans region to roughly 19,000 from more than 260,000 in 2016. 

According to Frontex Western Balkans Q1 report, in the first three months of this year the number of illegal border-crossings by non-regional migrants fell 10 per cent compared to the same quarter of last year, as well as in the last quarter of 2017. 

The continued pressure along the Greece-Albania-Montenegro-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia sub-route remains indicative of migrants trying to bypass existing security measures along the main route via Serbia.

2017 Figures 

In all of 2017, the six Western Balkan countries reported 631 cases of document fraud, the second highest number since data collection began in 2009.

As in previous years, non-regional migrants continued to attempt to enter the Western Balkans across the southern common borders with Greece and Bulgaria before heading north and trying to exit the region largely at the northern common borders of Hungary, Croatia or Romania with Serbia.

Afghan and Pakistani were the two main reported nationalities, accounting for roughly 32% and 30%, respectively, of the overall number of detections involving non-regional migrants. Syrians ranked third in 2017 accounting for 8% of the total.

The largest number of illegal border-crossings of regional migrants occurred at the common land borders between Greece, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM]. 

Cooperation between law enforcement authorities and enhanced border control measures were key to reducing migration pressure in the region. 

Firearms and drugs smuggling

Cannabis, mostly grown in the region and trafficked internally or to the EU, was the main smuggled narcotic substance in the region last year. More than 23 tonnes were detected by Albania, Montenegro Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. There were also 209 detections of smuggled firearms and ammunition. Most of them were detected in Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Last year, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] dismantled two organised migrant-smuggling groups arranging the transportation of migrants from Greece towards Serbia and onwards.

Read the Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis report.

Read the Western Balkans Q1 report.

Source: Frontex

Source: Ekathimerini English

Washington – The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action today targeting Turkey’s Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gul and Minister of Interior Suleyman Soylu, both of whom played leading roles in the organizations responsible for the arrest and detention of Pastor Andrew Brunson.  These officials serve as leaders of Turkish government organizations responsible for implementing Turkey’s serious human rights abuses, and are being targeted pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” which builds upon Treasury’s Global Magnitsky Act authorities. 

“Pastor Brunson’s unjust detention and continued prosecution by Turkish officials is simply unacceptable,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.  “President Trump has made it abundantly clear that the United States expects Turkey to release him immediately.”

Pastor Andrew Brunson has reportedly been a victim of unfair and unjust detention by the Government of Turkey.  He was arrested in Izmir, Turkey in October 2016, and with an absence of evidence to support the charges, he was accused of aiding armed terrorist organizations and obtaining confidential government information for political and military espionage.  

As the head of Turkey’s Ministry of Justice, Abdulhamit Gul is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 for being the leader of an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse. 

As head of Turkey’s Ministry of Interior, Suleyman Soylu is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 for being the leader of an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse.

As a result of these actions, any property, or interest in property, of both Turkey’s Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gul and Turkey’s Minister of Interior Suleyman Soylu within U.S. jurisdiction is blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.

Identifying information on the individuals designated today.

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury

The Turkish foreign ministry is warning foreign diplomats in the Republic of Cyprus not to overstep their authority, following comments by Israeli and Egyptian ambassadors in Nicosia during a diaspora conference last week.

On Monday, Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hami Aksoy accused the Republic of Cyprus of “disregarding the inalienable rights of Turkish Cypriots on natural resources.”

The statement came one week following remarks by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, who took to social media to say that Turkish Cypriots would not accept anything less than political equality in Cyprus.

“Greek Cypriots must stop acting like the sole owners of Cyprus. The fact that both sides on the island are politically equal will never change,” Cavusoglu wrote on Twitter.

But Aksoy’s statement went further, pointing fingers at comments made by foreign ambassadors in Nicosia, who spoke during an international conference of Greek Cypriot Diaspora last week.

“The remarks made by some Ambassadors during a recent conference in the Greek Cypriot Administration, in support of the unilateral hydrocarbon-related activities being conducted by the Greek Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean, are unwarranted,” he said.

Aksoy did not name the diplomats in his statement, except to say that his country would “recommend to the representatives of the relevant countries that they do not exceed their authority.”

According to Turkish media, the statement was a direct reference to the Israeli, Egyptian, and US ambassadors in Nicosia, who attended the Diaspora conference between July 25 and 27.

The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, addressed the conference where foreign ambassadors also took part in a round table discussion, offering their remarks on natural gas exploration in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Ambassadors in their own words

Israeli ambassador to Nicosia Sammy Ravel, according to CNA News Agency, told the audience that he “hoped military force would not be necessary against Turkish provocations.”

Egyptian ambassador Mai Taha Mohammed Khalil also spoke on the issue, saying “we hope we don’t reach the point where we will have to use the military in the area,” while adding “we will provide any possible assistance to Cyprus.”

US Ambassador Kathleen Doherty also reiterated the US position on natural gas exploratory drilling and the rights of the Republic of Cyprus, saying that the former US secretary of state had gone to Ankara and told his counterpart that “Turkey’s behaviour was unacceptable.”

Greek Ambassador Elias Fotopoulos also spoke in the conference, saying his country remained hopeful for a positive outcome in a possible new round of peace talks on Cyprus, “as long as Turkey shows the necessary will and the international community continues to support the process.”

Ankara recently upped the ante on rhetoric regarding a possible settlement in Cyprus, reiterating its position on political equality between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and insisting that no international agreements on Cypriot natural gas reserves could be signed without overall agreement between the two sides.

​Source: Kathimerini Cyprus

The National Federation of Cypriots in the UK and the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Cyprus held its annual Parliamentary Reception for Cyprus on Tuesday 10 July to mark the 44th anniversary of the illegal Turkish invasion and occupation of July 1974. During the event titled, ‘Cyprus: Prospects for a Solution’ the Government Spokesperson of the Republic of Cyprus, Prodromos Prodromou, updated a full house of Parliamentarians and members of the UK Cypriot community about the latest developments on the Cyprus issue.

Mr Prodromou outlined the latest developments on the Cyprus issue, including the appointment of Jane Holl Lute as the UN’s new special envoy on Cyprus. Mr Prodromou also conveyed President Anastasiades’ readiness to resume talks to reunify Cyprus from where the negotiations left off and based upon the framework set out by the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres. He also emphasised the need for thorough preparation for any talks in order to ensure they would lead to a solution of the Cyprus issue. Mr Prodromou called for respect in the negotiations process so that “a just and viable solution could be found that wouldn’t leave either side feeling like winners or losers but would instead address the concerns of both communities.”

In closing, the Cypriot Government Spokesperson paid tribute to the work of the APPG for Cyprus and National Federation of Cypriots in the UK, for strengthening the ties between Cyprus and the UK and for keeping the Cyprus issue on the agenda in Parliament. He also commented that the two countries would continue to have excellent relations even after Britain leaves the European Union.

Federation President, Christos Karaolis, welcomed guests to the event and spoke of the UK Cypriot community’s hope and determination to see a reunited Cyprus free from the outdated system of guarantees and without the presence of foreign troops. He said, “what we’re asking for is both fair and simple. A fully functioning state that is in line with the rule of law and is free from foreign interference. Put simply a “normal state” as the UN Secretary General said.”

Mr Karaolis also said that “the UK Cypriot community is clear in its demands that Turkey’s unacceptable demands [in the negotiations] and influence in Cyprus must end.” He referred to the Federation’s recent email campaign where MPs from Aberdeen to Exeter were contacted by constituents concerned about Turkey’s negative influence in Cyprus. Mr Karaolis emphasised that UK Cypriots would continue to have their legitimate concerns heard and would continue to campaign for a free, united Cyprus.

The High Commissioner for the Republic of Cyprus to the UK, Euripides Evriviades, addressed the event, thanked everyone for attending and expressed deep gratitude to the APPG for Cyprus for being “all-weather friends of Cyprus”. He also commented on the major contribution that the UK Cypriot community has made in the UK.

​Sir Roger Gale MP, who had earlier been re-elected Chair of the APPG for Cyprus, welcomed the guests to the event and emphasised that MPs were united across party lines in favour of the reunification of Cyprus. He said that he has spent the best part of his political career “trying to release Cyprus from occupation and to return the island to its rightful owners.” Sir Roger concluded by saying that “we shan’t give up until we achieve that”.

Speaking on behalf of the UK Government, Foreign Office Minister for the Commonwealth & UN, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, expressed gratitude to the High Commission for Cyprus to the UK, the National Federation of Cypriots in the UK and the APPG for Cyprus for their work in strengthening the ties between the two countries.

The Minister said that “the ultimate objective is to achieve a solution in line with the High-Level Agreements”. Lord Ahmad also stressed the importance of the Commonwealth to both the UK and Cyprus and said that both are working towards making it more secure and prosperous.

Fabian Hamilton MP, Shadow Minister for Peace and Disarmament, spoke on behalf of Her Majesty’s Opposition and reiterated the Labour Party’s steadfast commitment to the reunification of Cyprus commenting that, “security for Cyprus must be through the EU and not through old-fashioned guarantee systems nor by foreign troops nor by Turkey”.

The Rt Hon. Theresa Villiers, MP for Chipping Barnet, said that “it’s a tragedy that 44 years after the invasion, Cyprus remains divided” and that she “fights for a free, united Cyprus every day” by asking questions in the House of Commons and raising important issues with the UK Government such as the need to end the “outdated system of guarantees”. Ms Villiers reaffirmed her support for the abolition of the Treaty of Guarantee and foreign country intervention rights, as well as for the Republic of Cyprus’ right to explore and exploit natural resources in its EEZ.

The next MP to speak was Rt Hon. Joan Ryan, MP for Enfield North. Ms Ryan expressed her deep concerns that, under President Erdogan, Turkey is “sliding towards an authoritative regime” and that would have worrying consequences for Cyprus and the wider region. Ms Ryan also paid tribute to the UK Cypriot community and particularly their “important voluntary work”.

Bambos Charalambous MP for Enfield Southgate, and the only MP of Cypriot origin, highlighted the importance of resolving the tragic humanitarian issue of the missing persons. Mr Charalambous expressed his delight that the Federation was making its presence felt through its email campaigns which he said have “bombarded him with emails from constituents about Cyprus”. He also referred to questions he asked in Parliament about the Cyprus issue, torture by British soldiers in Cyprus in the 1950s, and Turkey’s aggression in Cyprus’ EEZ.

Catherine West, MP for Hornsey & Wood Green, said that “we must all work towards a bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal Cyprus”. Ms West also said she “supports peace, human rights and justice” and that she hoped to see the resumption of reunification talks very soon.

Mike Freer, MP for Finchley & Golders Green, said that “44 years after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, it’s important to remember that while time has passed, the issues haven’t gone away. We still have people dispossessed from their land and their homes, families with missing relatives, and an island still divided… we continue to strive for a just solution for Cyprus and a reunited island.”

Stephen Gethins MP, SNP Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, paid tribute to the contribution that the UK Cypriot community has made in the UK. He also said that he looked forward to seeing a reunified Cyprus in the future and hoped to work closely with the community in the future.

Lord Collins, Shadow Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, said that the event left him with “a sense of hope that we will achieve the justice and independence that we’ve so badly needed over the last 44 years”.

Roger Godsiff MP said that he “really hopes to see a solution to the Cyprus issue sooner rather than later” and also that he hopes that Cypriots continue to demand and campaign for a reunified island.

Other MPs in attendance were Khalid Mahmood (Shadow Minister for Europe) and John Penrose (MP for Weston-super-Mare).

Other distinguished guests in attendance included members of the Cyprus High Commission; Andreas Papaevripides, President of POMAK (the World Federation of Overseas Cypriots); Harry Charalambous, President of NEPOMAK UK (the youth branch of POMAK); members of the National Federation of Cypriots’ Executive Committee and Secretariat; and representatives from Cypriot communities in Birmingham, Cardiff, Manchester, and Leeds.

Source: National Federation of Cypriots in the UK

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has announced the new ministers of his cabinet as Turkey officially switched to an executive presidency.

Erdoğan appointed Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar as the new defense minister and his son-in-law Berat Albayrak as the Treasury and Finance Minister in a 16-seat surprise cabinet with not much known bureaucratic figures, hours after he was sworn into office on July 9.

Erdoğan’s vice president is Fuat Oktay, former undersecretary of the office of the prime minister, who is regarded as one of the architects of the bureaucratic and administrative transformation after the governmental system has been shifted into presidency through last year’s referendum.

Erdoğan opted to continue with current Justice Minister Abdülhamit Gül, Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in the new cabinet.

These figures, along with Berat Albayrak, who will serve as the Treasury and Finance Minister, will have to resign from the Parliament to join the cabinet.

President’s choice as the Trade Minister Ruhsar Pekcan, a businesswoman who has been serving at Turkey’s largest trade chamber as the deputy head for the woman entrepreunership and at Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK).

Mustafa Varank, one of closest aides of Erdoğan, will serve as the Industry and Development Minister in the new cabinet.

Undersecretary of the Energy Ministry Fatih Dönmez is appointed as the Energy Minister while Cahit Turan, former head of the Directorate of Highways, will serve as the Transportation and Infrastructure Minister.

Education Minister Ziya Selçuk has long served at the Education Ministry but he is well-known as the owner of a private college in Turkey.

Full list of ministers

Erdoğan took his oath in parliament on July 9 after being elected as the country’s president in the June 24 elections, in which he garnered 52 percent of the votes.

After his swearing-in, the system change — stipulated by the constitutional amendment which was approved by last year's referendum — has gone into full effect.

Following an official inauguration ceremony at the presidential complex in Ankara on July 9, Erdoğan announced the full list of minister with a press conference as follows:

Vice President:
Fuat Oktay

Justice Minister: 
Abdülhamit Gül 

Foreign Minister:
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu

Interior Minister:
Süleyman Soylu

Defence Minister:
Hulusi Akar

Treasury and Finance Minister:
Berat Albayrak

Energy and Natural Resources Minister:
Fatih Dönmez

Industry and Development Minister:
Mustafa Varank

Commerce Minister:
Ruhsar Pekcan

Environment and Urban Minister:
Murat Kurum

National Education Minister:
Ziya Selçuk

Health Minister:
Fahrettin Koca

Transport and Infrastructure Minister:
Cahit Turan

Culture and Tourism Minister:
Mehmet Ersoy

Labor, Social Services and Family Minister:
Zehra Zümrüt Selçuk

Agriculture and Forest Minister:
Bekir Pakdemirli

Youth and Sports Minister:
Mehmet Muharrem Kasapoğlu

The ministers took their oaths on July 10, 2018.

The announcement came hours after Erdoğan issued the first presidential decree through which the new ministries were formed and presidential organizations were set under his authority.

Under the new government system of Turkey, the president is both the head of state and government, with the prime minister’s post abolished.

Turkish ministers will be reporting to the president, no longer to parliament as it was in the old system.

Bureaucratic cadres will be appointed after the new ministers take office.

Beside ministries, there will be a number of offices that will work under the president and will implement the presidency’s projects in the new system.

A total of 65 existing boards, commissions and committees established with laws and other regulations are merged under nine entities, namely Social Policies Council, Law Policies, Security and Foreign Policies, Local Governments, Health and Food, Economy, Education and Science/Technology/Innovation.

The president will chair the boards, but there will be an acting chair for each of them. The boards will propose policies, oversee the implementation of the policies and take macro decisions that are beyond the responsibilities of the ministers.

The eight directorates will include the Directorate of General Staff, Directorate of National Intelligence, and Directorate of Religious Affairs. The Directorate of Strategy and Budgeting will be launched for the first time. It will be in charge of preparing the budget and will be overseen by the president. The Directorate of Communication will organize all media and communication activities.

Source: Hürriyet Daily News

Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras on Wednesday hailed the “new dynamic” that has developed in the Balkans in the last year that will enhance the regions’s prospects. 

​Speaking at the fourth Quadrilateral Summit in Thessaloniki between the leaders of Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia, Tsipras said the positive outlook has been boosted by the recent name deal with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and the European Union’s decisions to start accession talks with Serbia and Montenegro – and with Albania and FYROM next year. 

He also expressed his support for the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania in the Schengen Treaty. 

In a parallel meeting, the infrastructure ministers of the four countries discussed ways to expedite infrastructure and energy projects in the region – namely rail links between Thessaloniki, Kavala, Alexandroupoli and Burgas, as well as the one connecting Thessaloniki, Skopje and Belgrade. 

The IGB gas pipeline which will connect Greece and Bulgaria was also discussed, as well as the prospects of upgrading ports in northern Greece and the Black Sea. 

Tsipras said this wide range of links will upgrade the significance of the western Balkans. 

The Thessaloniki meeting is seen as an effort to coordinate the four countries’ positions on a number of key issues ahead of a meeting of the leaders of China and the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans in Sofia on Saturday and the Western Balkans Summit of the Berlin Process, which will be held in London next week. 

During the summit at the Hyatt Hotel in Thessaloniki, there was a protest march by people that oppose the name deal between Greece and FYROM.

​Source: Ekathimerini

DBRS Ratings Limited (DBRS) upgraded the Hellenic Republic’s Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency – Issuer Ratings from B to B (high) and maintained the Positive trend. DBRS confirmed the Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency – Issuer Ratings at R-4 with a Stable trend.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

DBRS views the Eurogroup statement with respect to the Hellenic Republic published on the 22nd June 2018 as warranting an extraordinary review of the sovereign rating. The subsequent upgrade is underpinned by new medium-term debt relief measures and clarification on the size of the liquidity backstop included therein. DBRS views the debt relief as being supportive of public debt repayment capacity in the medium term. Following completion of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Third Economic Adjustment Programme in August the liquidity backstop provides a precautionary funding buffer while Greece returns to bond issuance; and a portion of it is planned to be used to amortise debt.

The expected unprecedented activation of the European Commission’s (EC) quarterly reporting under the “Enhanced Surveillance” mechanism, in Greece’s case, linking additional beneficial financial measures to post programme policy commitments, is another positive rating factor. This should provide an additional incentive to encourage Greece to stay on course with structural reforms, thereby supporting economic growth. Improvements in the ‘Debt and Liquidity’ building block of our methodology underpin the upgrade.

The Positive trend reflects the likelihood that Greece will continue on its reform path under the enhanced surveillance mechanism and gradually return to market funding. The benefits of euro zone membership as demonstrated by EU institutional support to Greece since 2010, as well as marked progress with fiscal adjustment and structural reforms are credit strengths. Challenges include the still very high level of public debt and still weak banks’ asset quality.

RATING DRIVERS

Triggers for an upgrade include: (1) continued implementation of fiscal and structural reforms to support future economic growth; (2) compliance with post-programme monitoring; and (3) greater bond market access.

By contrast, a return to a Stable trend could stem from: (1) a reversal or stalling in structural reforms; (2) material fiscal slippage (3) renewed financial-sector instability.

RATING RATIONALE

Debt Sustainability is Partially Addressed with Official Sector Debt Relief

New measures announced by the Eurogroup include a further deferral of EFSF interest and amortizations by 10 years and an extension of the weighted average maturity by 10 years. In addition, and conditional on compliance with policy commitments and monitoring, the abolition of the step-up interest rate margin related to the debt buy-back tranche of the second Greek programme was outlined. As was the use of 2014 Security Markets Programme (SMP) profits from the ESM segregated account and the restoration of the transfer of ANFA and SMP income equivalent amounts – if conditions are met to be disbursed in equal portions on a semi-annual basis in December and June from 2018 to June 2022.

The new debt measures improve the EC’s projections of debt and gross financing needs (GFN) (% of GDP) under a baseline and adverse scenario. In the baseline scenario, from 188.6% in 2018 the debt ratio declines to 96.8% in 2060 compared with 127% prior to the measures. Moreover, the measures extend the time period the GFN remains below the 15% benchmark. The GFN ratio lies below the 20% longer term benchmark throughout the forecast period with the new measures. A cash buffer of €24bn accounting for almost two years of Greece’s debt repayment needs provides a key backstop. This allows time for Greece to demonstrate continuation of policies that are supportive to growth raising confidence in the government’s ability to stay on track. €5.5bn of the final programme tranche of €15bn is set-aside for amortization.

Completion of the Fourth and Final Review to Increase Confidence, Supporting Additional Improvement in the Banks

Economic confidence is supported by the successful conclusion of the fourth and final review, as has been the case with past review completions. After a prolonged period of recession, the Greek economy moved to expansionary territory in 2017, with real GDP increasing by 1.4%. The main drivers were goods and services exports and investment, while consumption and goods and services imports had a negative impact on growth. The growth rate was below the 1.8% estimated by the government in the 2018 budget, however, it is the strongest growth Greece recorded in its decade-long crisis.

The 2.3% growth in the first quarter of this year, due to stronger growth in exports of goods and services, suggests that the gradual recovery is strengthening. According to the European Commission, real GDP is expected to reach 1.9% this year with private consumption and investment being the main contributors, on the back of the significant improvement in the labour market and the business climate. On the back of the labour market reforms, employment has been growing and the unemployment rate has been falling amounting to 20.1% in March 2018, however, it remains the highest in the EU. DBRS considers that the continuation of the reform effort and safeguarding the reforms that have already been adopted, will support Greece’s ability to remain on a sustained growth path.

Greece’s banks’ profitability continues to improve helped by more positive economic developments. However, high levels of impaired assets prevail, with a non-performing exposure ratio of 43.1% at end-December 2017. This year, reduced reliance on the ECB’s Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) is reflected in the decline in the ceiling from €24.8bn in mid-December to €10.9bn according to most recent data. This demonstrates banks’ improved liquidity including access to wholesale markets. Also, deposits placed by the private sector increased at an annual rate of 7.4% in May. Capital controls introduced in June 2015 have been eased; credit to the domestic private sector is stabilising. The waiver related to the use of Greek bonds as collateral for financing operations with the ECB is to be reviewed by the end of the programme in August, but estimates suggest that if it is withdrawn, banks should fill the gap with repatriating deposits, secured interbank funding, or if necessary, with more expensive ELA. It is possible that the enhanced surveillance to be put in place will support a decision on the continuation of the waiver.

Stronger GDP Boosts Employment Growth to Help Achieve Primary Fiscal Surplus

Greece has managed to restore its fiscal sustainability. Since 2010, it went through an unprecedented fiscal adjustment, with the cumulative improvement in the primary balance exceeding 16 percentage points in 2017. For a second consecutive year Greece delivered a primary surplus of 4.2% well above the 1.75% target set by the programme. The target for the primary surplus is set at 3.5% a year in 2019-2022. DBRS considers that the fiscal reforms undertaken under the adjustment programmes have restored Greece’s fiscal sustainability, however its durability is contingent on the sustained economy recovery.

Since the Crisis the External Imbalances Have Receded Substantially

Greece’s current account deficit has been on an improving trend, falling by almost 12 percentage points since 2009. The current account deficit in 2017 was 0.8% of GDP compared with a deficit high of 12.3% of GDP in 2009. In 2018, the current account is expected to be around the 2017 levels, supported by the strong performance of exports of goods and services. Greece’s exports of goods have increased by 58% since 2009 in nominal terms. The strong services balance also contributed, increasing to a surplus of 9.8% of GDP in 2017 from a surplus of 4.8% of GDP in 2009. This is mainly attributed to the improvement in the travel balance, with tourist revenues increasing by 10.8% in 2017 due to an increase in the number of inbound visitors and a rise in the expenditure per trip. Foreign arrivals increased by 9.7% in 2017 and are expected to grow even more strongly in 2018 mainly driven by increased air connectivity and the extension of the tourist season.

From a stock perspective, Greece’s negative net international investment position (NIIP) remains high at 141.4% of GDP at end-2017 up from 88.8% in 2011, mostly reflecting public sector external debt. It is expected to remain at high levels because of the long-term horizon of foreign official-sector loans to the public sector. A current account close to balance, if sustained, should prevent a material deterioration in the external borrowing position.

DBRS Currently Sees a Durable Commitment to Reforms

Greece’s political landscape changed drastically during the crisis years, resulting in five national elections, eight prime ministers and four coalition governments. The SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government elected in September 2015, despite the slim parliamentary majority, is the longest-serving since the onset of the debt crisis in 2009. However, the legislation of a number of unpopular measures had a negative impact on popular support for SYRIZA. The latest opinion polls show that the center-right, New Democracy is leading by almost 10 percentage points. DBRS believes, that the increased political stability observed over the last two years is likely to be maintained after the end of the current adjustment programme and we do not expect any policy reversals under a potential New Democracy-led government.

RATING COMMITTEE SUMMARY

The DBRS Sovereign Scorecard generates a result in the BB (high) – BB (low) range. Additional considerations factored into the Rating Committee decision include the high debt stock and the political challenge of remaining on track with the fiscal and reform agenda. The main points discussed during the Rating Committee include the impact of the 22 June Eurogroup statement on debt relief and the cash buffer, as well as recent economic and financial trends.

KEY INDICATORS

​Fiscal Balance (% GDP): 0.8 (2017); 0.8 (2018F); 0.9 (2019F)
Gross Debt (% GDP): 178.6 (2017); 179.5 (2018F); 177.9 (2019F)
Nominal GDP (EUR billions): 177.2 (2017); 184.8 (2018F); 192.4 (2019F)
GDP per Capita (EUR): 16,641 (2017); 17,307 (2018F); 18,120 (2019F)
Real GDP growth (%): 1.4 (2017); 1.9 (2018F); 2.3 (2019F)
Consumer Price Inflation (%): 1.1 (2017); 0.7 (2018F); 1.1 (2019F)
Domestic Credit (% GDP): 132.0 (Sep-2017)
Current Account (% GDP): -1.1 (2017); -0.8 (2018F); -0.6 (2019F)
International Investment Position (% GDP): -139.5 (2016); -141.4 (2017)
Gross External Debt (% GDP): 248.2 (2016); 228.6 (2017)
Governance Indicator (percentile rank): 62.5 (2016)
Human Development Index: 0.87 (2015)

Notes:
All figures are in Euros unless otherwise noted. Public finance statistics reported on a general government basis unless specified. Governance indicator represents an average percentile rank (0-100) from Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability and Government Effectiveness indicators (all World Bank). Human Development Index (UNDP) ranges from 0-1, with 1 representing a very high level of human development.

The principal applicable methodology is Rating Sovereign Governments, which can be found on the DBRS website www.dbrs.com here. The principal applicable rating policies are Commercial Paper and Short-Term Debt, and Short-Term and Long-Term Rating Relationships, which can be found on our website here.

The sources of information used for this rating include the IMF, World Bank, UNDP, Haver Analytics, Bank of Greece, PDMA, Greek Ministry of Finance, Eurostat, ECB, European Council: Consilium Europa, European Commission. DBRS considers the information available to it for the purposes of providing this rating to be of satisfactory quality.

Source: DBRS

If you were to deconstruct Washington, all you’d be left with was a think tank, a lobby and a hotel. The crossroads of K and 15th now has all three components, as the newest member of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s lobby, the “Macedonia Political Action Committee” (MACPAC), just opened next to the almighty Atlantic Council and across the street from the Architect Hotel.

MACPAC does not boast lofty offices, but is tucked away behind hundreds of small boxes lining the wall of a well-known express delivery firm. It is a common practice of many new businesses, but also of shady organizations like MACPAC, to use PO boxes for their international correspondence. But what makes MACPAC stand out is not its location, but its founder, a woman by the name of Louette Ragusa.

Ragusa did not appear to be in any way associated with the Skopje lobby until recently. She is better known as the operations director of the Turkish Coalition of America (TCA) and her office is just a 5-minute walk from MACPAC’s PO box. This suggests that MACPAC is not some formal yet negligible effort of the colorful yet active FYROM lobby, but is rather an initiative of the powerful Turkish lobby.

The TCA poses as an independent nonprofit organization of the Turkish-American diaspora, with revenues of nearly a million dollars a year and assets of more than $8 million. It employs a professional, full-time staff and has an active volunteer corps that donates thousands of dollars a year. Similar Greek diaspora groups are nowhere near the TCA in terms of organization, funding and strategy, with the exception of the Hellenic American Leadership Council – an oasis in the diaspora desert.

We do not know whether the TCA created MACPAC on its own initiative in order to further Skopje’s agenda or whether it was in communication with mother Turkey or the FYROM lobby. I believe that there was some level of coordination, but nevertheless, the main message behind the move is that the Turkish Americans are very well aware of the importance of backstage lobbying in the American political system.

The same cannot be said of the Greek Americans, unfortunately, as many of our leaders – and politicians – are more concerned with applause and lack the know-how to carry out the duties they chose to undertake.

Political action committees (PACs) like MACPAC are aimed at finding funding to support members of Congress and promote issues that concern specific social groups and interests. In the US, in contrast to Greece, there is significant transparency regarding the funding of parties and politicians.

According to the federal database, the TCA has created various PACs across American to promote the Turkish agenda and undermine Greek national issues like Cyprus and the Pontic* and Armenian genocides. The largest of the TCA’s PACs has spent nearly $2 million in the last decade working closely with more than 140 members of the House of Representatives who comprise the Turkish alliance in Congress – one of many informal congressional groups that come together to promote various issues.

The Greek alliance has about the same number of members, some of which are also funded by the Turkish community, but it doesn’t have the dynamism it deserves. Most diaspora groups have failed to rise to the occasion and expend their energies on initiatives that have zero impact in Washington.

Thus, the diaspora’s significant political and economic capital remains unused, wasted in the pursuit of self-promotion. The problem is that if the diaspora ever wants to support or create a PAC similar to its only professional grassroots organization, the Hellenic American Leadership Council, it will mean its members having to dig into their pockets without enjoying any applause.

There is no glamour in that, however, as the real work that needs to be done is hard, systematic and comes at a personal cost, with the only reward being the satisfaction of serving the greater good.

In most cases, the real work is done in silence, away from the cameras and the lights, unacknowledged on Facebook and Twitter, hidden away in the most unlikely places – even PO boxes. Unfortunately, these boxes appear too small and dark for our great leaders.

About Nikolas Katsimpras:
Nikolas Katsimbras is a lecturer at Columbia University's Negotiation and Conflict Resolution program and an assistant adjunct professor at the Dispute Resolution program at City University of New York. He is also a consultant on strategic planning and analysis for conflict management and a former officer of the Hellenic Navy.

--
Note by the Macedonian League:
* The Macedonian League recognizes the genocide of the Greeks in Asia Minor as the "Greek Genocide"

After more than two days of vehement debate in Parliament, the government on Saturday survived a no-confidence vote brought against it by the main opposition New Democracy party, but with one less MP.

​The motion garnered 127 votes with 153 against. The junior coalition partner Independent Greeks (ANEL) backed the government despite its opposition to the name deal with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) that Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras announced last week, bar one MP, Dimitris Kammenos, who backed the motion. He was subsequently expelled from the party, reducing the government’s majority to 153.

Before the vote, protesters gathered for the second day in a row outside the House to oppose the deal and riot police fired tear gas at one point to disperse demonstrators.

There was tension inside Parliament too, notably when Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias submitted declassified ministry documents in a bid to compare the government’s negotiating tactics on the name issue to that of previous administrations.

Addressing Parliament, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras slammed the opposition for bringing the motion of no confidence, remarking that “future historians will struggle to comprehend why, at such a positive moment for the country, ND chose to try and topple the government.”

ND leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis declared that “a vote against the motion of no confidence is a vote in favor of the Tsipras-Zaev agreement tomorrow,” referring to FYROM’s premier, Zoran Zaev. “I want all Greeks to understand the theater of hypocrisy that has been staged.”

Tsipras’s coalition partner Panos Kammenos reiterated his party’s opposition to the FYROM name deal, saying that ANEL will oppose it, when it comes to Parliament, “not just with our vote” but by any means possible. He stressed, however, that he remains allied to Tsipras for his declared fight against corruption and to get the country out of the bailout era.

The leader of centrist To Potami, Stavros Theodorakis, pointed to the positive aspects of the deal. “Helping our country doesn’t mean supporting the SYRIZA-ANEL government,” he added. The leader of Movement for Change, Fofi Gennimata, in which Theodorakis is a partner, opposed the deal, saying she trusts the government with “nothing.”

Former conservative premier Antonis Samaras also weighed in, condemning the government for conceding too much to FYROM. In his speech to MPs, Samaras criticized the left-led administration for recognizing a Macedonian ethnicity and language, and warned that the deal will fuel “aggressive irredentism,” creating instability in the wider region. “Either the deal will not last or it will cause turmoil,” Samaras said. “I fought for the Macedonia issue, you gave it all away,” he said.

​Source: Kathimerini

At the final press conference, President Tusk presented the main results of the EU-Western Balkans summit and the Leaders' agenda dinner held in Sofia.

Good afternoon. Before anything else, let me thank Prime Minister Borissov and his whole team; you did something excellent and I am really impressed when it comes to your effectiveness, determination, and mainly because of your engagement we can say today that the summit was successful, and of course thank you for the wonderful Bulgarian hospitality. Blagodaria Boyko, blagodaria prelestna Bulgaria (thank you Boyko, thank you beautiful Bulgaria).

We have just concluded a very good and fruitful EU-Western Balkans summit. I believe that it took us too long since our last meeting in Thessaloniki fifteen years ago, and this is why we decided to meet again in two years in Croatia. This is the best illustration that the integration with the Western Balkans is a top priority for the EU.

Today we reaffirmed our mutual commitment to the European perspective for the whole region. As I said during my recent visit to the region, the European Union is and will remain the most reliable partner of the entire Western Balkans. 

And in very concrete terms we discussed how to improve connections with and within the Western Balkans region. We are speaking about human, economic, digital and infrastructure connections. The package of measures we signed a while ago - the so-called "Sofia Priority Agenda" - adds new initiatives to our current cooperation. For example, we agreed to double the Erasmus+ to allow more youth to study in the EU. We agreed to work towards the lowering of roaming charges and we agreed to create more favourable conditions for private investments by providing better bank guarantees.

And to avoid any confusion, let me be very clear: The connectivity agenda is neither an alternative nor a substitute for enlargement. It is a way to use the time between today and tomorrow more effectively than before, so that our citizens and businesses are not waiting for all the benefits of EU integration. Because I don’t see any other future for the Western Balkans than the EU. There is no other alternative, there is no plan B. The Western Balkans are an integral part of Europe and they belong to our community.

Before concluding let me very briefly comment on EU leaders’ meeting yesterday evening.

We agreed that the EU will step up its efforts on digital and innovation in order to rise to the challenge of technological revolution. You should expect very concrete decisions when we formally meet in June. They will include elements like the establishment of a European Innovation Council in the next MFF, pilot projects including for Artificial Intelligence and more funds for investments. All this will be based on our European values, including full respect of citizens’ privacy, also online.

As to the Iran Nuclear Deal we agreed unanimously that the EU will stay in the agreement as long as Iran remains fully committed to it. Additionally the Commission was given a green light to be ready to act whenever European interest are affected. Finally on EU-US trade. Also here, we have achieved a united approach that will strengthen the Commission in its ongoing negotiations with the United States. The EU is even ready to talk about trade liberalisation with our American friends but only if the US decides an unlimited exemption from steel and aluminium tariffs. President Juncker will present our approach in more detail. Thank you.

Source: European Commission - Council of the European Union​

Agenda highlights

The EU-Western Balkans summit will take place in Sofia, Bulgaria, on 17 May 2018.

What are the summit's objectives?

The summit will aim to inject new energy in the EU-Western Balkans relationship. It will seek to:

• reaffirm the EU's commitment towards its Western Balkans partners and reiterate the region's belonging to the European family
• strengthen links between the EU and the Western Balkans in infrastructure, digital and human connectivity
• work more closely together to tackle common challenges, such as security, migration, geopolitical developments and good neighbourly relations

The summit will be centred on the theme of connectivity with a view to improve the links with the Western Balkans and within the region.
​

Who will attend the summit?

The EU-Western Balkans summit will bring together:

• heads of state or government from EU member states
• leaders from the 6 Western Balkans partners: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo*

The meeting will be hosted by Boyko Borissov, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, which currently holds the Presidency of the Council.

The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, will chair the meeting. He will represent the EU together with the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker.

The President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, the EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, will also attend the summit.
Representatives of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, the European investment Bank and the Regional Cooperation Council will also participate.

​President Tusk's visit the region ahead of the summit

From 24 to 27 April President Tusk travelled to Tirana, Podgorica, Belgrade, Pristina, Sarajevo and Skopje. He met with the leaders of each Western Balkans partner to prepare for the upcoming summit and to discuss bilateral relations with the EU. At the end of his tour in the region, President Tusk participated in the Brdo-Brijuni process summit in Skopje.
​

​Side events

President Tusk has invited EU leaders to an informal dinner ahead of the summit. This dinner is part of the Leader's Agenda and it will focus on digital Europe, research, and innovation. EU leaders are also expected to use this occasion to exchange views on the Iran nuclear deal and trade with the US. Boyko Borissov, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, will host the dinner at the Sofia Tech Park. A Leader's Agenda note was issued ahead of the dinner outlining the key issues that will be discussed.

The Bulgarian Presidency of the Council has also scheduled several side events around the summit. They will provide an opportunity to showcase the breadth of EU-Western Balkans relations beyond intergovernmental aspects.

On 16 May, the European Council on Foreign Relations and the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies are organising the conference 'In dialogue with the Western Balkans: creating a region of growth, security and connectivity on the path to Europe'.

Also on 16 May, the Bulgarian Forum for Business Leaders is organising the event 'Investment prospective: Western Balkans'. It will focus on economic potential of the Western Balkans as well as investment horizons in the region.

On 17 May, the World Economic Forum is co-hosting a strategic dialogue on the Western Balkans together with the Bulgarian presidency. The objective will be to advance private public partnerships to support investment in the region.

On 18 May, the Vienna Economic Forum will host the 'Sofia Talks 2018' focusing on regional economic cooperation.

On the same day, an event on the circular economy and clean technologies will be organised by the Bulgarian Ministry of Environment and Waters and Cleatech Bulgaria.

In addition, the European External Action Service (EEAS) launched the EU-Western Balkans cultural heritage route. Several initiatives and events will be organised to promote the rich cultural heritage of the Western Balkans, as part of the European year of cultural heritage.

Source: European Commission - Council of the European Union

First and foremost, I want to thank you for inviting me to such an important commemoration. This invitation carries symbolic meaning not only on an individual level; but the fact that a Turk was invited to speak to you here today conveys a meaningful message. With this invitation, the Swedish Parliament and my Armenian friends have made a clear statement: That the resolution of Armenian-Turkish tension can be achieved through human decency; that our place of birth and ethnicity are not central—rather, what counts most is our attitude toward facing the crimes committed in the past. Taking a stand defines who we are. Speaking out about historical crimes, especially genocide, is the responsibility of all humanity. This is not an issue for Armenians and Turks or Jews and Germans, alone.

​Therefore, I would like to offer my sincerest gratitude once again for offering me this distinguished podium and the opportunity to enumerate the historical crimes for which Ottoman-Muslims (Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Alevites, etc.) bear responsibility. The central issues that Turks must confront, is our inability or refusal to acknowledge the massacres and genocide carried out against Ottoman Christian citizens—the Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks. While mass violence is not unique to Turkey, it is a major feature of the turmoil that characterizes the Middle East.

It is difficult to determine the beginning- and end-dates for historical processes; however, between the 1878 Berlin Congress and the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Ottoman-Turkish lands experienced waves of earthquakes comprised of a series of massacres that constitute a genocidal process. The 1894-6 massacres of Armenians and Assyrians; the 1904 Sasun and 1908 Adana massacres of Armenians; the 1913-4 ethnic cleansing and massacres of Greeks; the 1915-18 genocide of Armenians and Assyrians; and the 1921-22 Pontus Genocide represent the most significant tremors of this earthquake.

The 45-year long (1878-1923) earthquake, which can be characterized as the Ottoman genocide of Christians, continued during the Republican era at various intervals. The Anti-Jewish pogroms in 1934 in Trace; the 1937-38 Dersim Genocide; the 1942 Wealth-Tax; the pogrom of 6-7 September 1955; the slaughter of intellectual youth during 1960, 71 and 80 military coups; and the never-ending suppressions of the Kurds, including their systematic torture and killings in the 1990s and 2015 represent some examples of this continuation.

If, today, Turkey struggles to establish a regime that respects human rights and continues to face significant hurdles in its democratization, it is due to the refusal to confront and face the crimes committed in the past. Moreover, the challenges are not limited to Turkey’s internal affairs, but also extend to the wider region. The military operations in Syria and the war with the Kurds are also manifestations of this inability to face the past.
​
This state of affairs raises a central question: Why must we face our history? Why must we memorialize and remember past crimes? Allow me to present five fundamental and interconnected reasons.

The first important reason why we should remember and commemorate past atrocities is because we have to remember the victims, pay our respects to their memory and re-humanize them. Dehumanization is essential to the perpetration of mass atrocities. The most effective way to inspire perpetrators to kill is to make their victims inhuman. This is how individuals overcome their normal human revulsion toward murder. Nazis classified the Jews as bacteria or microbe/germs; in Rwanda, the Hutus called the Tutsis cockroaches. The Ottoman Turkish rulers described Armenians as a tumor in the Turkish body that had to be excised. This term was used very often by the leaders of Teshkilati Mahsusa. By depriving the victim group of its humanity, perpetrators pave the way for mass-atrocities.

Commemoration is, if nothing else, an act of protest against this repulsive phenomenon. Re–humanizing the victims by honoring them and restoring their dignity is one of the most important steps in denouncing the perpetrator.

The second reason for remembrance is that it creates the foundations for co-existence. Communities that have experienced a painful past filled with violent acts, can only reconcile and live together peacefully if they “talk” about this common past with each other. Failing to do so, they will continue to regard each other with doubt and suspicion and ultimately get crushed under the burdens of the past. If Turks cannot engage in an honest reckoning of their crimes, enter into serious dialogue with Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians, and listen to the deeply painful histories of these communities, the victim groups will never feel any measure of trust for Turks. The only way for Turks to achieve peaceful coexistence at home, and with their neighbors, is for the Turkish government and its people (including Turks, Kurds, Alevites, Sunnis, etc.) to acknowledge historic wrongs honestly and to accept responsibility for their actions. Without genuinely confronting and accepting this painful history, a common future will never be constructed.

The third reason why we must face our history is as follows: We remember the past and commemorate mass atrocities because this is a basic prerequisite for a democratic society. In order to establish a democracy that respects human rights, it is essential to first confront human rights violations. Failure to do so, and impunity for past crimes, inhibit a nation’s commitment to respect present day human rights. How you view and regard your past will also determine how you construct your future.

In the late Ottoman period, all Christians living on Ottoman soil were stripped of citizenship and their most basic human rights were violated. The government viewed Christian demands for equality and justice as grave threats to national security. Kurds experience the same undemocratic abuses today. Their basic demands for freedom and justice are judged as threats to Turkish security and the government violently suppresses them. It should not, therefore, surprise us that those who, in the past, met the Christian populations’ demands with repeated violations of their human rights employ the same strategy toward Kurds and their demands today. Recognition of historic injustices is essential to establishing a democratic environment that values human rights.

The fourth important reason for remembering and honoring the past is to raise our voices to say, “Never again.” In order to avoid mass atrocities, we must remember! But remembering, alone, may not be enough to prevent the repetition of past injustices; however, it is an important pre-condition. Denying historic wrongs, leaves the door wide open for the potential risk of repeating the same crimes, the same mistakes over again. By denying massacres and crimes, Turkey sends the message that it would perpetrate the same crimes again, if threatened. For this reason, it is not an exaggeration to claim that Turkey represents a potential threat to the entire region.

The last important reason to commemorate past atrocities is to fight denial and overcome obstructions in the quest for truth and justice. This core principle is crucial, for it effectively demonstrates that acknowledging a historic crime is not limited to remembering an event of the past, but that it constitutes a prerequisite for the consolidation of peace, security and stability today.

Thus, the fight against denial is crucial and we should decide how best to fight it. There are two basic misunderstandings regarding genocide denial and, especially, Turkish denial. Firstly, denialism is often regarded as a mistaken but tolerable ideological attitude toward mass atrocities. The second misunderstanding is related to the first and assumes that confronting denial is about establishing a “moral” attitude towards a single crime that remains forgotten in the pages of history. Any connection with the present is effectively walled off.

Both of these misperceptions are a logical consequence of what I call temporal compartmentalization: Namely, the tendency to place the past and present into different boxes and to ignore their interconnectedness. It is enormously problematic to sever the ties between denial and contemporary political problems. Denial is not only about an ideological attitude towards the past and the demand for recognition of historical crimes is not confined to a moral conviction [or conduction Sunday Church services] regarding past events.

Denialism is a structure that cannot be simply relegated to past atrocities. The denialist structure produced and continues to carry out policies in the present day. In this regard, it would be appropriate and reasonable to compare Turkish denialism with the racist apartheid regime of South Africa. The system, mindset and institutions of apartheid were constructed upon racial differences; denial of the Armenian genocide has similar roots. It was manufactured upon the discrimination and exclusion of ethnic-religious minorities and considers the democratic demands of these groups a national security threat that has to be eliminated.

In the past, the emergence of the so-called “Armenian question” was the result of Armenian demands for equality and social reform, which arguably would have led to a better and stronger Ottoman society. Nevertheless, their demands and the Armenians themselves were considered a security threat, which caused them to become targets for massacres and genocide. Denying this truth constitutes the foundation of the Turkish concept of security, which is not only based on the denial of crimes but also on the perception that the promotion of basic democratic rights, such as equality under the law, social reform and freedom of speech threaten national security.

The irony is that denying genocide and criminalizing demands for a more democratic and just society because of national security are the real obstacles to democracy. The violent Turkish response to calls for human rights is counterproductive. In fact, they lead directly to real security problems. This “self-fulfilling prophecy” was a root cause of the Armenian genocide and it shapes the Kurdish problem today.

Instead of solving Kurdish problems by seeking solutions that would lead to a more democratic society, institutionalized denial resurrects the same security concept and declares that Kurdish demands are an essential security problem for the nation. This is the short story of the invasion of Syria by the Turkish Army.

The picture is very clear. By denying what happened in 1915, Turkey reproduces the institutions, social relations, and mindset that created the events of 1915 in the first place. Denial is not simply a defense of an old regime (Ottoman Empire). Denial also fuels the politics of continuing aggression, both inside and outside Turkey today.

It is not hard to show the strong interconnection between Turkey’s denial of the Armenian Genocide and Turkey’s domestic and regional policies today. Without addressing in detail the ongoing dark developments in Turkey today, particularly since the attempted coup of July 2016, allow me to express the current situation in numbers. Currently, more than 10 parliamentary representatives and around 150 journalists are incarcerated; approximately 4,000 academic intellectuals have been forced to step down from the university positions, and Kurdish cities have been destroyed and burned to the ground. According to a Freedom House Report in 2017, a total of 162 media companies have been closed down; these include 48 newspapers, 60 television and radio stations, 19 periodicals, 29 publishing houses and six press agencies.

In addition to these realities, Turkey is experiencing a mass exodus of its intellectual elite – perhaps the largest one in its history. More than 1,000 academics, journalists, and literary intellectuals have already fled to Europe. Turkey is galloping towards – if it has not already arrived at—a totalitarian regime. Turkish Government used the coup attempt as an excuse to crash the democratic opposition. And their primary argument in support of these policies is that the demand for more democracy and respect for human rights is a threat to its national security and must be crushed before it spreads.

Aggression towards Syria is another part of this Turkish national security policy. Perceiving Kurdish demands for a democratic structure in Syria or in Turkey as a national security treat, Turkey invaded Syria. Ziya Gökalp, one of the ideologues of the Young Turks and an architect of late Ottoman policies, described Ottoman aggression towards the East during the First World War through the analogy of the “Red Apple.”

The “Red Apple” exemplifies a belief that dates back to old Turkish lore and is meant to reflect Turkish sovereignty over the universe. When talking about battles and victory, Ottoman Turks would characterize their triumph as having reached the “Red Apple” and the “Red Apple” has come to symbolize the idea of pan-Turkism, the uniting of all Turkish peoples. Knowledge of this mythology is crucial to understanding the Armenian genocide. It is extremely revealing that Tayyip Erdoğan referenced this legendary symbol just before the 2018 Afrin operation in Syria. In a speech delivered on Jan. 22, Erdoğan answered the question “Where are we going?” with the response “Towards the Red Apple… yes, towards the Red Apple”.

All of these policies are conceptualized, decided, and implemented by the highest constitutional institution in Turkey: The National Security Council. In 2001, this supreme constitutional authority established a “Coordinating Committee for the Fight Against Baseless Claims of Genocide.” All of the important ministries, including the Armed Forces, are represented on this committee, which is chaired by the Vice Prime Minister. The sole mission of this institution is to fight those who demand recognition of mass-atrocities, including the Armenian Genocide, committed by successive Ottoman-Turkish governments in the past. It is not a coincidence that it is the same institution that considers the democratic demands of Kurds and other minorities and regional developments in Syria to be a national security threat.

The picture is clear. As long as Turkey continues to regard facing historic injustice with honesty and acknowledgment of wrongdoings as a national security threat and refuses to come to terms with its past for national security reasons, further security problems will ensue. Recognition of the Armenian genocide is not a thing of the past that can be forgotten when confronted with the seemingly more pressing issues of today. On the contrary, it is the key to solving contemporary security problems.

This brings me to my next point. There is a widely accepted opinion, which contends that while resisting denial and demanding the recognition of a historic crime might be a meaningful and amiable moral attitude, however, we must be realistic and prioritize the more crucial and compelling security and national interests of contemporary states. Accordingly, in situations where the recognition of an historic crime is in conflict with the national interests and security of today, it is meaningless and nonsensical to maintain the demand for recognition because the event in question has long passed. To insist on it, represents a fundamentalist moralist attitude.

The discussions within the West, and especially in the United States, regarding the 1915 genocide and relations with Turkey are generally conducted within this framework of realpolitik. According to this perspective, the “national security concerns” of the West (the U.S., Great Britain, France, Germany, etc.) in the Middle East are placed on one side, while the recognition of a 100-year-old genocide is placed on the other. And for this reason, instead of pressuring Turkey into changing its denialist policies towards 1915, for decades these countries have opted to support Turkey. Today, it is hard to find any member of the American Congress who contests the fact of the Armenian genocide. But this very same congress still—to this day—denies recognition of the Armenian genocide, solely because they pit “national interest” against “morality” as two mutually exclusive positions. This is plain wrong.

As I illustrated in the Turkish case, and as recent developments clearly demonstrate, there is a strong interconnection between security, democracy and facing history in the Middle East. Even a passing glance at the region makes it clear that historical injustices and the persistent denial of these injustices by one or another state or ethnic-religious group is a major stumbling block, not only for the democratization of the region, but also for the establishment of stable relations between different ethnic and religious groups. You cannot solve any problem in the Middle East today without addressing historic wrongs because history is not something in the past; in the Middle East, the past is the present.

Putting it another way, one of the main problems in the region is the insecurity felt by different groups and states towards each other as a result of events that have occurred in history. When persistent denial of these pain-filled acts is fundamental to your security policy, feelings of insecurity towards the other become inevitable. This is what we call the security dilemma: What one does to enhance one’s own security causes a reaction that, in the end, can make one even less secure. For this reason, any security concept, any policies of realpolitik in and for the region that obfuscates past atrocities and ignores addressing these historic wrongs is doomed to fail in the end.

We must cease this senseless distinction and compartmentalization between the recognition of 1915 and contemporary realpolitik. Until today, the West has either failed to recognize 1915 for reasons of “security” and “national interest” or, even in cases where it adopted some affectatious parliamentary decisions, continued to carry out policies that gave support and political cover to Turkey. If democracy, peace and security is the objective—the end-goal—of the policy of the West towards Middle East, this type of behavior must be terminated.

For it is this attitude and behavior of the West that emboldens Turkey to continue its denial of 1915 and encourages it to persist with its policies that threaten democracy, peace and security in the region today.

Let us not forget—denialism is not a problem exclusive to Turkey and its history. It is the collective and fundamental problem of Europe with regard to its future and regional peace and security. If we do not place the struggle to face our past and fight against denialism at the center of our politics, we fail not only today, but we also risk losing our future. There is no difference between fighting Turkish Denialism and fighting the South African Apartheid regime. Apartheid did not collapse from internal pressure alone. The support of the international community was also extremely important. I appeal to you from this podium today to end this detrimental compartmentalization between past and present and to grasp the severity and magnitude of Denialism’s impact.

A thorough and honest commemoration of a heinous crime perpetrated in the past cannot be accomplished in a Sunday church service. If we want to respect the dignity of victims; to establish justice, to create democracy, peace and stability in the region and to stop mass-atrocities in the future, we must fight denialism not only as an attitude towards a past crime but also as a crime against human dignity today…

Thank you for listening.

Source: Armenian Weekly

Turkey’s tendency to question Greek national sovereignty is the biggest problem facing Greece in its relations with its neighbor, a nationwide poll conducted by Public Issue on “Greece and the World 2018” showed this week.

According to the survey, 74 percent of respondents said challenging Greek sovereignty in the Aegean and over islands such as Kastelorizo, Fourni and the Dodecanese is the most important issue, while 16 percent believe it is Turkey's aggression and intransigence.

Asked where Greek-Turkish relations stand today compared to a year go, 81 percent said they have deteriorated, 16 percent said they are the same and just 2 percent believe they have improved.

Concerning the Greek government’s handling of bilateral relations with Turkey, 54 percent of the respondents said it was “probably wrong,” versus 37 percent who responded “probably correct.”

At the same time, 56 percent of participants said that the criticism levelled by the opposition against the government on its policy towards Turkey is “probably wrong,” while 32 percent it is “probably correct.”

The same survey found that 67 percent of respondents are “probably against” Turkey's accession to the European Union and 27 percent are “probably in favour.”

However, the vast majority said Greece should continue to engage in dialogue and negotiations with Turkey (70 pct) with only 28 percent being against talks.

Asked whether they believe a war with Turkey is probable in the years to come, 52 percent said it is “improbable,” and 44 percent it is “probable.”

The survey was conducted through telephone interviews between 16-23 April 2018 in a sample of 600 respondents.

Source: Ekathmerini; Poll conducted by: Public Issue

U.S.-Greece Relations

The United States appointed its first Consul to Greece in 1837, following Greece’s independence from the Ottoman Empire, and established diplomatic relations with Greece in 1868. After World War II, the United States contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to rebuild Greece’s buildings, agriculture, and industry as part of the Marshall Plan. Today, an estimated three million Americans resident in the United States claim Greek descent. This large, well-organized community cultivates close political and cultural ties with Greece.

Greece is an important partner of the United States on many policy priorities. As a leader in the region, Greece has been an ally to the U.S. in promoting Balkan stability and economic development, supporting Turkey’s bid for accession to the European Union, and supporting the diversification of Europe’s energy supplies. Greece’s geostrategic position also makes it an important ally in engagement and dialogue with the Muslim world. Greece is the primary entry point into the Schengen visa area for migrants from the Middle East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southwest Asia.

Greece occupies a strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean on the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The U.S.-Greece mutual defense cooperation agreement provides for the operation by the United States of a naval support facility at the deep-water port and airfield at Souda Bay in Crete. Greece contributes to NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, as well as to counterterrorism and counter-piracy maritime efforts.

U.S. Assistance to Greece

U.S. assistance fosters strong bilateral military-to-military relations and contributes toward the interoperability of Greek forces within NATO.

Bilateral Economic Relations

Greece is a member of the European Union and the Eurozone. The United States has expressed consistent strong support for Greece’s ongoing effort to restore fiscal stability, implement structural reforms, recover competitiveness and restart growth. There are no significant non-tariff barriers to U.S. exports. The top U.S. exports to Greece are defense articles, although. U.S. business activity is expected to grow in the tourism development, medical, construction, food processing, specialty agriculture and packaging and franchising sectors. U.S. companies are interested and involved in Greece's ambitious but slow-moving privatization efforts. Further deregulation of Greece's energy sector and the country's central location as a transportation hub for Europe may offer additional opportunities in electricity, gas, refinery, and related sectors. Greece participates in the Visa Waiver Program, which allows nationals of participating countries to travel to the United States for certain business or tourism purposes for stays of 90 days or less without obtaining a visa.

Greece's Membership in International Organizations

Greece and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Greece also is a permanent observer to the Organization of American States.

Source: U.S. Department of State