Macedonian League
  • Who We Are
  • Advocacy
  • Media Center
  • Resources
  • Take Action
  • Regional Locations
  • Contact

The 2020 Macedonian League Annual Assessment with National Security Advisor Marcus A. Templar

8/30/2020

0 Comments

 
In the 2020 Macedonian League Annual Assessment, we talk with Marcus A. Templar for an in-depth analysis of some of the most pressing questions from our audience including among others: the failings of the Greek political establishment; non-experts stoking flames of discord; and the less talked about factors of Skopje's future - the Albanian minority and Bulgaria.
Picture
1) You have always argued that the problem with Skopje is much more than the name issue of ancient Macedonian history, which the Greek side believes. Can you explain your stance?

My understanding of the issue was and is very different from most Greeks, politicians and diplomats.  The answer is complicated, so I will explain it in parts.

Know yourself and equally know your opponent

Sun Tzu was a Chinese general, military strategist, writer, and philosopher who lived in the Eastern Zhou period of ancient China.  He is the author of The Art of War, an influential work of military strategy that has affected both Western and East Asian philosophy and military thinking.

In his book The Art of War, Sun Tzu stated: He who knows the enemy and himself will never in a hundred battles be at risk; he who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes win and sometimes lose; he who knows neither the enemy nor himself will be at risk in every battle (Carr 2000, 80-1).  This applies to both hot war or diplomacy.  When people attend negotiations, they should understand how nations negotiate and what makes them click.  This means understanding what is significant, negligible, and the consequences of your own actions. It explains why I often ask, "would they negotiate their property as they have negotiated the national interests of Greece?"

Effective negotiation requires an excellent knowledge of yourself and your opponent.  It also requires intelligent maneuvering to deliver desired results.  This understanding should be precious to Greeks as it can help them use a better approach.  People do not know how to think, and it has nothing to do with IQ.  It has to do with their attitude based on their understanding of the issue.

Understanding Yugoslavia

At first, people must understand a few things about Yugoslavia and its peculiar system of Government.  They must also learn a few other facts that not one politician of Greece had fathomed.

Tito's Yugoslavia changed titles three times, starting on November 29, 1943, through the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ).  The new title of Yugoslavia was Democratic Federative Yugoslavia (Demokratska Federativna Jugóslavija).  It was a state which epitomized the last period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the first period of Marxist Yugoslavia.

On November 29, 1945, AVNOJ deposed King Peter II and proclaimed the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Federativna Narodna Republika Jugóslavija).  As of April 7, 1963, it became known as the Socialist Federative Republic [of] Yugoslavia (Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugóslavija).

The word Federative was always the principal.  It was so vital that Kardelj had argued that it should always hold the lead in the title of Yugoslavia.  Incidentally, the word federal in English is translated in Serbo-Croatian as federalni/federalna or even savezni/savezna (united).  It is erroneous for one to translate “Fedrativna Republika” as “Federal Republic.”

The federative power appears in John Locke's Second Treatise, Chapter XII as a branch of a government, not as a system of Government.  The chapter includes a discussion of the institutional arrangements of the commonwealth, which itself may take different primary forms.

In a true federation, the power emanates from the central Government to the federal units or autonomous territories of a republic.  The latter had equal rights with the republics, especially after the 1974 Constitution.  In the Yugoslav federative system, the power emanated from the republics to the central government, with the executive branch encroaching the rudder of the country.  It was the implementation of Locke's federative power with a slight twist.

Yugoslavia, from the day of its inception, was a Federative state, not a Federal one.  Federal defines the political setup of a state while Federative defines the manner the state operates and, of course, governs.  In a federative state, the people advise and direct the executive power which direction would take in domestic and mainly foreign policies.

Edvard Kardelj, the chief theoretician of Marxism, interpreted the Marxist theory on a slightly different basis from that of Lenin.  The politics of decentralization started at the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1952.  Among scholars, observers and participants, a consensus exists that the 1974 Constitution confirmed the confederal structure of the Yugoslav state.  Yugoslav politicians called it a 'cooperative federal system,' and its chief ideologist, Edvard Kardelj, qualified it already in 1971 as neither 'a classic federation … nor … a classic confederation, but... a socialist, self-managing community of nations' (in Ramet 1992).

This fédéralisme dénaturé, as a French observer put it (Drouet 1997), based at the federal level on the rule of consent and unanimity, was characterized by the ever-growing dependence of federal institutions on constitutive republics.  The center had to operate through the republics to 'implement virtually all policies, to gather revenues and to establish connections with the citizenry' that, as Valerie Bunce reminds us, amounts to quite a precise definition of confederalism (Bunce 1999).

In 1945, Kardelj viewed the federal units of Yugoslavia, i.e., republics as sovereign, except in matters which constitutionally were under the authority of the highest organs of the state (Jelić, Zagreb: Globus, 43 in Haug 2016, 89).   Yugoslavia was a kind of Commonwealth, like the relationship that the Province of Quebec in Canada had sought to have with the Confederation of Canada.

Kardlej, Djilas, Dimitrov, Dedijer (Serbian version), and Haug agreed that the Bled August 1, 1947 Agreement establishing a federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was not a final document, but only a draft.  Stalin thought that it was final, although Molotov knew the truth.  The point of disagreement was the nature of the federation between the two countries.  Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could not agree on the form of such a federation.  Yugoslavia wanted each of its republics to negotiate separately with Bulgaria, i.e., 6+1.  Bulgaria, on the other hand, was pushing for a federation with Yugoslavia, i.e., 1+1.  To that effect, both Dimitrov - 10 January 1945 (Banač 2003, 352) and Kardelj (Kardelj 1982, 106) fully collaborated.

To understand the function of the Government of AVNOJ Yugoslavia in domestic and foreign matters, it is important to sense how Kardelj interpreted Marxism.  After all, as the theoretician of Marxism, he was responsible for the development of the country.

In the second half of 1889, Lenin wrote an article to Rabochaya Gazeta (Рабочая Газета) or "Workers' Newspaper" in which he revealed the way that one should follow Marxism.  He wrote, "We do not regard Marx's theory as something completed and inviolable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the foundation stone of the science which socialists must develop in all directions if they wish to keep pace with life" (Vladimir Lenin, Collected Works, 1977, vol. 4, 211).

Along similar lines, the Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia declared that "Marxism is not a dogmatic system or established doctrine, but a theory of social process which develops through successive historical phases" (Program L.C.Y. 1959, 175 in Lapenna 1964, 1-2).

Ivo Lapenna was a law professor of International Law and International Relations at Zagreb University.  He had held a position jointly with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies.  Here is what Ivo Lapenna stated,
​
From Yugoslavia also came reproaches that the federal principle and the right of self-administration of the various nationalities is, in the Soviet Union, 'an empty slogan', while in Yugoslavia this principle is 'truly and consequentially being realised; that local Government does not exist in the Soviet Union, but does exist in Yugoslavia; that in that country the economic enterprises, unlike those of Yugoslavia, enjoy no independence; and that in the USSR the administrative organs are subjugated one to another in a vertical line from base to top, but not to their own representative organs, as in Yugoslavia, etc.

The Stalinist 'proletarian internationalism' is assessed as a simple instrument of the imperialist aspirations of the new Soviet caste, while the 'Stalinist' Constitution is considered to 'crown the Soviet bureaucratic system' (Kardelj), notwithstanding the fact that a short while before that same Constitution had been praised in Yugoslavia as the culmination of democracy, and had been imitated in the Yugoslav Constitution of 1946 (Lapenna 1964, 45 - Emphasis is mine).

Based on the above interpretation of Marxism, while Lenin deemed the peasantry to be the revolutionary frontline in pre-industrial societies rather than the proletariat, Kardelj felt that the economy should be in worker-controlled enterprises which would participate in a market system.  It was Kardelj's response to Marx's "Association of Free and Equal Producers" and opposite to Soviet statism and "state capitalism" within a controlled economy.

The Macedonia name dispute

Now, as to the main point of the question regarding the Macedonia dispute, Greek politicians of all political parties since 1950, tacitly aided and abetted the Yugoslav AVNOJ governments as well as the governments of Skopje and its influence over the central Government.  The central Government in Belgrade was very weak and became weaker every day.  In the case of Macedonia, Skopje held true power, not Belgrade.

I’ve read many books on the Macedonian Struggle.  Not one of these books refers to ancient Macedonian history as the reason for the strife over the region of Macedonia.

Remember, the VMRO was called "The Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization'' with Adrianople stipulating Thrace.  At that time, the Bulgarians of VMRO also wanted the whole of Thrace. Bulgaria's vision was to be a great empire, as it was under Tsar Samuil, while the rivers of Macedonia would guarantee trade, food, and communication.  The seaports of Alexandroupolis (then Dedeagatch), Kavala, and Thessaloniki would ensure military dominance over the southern Balkans and, of course, more food, more communication, and a window to the world.  The ultimate aim was Russian foreign policy dominance in the Balkans with control of the Orthodox faithful, through the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey.

The Prespes Agreement


With regard to today’s Prespes Agreement, several issues within the Agreement still need to be discussed and resolved between Greece and the Skopjan republic. Other parts of the Agreement expose Skopje’s bilateral issues toward Serbia, Albania, and Bulgaria, as well as Skopje's own population.  One thing the Agreement has achieved is to stop all kinds of ludicrous and baseless claims that the Greek part of Macedonia should be within the Skopjan state.  Other issues within the agreement will affect the relations between Greece on the one hand, and Serbia, Bulgaria, and Albania on the other.

The National Anthem of Skopje refers to Macedonia[sic], which covers all geographic Macedonia, including the Greek region. Since the name of the country has changed, the national anthem should also change.

In European law, nationality gives a nation the right to protect a person from other nations. Diplomatic and consular protection are dependent upon this relationship between the person and the state. The nationality law of Greece is based on the principle of jus sanguinis. Greek citizenship may be acquired by descent or through naturalization.  It means that a Greek national is a citizen of the European Union, and therefore entitled to the same rights as other EU citizens.

Skopje’s declaration of a "Macedonian" nationality on its passports is offensive to all ethnic groups in the country, except of course, the Macedonian Greeks.

The nationality statement on the passport could have remained out of travel documents altogether, like the passports of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) or they could have used the name of the country instead, like U.S. passports.

According to the nationality law of Skopje, citizenship is based primarily on the principle of jus sanguinis, that is, a child's citizenship is determined by that of his or her parents, irrespective of place of birth.

Consequently, the expressed ethnicity of the komitadjis constitutes a problem that implicates all Skopjian descendants.  It needs clarification - while Skopje says that the komitadjis were ethnic "Macedonians," in school we learned that the komitadjis were Bulgarians.  Penelope Delta was very conclusive about it.

Additionally, here is what A. A. Pallis states in his paper "The Greek Census of 1928"
​
The diminution in the number of Bulgars is due to the emigration to Bulgaria, under the Neuilly Emigration Convention of 1919.  Thus in Western Thrace there are practically no Bulgars left.  A small number still remain in Macedonia, in the westernmost part of that province, principally round Kastoria, Florina, and Edessa (Pallis 1929, 546 - Emphasis is mine).

As per Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Neuilly Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria concluded the 27th of November 1919, Greece and Bulgaria had agreed to a reciprocal voluntary emigration of the racial, religious, and linguistic minorities in Greece and Bulgaria. The exchange of populations was voluntary as per Article 5 of the Convention, which stated, "Emigrants shall lose the nationality of the country which they leave the moment they quit it and shall acquire that of the country of destination from the time of their arrival there." By contrast, the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey was mandatory.

I
n 1924, Greece and Bulgaria signed the Politis-Kalfov Protocol, a bilateral agreement concerning the "protection of the Bulgarian Minority in Greece."  The agreement only lasted 9 months. Serbia threatened to renounce the 1913 Greco-Serbian alliance treaty, which forced the Greek Parliament to renege from ratifying the Politis-Kalfov agreement.  As a result, the League of Nations annulled it.

According to Alexander Pallis, a member of the Refugee Settlement Commission, the number of immigrants from Bulgaria to Greece was 49,027. If we add the Greeks who had left Bulgaria before the Convention, their number rises to 52,891.  However, the number of voluntary immigrants from Greece to Bulgaria was 92,000, including 39,000 who had left Greece before the Convention.  According to other accounts, the number of Bulgarians emigrated from Greece to Bulgaria was 101,800, including 40,000 of them who had left Greece before the Convention.  These numbers include ethnic Greek and Bulgarian emigrants between 1913 and 1925.

Consistent with Serbia's nationalistic view, the Slavophones of Greece were not Bulgarians, but Serbs.  In other words, the Serbians considered the Slavophone Greeks to be Serbs!  In keeping with such a notion, people who believe that Serbia was and is Greece's friend, need to think twice.  After all, according to Serbia's claim, Serbs were killing the Greeks of Macedonia, aiming at the annexation of Greek Macedonia, not Bulgarians.  Are we serious?

Thus the issue of the Slav ethnicity, as it has developed, is far from bilateral now. With Greece’s recognition of a "Macedonian"* ethnicity under the Prespes Agreement, regardless of the origin of such a designation, it now affects four countries, not just two: Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania.


*of slavic heritage with no connection to the Greek heritage of Ancient Macedonia


The borders of Greece

The borderline between Greece and Skopje is about 153 miles (246 km), consisting of 140 miles of land and 13 miles of water (lakes).  There are 177 boundary numbered columns, but also many other benchmarks that are not numbered.  The boundaries are identical to those set by the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Serbia, later Yugoslavia.  They were delimited in June 1913, shortly before the outbreak of the Second Balkan War (June 29 – August 10, 1913).

About a year later, the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Serbia signed the Greek-Serbian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Mutual Cooperation in Thessaloniki on May 19 (O.C.) / June 1 (N.C.), 1913. The 11 articles of the treaty "provided following the terms of the preliminary protocol, the mutual guarantee of the territorial possessions of both countries and the reciprocal provision of military assistance in case of an unprovoked attack against one, the determination of the distribution of the territories to be assigned from Turkey after the end of the war and the Greek obligation to provide every necessary convenience to the Serbian import and export trade through Thessaloniki." (Svolopoulos, September 1, 2008, 91).

Article 3 of the treaty describes the borders between Greece and Serbia, (presently, the borders of Greece and the Republic of Skopje), based on the line of separation between the respective armies. Article 7 established the Free Serbian Zone in the port of Thessaloniki.  Article 13 of the Prespa Agreement does the same for Skopje while it alludes in Article 18.1 and 18.3 guaranteeing Serbia's free passage through Skopje.

Although the zone remains within Greek sovereignty, the authority within the zone is Serbian.  This means that commercial trains depart from the zone for Serbia as rail maneuvers to the Commerce Railroad Station of the Thessaloniki (Old Station) a few meters away.  The same happens for trains from Serbia directed to the Serbian Free Zone.

Although the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had recognized its boundaries de jure, the AVNOJ Yugoslavia recognized it only de facto, not de jure.  The Prespa Agreement most likely changes the status of the borders from de facto to de jure, a significant change in international law.

The Macedonian Issue since 1950

Yugoslavia and Greece normalized their bilateral relations on November 28, 1950, when the Prime Minister of Greece Sofoklis Venizelos announced in the Parliament that Greece was going to exchange ambassadors with Yugoslavia.  Consequently, Greece opened the Consulate General in the city of Skopje, knowing in advance that the city was the capital of the People's Republic of Macedonia, that the population there was speaking "Macedonian" because they called themselves "Macedonians." Recognition of a country may be constitutive or declaratory, de facto or de jure, tacit or express, explicit, or implicit.  That was a tacit recognition of the republic's name, the ethnonym and the glossonym of its Slav inhabitants.

While people's eyes fell on Article 7.3 of the Interim Accord of September 13, 1995, my eyes fell on Articles 12 and 13 which brought my memory to a dozen of treaties that took place on June 18, 1959, as referred to in Articles 12 and 13 of the Interim Accord.

One of the Agreements regarded border crossing facilitation.  Under the agreement, a zone about 10 kilometers deep was defined on both sides of the border, including in the cities of Florina and Monastiri, which allowed residents to move freely.  The zone allowed people to freely import and sell certain products, to practice medicine freely, to cultivate lands on the other side of the border, as long as the beneficiaries could prove their ownership in 1939.

However, here is a critical detail.  The border papers were published in the official languages of both countries, without naming the languages.  Yet, although the documents published by the Greek Government were in Greek and Serbo-Croatian, those papers published in Yugoslavia were printed in Greek, Serbo-Croatian, and Skopjan.  It was a tacit recognition of the Skopjan language by Greece.  The Government was of Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωσις (E.R.E).

The Yugoslav side violated the agreement on border communication as the citizens of the People's Republic of "Macedonia" and "Macedonian Slav" refugees traveled to Greek Macedonia, practiced propaganda and collected material about the history of the villages of Western Macedonia during the occupation and civil war for further exploitation (Sfetas 2012, 30-31). Greece did not react at all!

PM Con. Karamanlis accepted the agreement at face value, saying that Greece recognized the Yugoslav Constitution.  Really?  Article I, section 2, paragraph 1 of the constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which stated:
​
The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is composed of the People's Republic of Serbia, the People's Republic of Croatia, the People's Republic of Slovenia, the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the People's Republic of Macedonia, and the People's Republic of Montenegro (Emphasis is mine).

Also, he had missed the following articles of the Constitution of Yugoslavia on the languages of Yugoslavia, to wit, Article III, section 13; Article VII, section 65; Article XIII, section 120.

Just before the new 1963 Constitution of Yugoslavia changed the title of the country along with other things, Con. Karamanlis asked Tito to change the name of the republic of Skopje.  Tito stated he would see what he could do; it never happened.  The Greek side’s reason was the result of the Greek elections in which ERE lost to E.K.  The fact is Tito did not have the authority nor the power to do anything of the kind.  If he did, he would have changed the name regardless of election results.

Tito could have done it a little later.  Significant changes in the structure of the federation started with the Constitutional Amendments in 1967 and 1968.  The Amendments marked the beginning of the concrete implementation of policies of the 8th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (S.K.J.) held on December 7-13, 1964.  They also gained their integral form in 1971 (Amendments XX-XLII, adopted on June 30, 1971), the basis for the Constitution of 1974.

The problem is that various publications that subsequent Greek governments had supported and promoted described the borders of "geographic" Macedonia in several conflicting ways.  One of the books stated that, "Macedonia, a geographical area of ​​the Balkan Peninsula (between Montenegro Lake Ohrid, Mount Grammos, Mount Olympus, Chalkidiki, River Nestos, Mount Pirin, and Mount Osogovo) in the Ottoman Empire until the Balkan wars of 1912-1913". (Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou, Civic Education, Athens, Cambana, 1970, pp. 487-8.  Translation is mine).

I followed the description, and based on it, I drew the borders (solid red line) of Macedonia as depicted.  The map of Macedonia's geographical area below reflects the imagination of the author of the above book rather than reality.  The description of the borders of geographic Macedonia includes the southwestern part of Serbia, a part of Albania and Kosovo, and of course, the whole republic of Skopje, Bulgarian and Greek Macedonia.  Even if one plays with the borders of Montenegro and Albania (see dashed line), one cannot sidetrack everything else.
Picture
The same book described Greece's policy on the issue of Skopje as follows:
​

"As far as Greece is concerned, there is no Macedonian question.  Conversely, even though after 1950 the relations between Greece and Yugoslavia have been restored, the latter keeps bringing up the matter some time the demonstrative myth as she tries to preserve its life, either through statements made by its official representatives or through its Skopje Press, or through various blatant "diplomatic" methods.  Its [Yugoslavia's] attitude imposes on the Greek nation to be on a continuous vigilance" (Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou, Civic Education, Athens, 1970), p. 494.  Translation is mine - Emphasis in mine).

The book above was published under the auspices of the Greek Government under the Colonels in 1970.  It was distributed to schools (a shorter version) and military units.  I obtained my copy from the 2nd (Intelligence) / 7th (Public Relations) Staff Office of the 33rd Infantry Regiment in Polykastro of Macedonia.

According to Wikipedia, "The Greek military junta appointed him [Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou] Deputy Minister of State (1967) and then Minister of Education (1967–1969).  He resigned on April 5, 1969, when it was clear that there would be no elections as the military Government had promised.  He compiled a handbook on Civic Education (Πολιτική Αγωγή) in 1970, which was used in a shortened form as a textbook in schools.  The 2 million drachmas he received as royalties he donated to the state".

Nevertheless, the Government of Greece claimed that it had not recognized anything "Macedonian" because the territory that Skopje was located was not independent.  But if that was true, why had Greece recognized the "Macedonian" language using as its basis the signature of approval of the final Technical Papers (Vol. II) of the Third United Nations Conference on Standardization of Geographical Names held in Athens between August 17 and September 11, 1977?  I did not know that Skopje had earned its independence at that time.  Here is a copy of page 145 of the said Technical Paper.
Picture
The Yugoslav Geographical Dictionary or Gazetteer does not contain any of the official languages ​​of the country, only the language alphabets of the country.  It comprises 607 pages, two of which explain the various acronyms and then include toponyms, features, i.e., city, mountain, river, administration, railway station, well, resort, etc., latitude, longitude, type of administration, i.e., republic, state, province, etc., and Geodetic Reference System or UTM.  The most important of all is that in 1977, Skopje was not an independent country.  Therefore, the claim by the Government of Greece at the time had not recognized anything "Macedonian" because the territory that Skopje was located was not independent is utterly false.  The mentioning of the "Macedonian" language and the acceptance of such by the Greek delegation without reservations or objections were enough for Greece to recognize the language.  I believe it was Andreas Papandreou the Prime Minister of Greece at the time.

Nevertheless, since the Greek governments knew what Yugoslavia was doing, what exactly did all of them do about it?  Where was the vigilance?  As many times as I had been asking Greek diplomats abroad, their answer was standard, "we do not have the problem, they [Skopje] have it." Why did the Government of Greece accept the U.N. resolution as expressed in technical papers regarding the "Macedonian" language without reservations?

The independence of Skopje and the failure of the Greek American diaspora

Upon Skopje's independence on September 8, 1991, politicians of Greece did not change their erratic behavior.  The disagreement between PM Mitsotakis and Samaras regarding Greece’s reaction where the new state is internationally recognized as 'Macedonia', gave Prime Minister Mitsotakis the opportunity to dismiss Foreign Minister Antonios Samaras and take over the Foreign Ministry himself.

On January 26, 1993, at the directive of PM/FM Con. Mitsotakis, the lawyer Mike Manatos sent a letter to Pres. Clinton telling him that Greece was ready to compromise.  The first shot was not fired and Greece was ready to surrender.

That happened without giving President Clinton a chance to check into the matter.  Under the leadership of the Public Relations firm, not a lobby, Manatos and Manatos, an ad hoc Leadership Committee of the Greek American diaspora was formed ready to fulfil the wishes of Con. Mitsotakis regarding Greece's readiness to surrender the name Macedonia to the Slavs.  The firm Manatos and Manatos prepared an elusive letter and passed it to the following members of the said Committee for their signature:
  • Andrew Athens, Chairman, United Hellenic American Congress,
  • Andrew Manatos, Special Counsel, United Hellenic American Congress,
  • Angelo K. Tsakopoulos, Former National Chairman, Greek Americans for Clinton,
  • Art Anagnos, former Mayor of San Francisco,
  • Clay Constantinou, Esquire,
  • Dr. Christos P. Ioannides, Professor, Greek and Middle Eastern Affairs,
  • Dr. Gus A. Constantine, Supreme President, AHEPA,
  • Dr. John Nathenas, President, Hellenic American National Council,
  • Dr. Takey Crist, Chairman, American Hellenic Institute-Public Affairs Committee,
  • Eugene Rossides, Esq., Chairman, American Hellenic Institute,
  • Fotis Gerasopoulos, Vice-President, Hellenic American National Council,
  • Jim Regas, Esq., Senior Counsel, Regas, Frezados & Harp,
  • John Catsimatidis, Chairman, Red Apple Group,
  • Michael Dukakis, Former Governor of Massachusetts,
  • Michael Jaharis, Chairman, K.O.S. Pharmaceutical, Inc.,
  • Nicholas C. Petris, State Senator, California,
  • Nicholas Gage, Author,
  • Peter J. Pappas, President, P.J. Mechanical Corporation,
  • Phil Angelidis, California Democratic Party,
  • Philip Christopher, President, PSEKA,
  • Professor Speros Vryonis, Jr., New York University,
  • Sotiris K. Kolokotronis, President, S.K.K. Entreprises.
The Interim Accord of 1995

When Greece signed the pre-agreement with Skopje in 1995 (the Interim Accord), it had automatically accepted the name "Macedonia," due to the Accord including the name following the principle of precedence.  Greece was thus bound to accept the same in the final name of the country.  Greece had not specifically stated that including the name "Macedonia" in the pre-agreement did not in any way mean it had accepted the appellation "Macedonia", in the eventual final name of the state in the second part of the Accord.


Indeed, the argument of the Slavs in the last negotiations was exactly that.  Since Greece had accepted the name Macedonia in the Interim Accord, they argued there was no reason not to accept the same name in the final agreement.

When we called the country "Skopje," a columnist of Nova Makedonija
, a Skopje newspaper wrote, "Since when a country takes its name from its Capital?"  They have never heard of Panama and Mexico.  What about Algeria?  These countries have taken the name of their capital.  With the same model, The FYROM could have been called Republic of Skopje.

The Greek political establishment


Referring to the issue of the referendum, between 2008 to this day consecutive Greek governments of New Democracy, PASOK and all in between, could have easily declared a referendum, but no government has done so.

More specifically, Mr. Karamanlis could have easily declared a referendum on the name issue, but Mrs. Bakoyanni had her say, and as she put it, "we are going to live with them [the Slavs], not you [the diaspora]."

On December 7, 2009, "The Unknown Dialogue," the Athenian newspaper ETHNOS reported that Mrs. Bakoyanni had already agreed to modify Greece's red line of "erga omnes" and make it for "International Use."  Also, she had no problem recognizing the ethnicity and language of Skopje as "Macedonian." According to the report, on September 20, 2008, Mrs. Bakoyanni accepted the above points as a negotiating basis.

Thus, Mrs. Bakoyanni’s abuses before and after Bucharest are as follows:

  • International usage: Six months after Bucharest, Mrs. Bakoyanni did not even mention "erga omnes" for the name of Skopje, even in the debates.  Indeed, a diplomatic employee of the Greek Embassy in Washington claimed that the terms erga omnes and International Usage are identical.

  • Use of name: Mrs. Bakoyanni assured Skopje that "the Greek side does not deal with the Skopje Constitution," which means she did not care if Skopje did a substantive constitutional review.  Without such a constitutional review, Skopje was free to use whatever name they wanted.

  • Identity and language: Mrs. Bakoyanni proposed the term "Macedonian" to a Cyrillic alphabet as a determinant of the language and ethnicity of the Slavic people of Skopje.  Miloshoski did not accept the existence of "Macedonian identity, citizenship, and language," but instead, he proposed the recognition of this entity by Greece itself.

  • History: Mrs. Bakoyanni's report in response to Mr. Milososki is problematic that "Macedonia's history is a matter of the past." Of course, history is a matter of the past.  Even children know this. 

When Yannis Mangriotis (PASOK) said that the Pan-Macedonian Association could not direct Greece's foreign affairs, he actually meant they were ready to compromise Greece’s interests due to arrogantly thinking they knew best.

They then went ahead, allowing Skopje to affiliate with NATO under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.  When the Skopjans went to Afghanistan, the Greek Contingent provided shelter in two Greek facilities.  At the same time, the Skopjans branded the name "Macedonia" on the blouse pocket of their uniforms and sold caps with the red map of geographic Macedonia in the Base Exchange of Bagram Air Base while Meimarakis (Defense Minister between February 15, 2006 –  October 7, 2009) and Bakoyanni were out to lunch with Karamanlis looking elsewhere along with the whole Parliament.  We now find them yelling like children: "Greek diaspora - HELP: they are beating us!"

The Greek political establishment did the same thing with Cyprus.  They allowed Turkey to become an EU candidate member, and now Turkey does not want to recognize the Cypriot Republic.  A few representatives in Parliament and their "leaders" were also in favor of the Annan Plan, as it was.  It should also be noted the Greek government gave in at Imia, as well.  Then they say they don't understand why the Turks play to their naiveté?  The more one gives in, the more the bully demands.  A good example of this is Hitler’s quote at the Conference of Munich: "Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich."
  

Additionally, Mrs. Bakoyanni was open to discussing the issue of the "Macedonian" ethnicity as per Mr. Branko Crvenkovski's suggestion, which was simple.  If a probe by the Greek Government revealed a problem on the topic before it went to the Parliament for ratification, then the final agreement could "implicitly" include the recognition in a manner that could withstand a superficial legal analysis written in legalese.  By the time a more in-depth analysis would transpire, it would be too late to modify the text.  Mrs. Bakoyanni went along with it.

However, Mrs. Bakoyanni did something that directly harmed Greece.  Mrs. Bakoyanni had lied to the Greek public and, of course, to the world when she declared that she had vetoed Skopje's membership to NATO.  The fact is that NATO does not contain the institution of veto; therefore, how could she use an institution that does not exist?

NATO has established the institution of consensus, and if someone believes that veto and consensus are identical and interchangeable, one needs a lesson in logic and political science.

The fact is that France and Romania had agreed with Greece not to invite Skopje to the Alliance.  One must bear in mind that NATO makes decisions in secret, and neither the Secretary-General nor any of its member States announce how each country had voted.  NATO ministers communicate almost daily, and they all know where each country stands and why.  Mrs. Bakoyanni revealed the secret for votes but simultaneously harmed Greece in the process.  Her lie was the basis for Skopje to file a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Greece for violating article 11 of the Interim Accord (Templar August 28, 2014).  Skopje’s legal team brought Mrs Bakoyanni's statements before the ICJ as evidence that Greece had violated article 11 of the Interim Accord.  If Mrs. Bakoyanni had not boasted about her "achievement" Skopje would have no proof that Greece was involved.  Also, after the lawsuit was filed, Mr. Mallias suggested to her that Greece should countersue Skopje for violating certain articles of the Interim Accord.  Mrs Bakoyanni told him plainly that she had decided on the strategy Greece had already followed.  She left Greece defenseless.

There are other issues that do not look related to the national interests and national security of Greece as serving other purposes, but they are.

The opening of the borders to supposedly Northern Epirotes, for instance, could give votes to PASOK, but it emptied Northern Epirus from most of its Greek population and flooded Greece with Albanians who had nothing to do with anything Greek.

Another one was the reason that Archbishop Iakovos was pushed to retire in 1996 might had been arguably the correct action on behalf of the Patriarchate, but it stripped the Diaspora of a formidable beacon of an actual lobbyist who did the job silently and behind the scenes as TRUE lobbyists do.  As a result, Greek power disappeared.  The splitting of the Archbishopric of America was a national disaster.  The report under the title "Archbishop Iakovos; led Greek Orthodox in Americas" by John Christoffersen of the Associated Press published in The Boston Globe (internet version) on April 12, 2005, is rather interesting. [1]

The intervention of the Macedonian Press Agency in favor of lifting its objection for the inclusion of the "Media Information Agency" of Skopje in the association of Press agencies of the Balkans at the end of 1990s gave a forum for Skopje to convey its message on an official basis.  Furthermore, the merger of the Macedonian Press Agency with the Athens News Agency in May 2005, even under the title Athens News Agency-Macedonian Press Agency (ANA-MPA) gave the impression to Skopje that the Greeks were taken more steps back in to order to facilitate Skopje's outrageous demands.  The whole negotiating technique of the Greek politicians gave me the impression that they were politically amateurs and violators of their oath.

But the problem lies deeper.  Even the Greek MFA has a few understandings about the issue of Skopje. There are also misinterpretations and historical inaccuracies from the Greek official side.  Here is an example.  

The Greek Foreign Ministry gives incorrect information.  For example, the website of the Greek Foreign Minister states,
​
The roots of the name issue go back to World War II, when General Tito separated from Serbia the area formerly known as Vardar Banovina (now the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), then granting the status quo of the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and renaming it first the "People's Republic of Macedonia" and then the "Socialist Republic of Macedonia" (Emphasis is mine).

The above statement, as formulated, is incorrect.  It does indicate a lack of understanding of the issue by the MFA.  The area that makes up "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," now North Macedonia[sic] WAS ONLY PART of Vardarska Banovina.  The northern part of Vardarska Banovina included the town of Leskovac, which is in the heart of Serbia just south of the town of Nis, about five kilometers north of the settlement of Pečenjevce, 11 km north of the town of Leskovac in Serbia.  Pristina, Kosovo was also within the Governorate of Vardar.
Picture
Kingdom of Yugoslavia - Banovinas (1929-1939)
Picture
Close up view of the Vardar Banovina (1929-1939)

​Greek media complicity


I do wish to point out one more oxymoron occurrence that goes on in the Athenian Press.  Since 1950, they were mostly silent about Macedonia and kept referring to it as “Northern Greece” a term that includes Thrace.  The newspapers of Thessaloniki and all Macedonia kept referring to the region by its name.  After the new law that permitted Athenian Press to be sold in Macedonia and Thrace - 
a law that killed the newspapers of Thessaloniki - before 10:00 am had passed on that day, the Athenian Press kept calling Macedonia, "Northern Greece."

On Thursday, July 16, 2020, the Athens-based newspaper Kathimerini English Edition, published an article under the title “Man in northern Greece found with thousands of ancient coins, jewellery”.  What happened to Macedonia?  The last time I checked the map, the city of Drama, from where the man hailed, was within Macedonian territory.  And then Greeks claim that Skopjans are at fault.  We keep shooting ourselves in the foot but we are never at fault.

​2) Early on, as the Prespes Agreement came into force, so-called "experts" from both sides - Greek and Slav - were heavily promoting the nullification of the Prespes Agreement as "a given." Aside from a few international law experts in both Greece and Skopje, the Macedonian League was the only diaspora organization that made it very clear that after the agreement came into force, it was a valid document.  Over a year later, not only do we see that the predictions of these so-called "experts" led to nowhere, but most of them have gone back into obscurity.  Should these people be held accountable for stoking the flames of discord?
Both groups are victims of their own ignorance, and ignorance is the mother of all the evil and misery we see.  They don't know, that they don’t know, what they don’t know.  Most of them think in terms of Conventions, or Councils.  Conventions and councils are very different. Treaties, accords, and agreements also differ.  However, such diplomatic instruments include clauses allowing for withdrawals or participation of new signatories.

The timing of withdrawals or new participations are regulated by these instruments and by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).  Generally, if a state party's withdrawal is successful, its obligations under that treaty are considered terminated, and withdrawal by one party from a bilateral treaty terminates the treaty.

T
he Preamble and Article 1 of the Prespa Agreement very firmly state that not only is it permanent but also terminates the Interim Accord.  That means that if somehow the Prespa Agreement were terminated by Greece, Skopje would be the winner, as the Interim Accord is dead;  Skopje would return to "Republic of Macedonia" and Greece would be blamed.  On the other hand, if the Prespa Agreement failed, Skopje would never see NATO or E.U. and would become the pariah of the world as North Korea is.  Worse still, Skopje's existence would be in question, considering the country is in the hands of a majority-minority ethnic group.

Now, returning to your question, "Should these people be held accountable for stoking the flames of discord?" Here’s my view:

It makes no difference either way, especially to those who are supposedly holding these people accountable, because they are the same type of people.  Those "experts" are narcissists and sociopaths seeking self-recognition.  They are agitators of a gullible society making noise around their name for self-gratification and self-pleasure.

I remember one of the ignoramuses had stated that France had vetoed the entrance of Skopje to the E.U. under the name "Republic of North Macedonia."  I started laughing because I was not sure whether the person who said it was more naïve or those who believed the falsehood.  I remember reading some organizations had inundated President Macron of France with letters expressing their gratitude.

The Agreement exists because of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 47/225 of April 8, 1993, in which Greece recognized Skopje's existence as a state after the latter withdrew its objection.  Also, the Agreement exists because of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) And 845 (1993) and all pertinent correspondence of clarifications that resulted in the Interim Accord.  There was no way that the Agreement would be nullified.  The five-year period of ascendancy to the EU was a technicality inserted to draw as many votes in the Sobranie as possible.  One must consider France's status as a permanent member of the UNSC with veto power.  If France were to stop the implementation of the Agreement, it would have brought it before the UNSC and then face the music of the consequences.  All resolutions and the Interim Agreement exist for one reason and one reason only, to avoid a war that could develop into a regional one.

As for the people who follow the know-it-alls, they are thirsty for knowledge and solace even in fiction.  We offer the knowledge of facts and we call them as we see them.

​3) In late 2019 and in early 2020, the Greek communities in both Australia and Canada witnessed breaches of the Prespes Agreement by their local politicians.  What do these breaches say about Greek community organizations and advocacy in the two countries?  Is there a lesson to be learned here?
Diplomatic instruments are an array of means of communication that include all instruments of statecraft, such as agreements or accords, charters, conventions, declarations, exchange of notes, memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi, protocols, and treaties, as well as political, economic, and military instruments.

Depending on the specific instruments, several of them expressly allow states to withdraw from them and others to recognize the eventual inclusion of more participants.

However, in a few cases, instruments of diplomacy are indefinitely binding or for a long period.  Several of them sanctioned by the UNSC apply to all governments, their agencies, and all organizations regardless of location or authority if the latter are sanctioned by the contracting governments.

The Prespa Agreement, as drafted, applies only to governments, their agencies, and their dependent entities or organizations.  Whether the Churches of both countries and their activities abroad are considered dependent or subsidized organizations depends on the legal status and degree of their dependence.

If the governments of either country do not subsidize individuals or organizations of the Diaspora, they are not affected at all.  Nevertheless, the same organizations fall under the laws of their controlling authorities, which fall under international law.  Since the Prespa Agreement has passed into international law, the latter prevails over municipal law as domestic law is legally known, and that includes the Constitutions or Constitutional Laws of the countries.

The Sterjova incident in Australia

Coming to the specific matter of the young mayor Ms. Emilia Sterjova of Whittlesea, who displayed the Sun of Vergina flag at an official event. The violation here is that as a mayor, she knowingly instigated an incident that caused subsequent violence.  It is a violation of Australian law.  She indirectly encouraged violent acts through her behaviour.  The beating of an unfortunate young man of Greek descent by four Skopjan thugs is a matter for the local, state, and federal governments to investigate and apply all pertinent laws.

Having said the above, the response by the leadership of the Greek community was at best lukewarm, at worst pathetic.  The reason that the leadership of the Greek Community was silent was not that they kept their cool, but that they chose to do nothing.  They were inept at writing a simple letter not just to the Australian community at large, but to the pertinent authorities.

But here is the issue. If the organizations they lead are solely cultural, their leadership should stick to what they qualify.  Otherwise, they are "irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent" to do anything more than organize balls, make pompous speeches and wave the flag, probably the white flag of surrender, regardless of how many PhDs they have.  Such false confidence is precisely how the fairytale of the "Greek lobby" started in the USA in 1974, and most Greeks believe in its existence.

The Oliphant incident in Canada

The second incident is one of Mr. Oliphant in Ontario, Canada.  The issue of Robert Oliphant, Secretary to the Minister of Global Affairs of Canada, is a different story and signals the ineptness of the Canadian Greek Diaspora to educate Canada's politicians.  Mr. Oliphant, whether he realized it or not, represented the Canadian Government in a cultural event organized by the Skopjan diaspora in Toronto in commemoration of the Bulgarian revolutionary Goce Delchev on February 1, 2020.

That Gotse Delchev was a Bulgarian is not a secret.  We have a letter of his, stating just that.  Delchev was born on February 4, 1872, in Kilkis, Greece and died on May 4, 1903, in a skirmish between the Ottoman Police and his band in Vevi of present-day Meliti Municipality, Greece, due to betrayal by the villagers who were fed up with being looted, killed, and extorted by gangsters.

In Mr. Oliphant's defence, he was unaware what the symbols on display all over the room walls meant.  Whether it was a set up by the "United Macedonians [sic] Organization of Canada" or not, is immaterial.  The Greek Diaspora of Canada should educate Mr. Oliphant and especially his staff on the issue.  Greek Canadians need education themselves.  They lack the full understanding that the problem is not ancient history per se, but actually concerns the national interests and national security of Greece.  The narrative "Alexander the Great and his Macedonians were Greek" is only a speck of the problem that goes much further than the naïve leadership (if it exists) believes. It is overly overconfident of their sources, methods, and especially knowledge.  Such guidance due to scholastic inadequacy on the matter, lacks the coherence of thought.  They are probably engineers, physicians, and other irrelevant professions.  They think in terms of if it is not white, it must be black.  As the old saying goes, a little bit of knowledge can be a dangerous thing.

The Skopjan Slavs being opportunists use their social engineers: they took the full fantasy sermon of the Dalmatian vicar Vinko Pribojević and converted it into historical fact, dreaming of expanding the land of Skopje southward, and exiting in the Aegean Sea.  They are now enjoying the fruits of their labour.  They built a castle, despite having foundations in the sand.  They achieved this because they found naïve people to believe them, ideological patsies to enable them, and gullible people to underestimate them.

The last thing people should do is continue falling into Skopjan ultra-nationalistic traps.  Being vigilant is one thing, but perpetually falling into their traps is another.  It equates to the Skopjans eating steak, while throwing odd bones at us to lick.  While we write impetuous letters to people who are indifferent to anything we say, the Skopjans work behind the scenes doing their job, making the national interests of Skopje identical to the national interests of the host country.  Greeks have not succeeded in doing so.  Turks, who have trained the Skopjans, take them for a ride on the matter.

Mr. Oliphant seems to be a philhellene, and it was evident by the fact that he did not say anything negative about Greece or the Greek people.  The fact that Greek politicians continue falling into traps, does not excuse us from doing the same.  Foreign politicians and their staff need proper education on the issue of Skopje and Turkey.  Education means using strong persuasive arguments, not fantasy ones.

Violations of the Prespa Agreement abroad

Returning to possible violations of the Prespa Agreement, we see a member of the clergy of the "Macedonian" Church Sitting at the table.  Whether the presence of the clergyman violates Article 6 of the Prespa Agreement is a matter that the Greek M.F.A. should pursue with the M.F.A. of North Macedonia[sic].  It depends on who supports the Skopjan churches abroad or the church in question.

Other violations could involve the presence of a Skopjan diplomatic representative at an event, even if the person or persons are attending in an unofficial capacity.  Such a presence would constitute a violation of the Agreement (save the traditional apathy and expression of the resignation of Greeks, «Ωχ, αδελφέ, δε βαριέσαι.  Όλοι περαστικοί είμαστε από αυτόν τον κόσμο. Oλοι αδέλφια, Χριστιανοί είμαστε, μήπως οι άλλοι είναι καλλίτεροι;»)

​4) Both you and the Macedonian League were specifically attacked as being a "Skopjan organization" by radio host Michael Nevradakis of Dialogos Media. His argument focussed on your fact-based research relating to the nullification of the Prespes Agreement.  Other Greek organizations were also attacked as traitors by him in the same interviews.  What did you make of this?
About 20-25 years ago, discussing the internet with an F.B.I. Special Agent, I told him the internet would become the favorite method of communication for fools.  Well, now the combination of the internet, radio, and TV has upgraded the means of spreading misinformation.  It serves to disperse the mental immaturity and unconscious incompetence of the users.  I have no idea who this individual is, and I couldn’t care less about his opinion.  He seems to have acquired a toy that he doesn't know how to use, so he uses it as a forum to spread hogwash.

It seems that this "gentleman" is one of those know-it-alls with no common sense, that repeats the same mistakes over and over again, while maintaining an attitude of self-righteousness.  People like him have two choices.  Either use their degrees to acquire experience and benefit their community or wrap fish in them.

The whole matter is based on maturity.  I do wish Greece had not allowed Skopje to use the name Macedonia.  Yet, as I wrote above, Skopje received anything they wanted from Greece using the salami-slice strategy and nothing in exchange.

The whole topic is a matter of experience, common sense, and education, which is based on enlightenment, not a piece of paper.  Let me overdramatize what I mean.  A plumber and a colorectal surgeon deal with plumbing.  Only an idiot would visit a plumber for colonoscopy.  I leave aside the fact that the plumber would call the paramedics to have his "client" taken away in a straitjacket.  These people sit on their brains.  They need to start learning how to think.

There are many things I do not like from the Prespa Agreement.  Some of them are tacit and others implicit.  They will be solved with the assistance of Albania, Bulgaria, and a couple of them with Serbia, but of course not in Greece’s favour.  Some of the issues are matters for the select committees.  I have not seen any correspondence between the two M.F.A.s and the U.N. Secretary-General.  The Macedonian League is guided by actual knowledge of how countries negotiate and the importance of stare decisis as well as the municipal law and possible application of both in international law.

We should bear in mind that international law is always above municipal or domestic law. 

  1. In the Free Zones case the Permanent Court observed "... it is certain that France cannot rely on her own legislation to limit the scope of her international obligations, (1932), PCI], Ser. AlB, no. 46, p. 167.

  2. And the opinion of the Court in the Greco-Bulgarian Communities case contains the statement: "it is a generally accepted principle of international law that in the relations between Powers who are contracting Parties to a treaty, the provisions of municipal law [domestic law] cannot prevail over those of the treaty". 

  3. The same principle applies where the provisions of a constitution are relied upon; in the words of the Permanent Court "It should ... be observed that ... a State cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in force. Applying these principles to the present case, it results that the question of the treatment of Polish nationals or other Persons of Polish origin or speech must be settled exclusively on the basis of the rules of international law and the treaty provisions in force between Poland and Danzig (Polish Nationals in Danzig (1931), PCI], Ser. AlB, no. 44, p. 24. The same goes for the Pinson claim (1928), RIAA v. 327; Ann. Digest, 4 (1927-8), no. 4.)

A few months after I had announced that the Prespa Agreement cannot change nor can be nullified because of the manner it was drafted I received a number of emails and messages from some people who kept sending me videos and clippings by some well-known to them professors, indirectly telling me that I was wrong.  All these professors of political science were irrelevant to issues of national security and were also ignorant of the full scale of the subject as were some former generals of the Greek Army.  They all lacked the proper educational and professional background.  Since the matter of the Macedonia dispute goes back to 1950, they never consider that once the door of the cage opens and the birdie leaves, no one and nothing can bring it back to the cage.

However, later I was vindicated by Angelos Syrigos, a lawyer and assistant Professor of International Law and Foreign Policy at the Department of International and European Studies at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences of Athens.  I believe he is now one of the Members of Parliament for the New Democracy Party which is in power in Greece today.  I was also vindicated by the facts.

People like this Michael probably consider traitors, not only Angelos Syrigos, but also the whole Party of New Democracy and N.D.'s followers as well.  The ONLY reason the N.D. voted against the Prespa Agreement in the Parliament was because they were the opposition.  What happened after N.D. was elected?  Nothing.  Because the PASOK (Center Union - Ένωσις Κέντρου and N.D. (National Radical Union - Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωσις) were in it from the beginning due to ignorance and indifference.

But what I have found very interesting is the fact these nickel and dime super-patriots call us "traitors" only because we told the Greek community what the fact is, that the Prespa Agreement could not be nullified or modified.

I am not by education, and neither by profession, or even by training an engineer, a physician, a mathematician, an architect, a chemist, a physicist, a journalist, an attorney, or what have you.  I do not get involved in matters of the above professions.  It is their profession which they obtained by appropriate education.

During my U.S. Army Pre-Commission Course, I learned the basics of bridge building, but it does not make me an engineer.

Also, I knew that the Gauss–Krüger Geographic coordinate system based on 1940 Krasovski's ellipsoid was used for Warsaw Pact military maps with the vertical datum at the foot of the bridge to Kronstadt, the island located off St. Petersburg, Russia.  Because of that knowledge, using trigonometry I had worked on the conversion of Gauss-Krassovski coordinates to UTM U.S. Military NAD83 in 1985.  I submitted my work to the U.S. Intelligence Community through my chain of command.  The pertinent authority classified it very highly.  Although it makes me a very good mathematician, it does not make me a cartographer.

In my college undergraduate years, as part of my Human Biology course, I dissected a fetal sow, but I cannot claim to be a pathologist.

In 1990 as part of the course of Geology, I wrote an academic paper, which I have shared with some of my close friends and on The Macedonian League website predicting the upcoming climate change, but it would be ridiculous to call myself an expert in weather change or clairvoyant.

Accordingly, I do not understand why every irrelevant know-it-all Tom, Dick, and Harry gets involved in MY business.  It is imprudent and dangerous that amateurs get involved in areas that they are unfamiliar with and they do not understand it, no matter how easy the areas might seem.

In my 30-year career in the Intelligence Community of the United States, I never cared about giving to the pertinent officials what they wanted to hear or read.  As I had mentioned to someone, "my job is not to watch CNN with all the pundits and come to work the next day to give the U.S. officials my assessment based on what I had heard the night before.  My job is to make an assessment based on the facts that I have before me and using my background knowledge and education, along with my experience, I offer my assessment.  What the elected officials are going to do with my assessment is not of my business; it is theirs.  They are accountable to their electorate; however, they will never blame me if they screw up because they preferred politicking over reality".

A little more than ten years have passed since my retirement, but I still think and operate in the same manner whether people like it or not.  I cannot lie to people feeding them with nonsensical and sensationalist disinformation only because they desire to hear it.  I am not a confectioner to sugarcoat anything.  I call it as I see it; it is either take it or leave it.

The reason we stated that the Macedonian League stood with then Greek M.F.A. Nikos Kotzias months before the Prespes Agreement, was that I had in mind the current geopolitical activities in the region.  One must have in mind the connection between Turkey and war, economic refugees along with ISIS fighters seeking to destabilize Greece and on top of it through constant bullying to steal the natural resources of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean affecting the economy of Greece and Cyprus.  I am not even touching the issue of Turkey with Syria and Libya.

The last thing Greece needed at that time was political instability over and above the economic instability, which was caused by the behavior of both PASOK and N.D. and the amateur handling by SYRIZA while negotiating the Agreement.  The reason that Greece negotiated the final agreement at that time was exactly the window of opportunity.  Skopje did not have VMRO-DPMNE in power anymore.  It would be impossible for Greece to negotiate in earnest an agreement with a Gruevski or similar Government.

There is one more reason we called for political stability in Greece.  The above super-nickel-and-dime patriots are so incompetent that they do not have any memory of the main three civil wars that Greece underwent in the past.

During the War of Independence (1821–1830) against the Ottomans, Greeks were fighting each other.

  1. Autumn 1823 – June 1824
  2. October 1824 – February 1825 

During the 20th century, communist forces inspired and sponsored by AVNOJ Yugoslavia versus Greek government forces, launched a civil war in three phases.

  1. First phase: 1943–1944 (1 year)
  2. Second Phase: December 3, 1944 – January 11, 1945 (one month, one week and one day)
  3. Third Phase: March 30, 1946 – October 16, 1949 (three years, six months, two weeks, and two days)

I am not even mentioning the outcome of the National Schism (ἐθνικός διχασμός) of the early 20th century.  It arguably cost Greece, Ionia, which it lost to the Turks.  I am not even touching the events that led to the military takeover on April 21, 1967.  

The recognition of Skopje was also the result of business, not by the Skopjan Diaspora, but by Greeks themselves.  Greek investors, along with the Alfa Banking Group headquartered in Moscow, Russia, found an opportunity that both political parties of Greece provided to take their money from Greece with no valid stipulations that supported and upheld the national interests of Greece.  Instead, successive governments of Greece closed their eyes, seeing the money earned in Greece escaping to Skopje, while the Greek population was unemployed.

In 2018, when the Prespa Agreement was signed, about 2,500 companies of Greek capital were already doing business in that country employing local people.  In addition, Skopjans, like the Bulgarians, enabled and assisted the gambling habits of the Greeks, who kept leaving thousands of euros at the Casino Flamingo Hotel in Bogorodica and Apollonia Casino & Hotel in Gevgelija.  Greeks abroad live in a parallel universe.

The last thing Greece needed while trying to get out of the economic ruin was political mayhem.  Before inept individuals start giving lessons on patriotism, they had better think about the consequences of their big mouth.

I saw them in 1974 when Greece had declared mobilization during the invasion of Cyprus.  While I walked in the Consulate General of Greece in Montreal, volunteering to fight for Greece, most super-duper patriots were calling the Consulate to find out how they could avoid the mobilization.  Diaspora Greeks found excuses such as “I have a business to run,” “I have a family to take care,” or “I am a Canadian citizen” and so on.  As I found out later, most men who volunteered to fight in Cyprus were Armenians, not Greeks.  So much for modern Greek patriotism. 

Before one starts to wave the flag or make balderdash speeches, one must look back to see what Greece had already given away to Skopje.  In international law, once a country gives something away, it cannot retrieve it unless it invokes a fundamental change of circumstances.  In the case of Skopje and Greece, there is no such a case accepted by the UNSC, nor by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May 23, 1969).  The fact that one does not like parts of the Agreement is not a reason for invalidation.  Responsible are the voters who kept on voting for politicians that only in name understand the relevant issues.   

What most people dislike is that Skopje got the word "Macedonia" as part of its final name.  People need to understand that all political parties they voted to form Greek governments, not only messed up the situation, but in addition, they gave away much more than the name.

As to whether they should be held accountable depends on the intelligence of their devotees and for how long the devotees are willing to eat grass.

Returning to Mr. Nevradakis, I would suggest he learns more about the application of the First Amendment.  As a journalist, he should know the rules of journalism.  The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not give him a license to smear people he does not know, he does not like, or who do not do as he says by calling them names.  His right to say, whatever comes to his head, covers only celebrities and politicians.  If people of the last two categories sue him, during the discovery process, they must show that the journalist did it out of malice.  I am neither a celebrity nor am I a politician.  I live on my reputation and my reputation alone.  When he destroys my reputation with malarkey, I have nothing left to live on.  Only a Court will get my reputation back at his expense.  In my first language, δε βαριέσαι is unknown.

People like me undergo vigorous investigations by the F.B.I., and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) every five years as the law requires so that we receive and maintain a Top-Secret Clearance with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (S.C.I.) and NATO Cosmic Top-Secret Clearance.  Such quinquennial investigations are designed to ascertain that the life of vital personnel is beyond criticism and cleared from any possibility for extortion.  It is how we perform our designated jobs.  We perform impossible jobs.  Even our spouses do not know what we do to protect those like Mr. Nevradakis so that they enjoy the freedoms we provide, setting the foundations for their prosperity.

Immature people do not understand that degrees do not make them anything; they make the degrees.  Peter Jennings, the suave, Canadian-born broadcaster who delivered the news to Americans each night in five separate decades, had never finished high school.  The master's degree is designed to deepen career-oriented knowledge and skills. The doctorate is a heavily research-based progression designed to develop critical research, analytical, and writing skills to fill knowledge gaps of a specific industry.  France does not differentiate between the two.
 

I was an Intelligence Officer for 28 years; my Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) did not make me an Intelligence Officer.  At the end of my career, I decided to apply for a seat in the MSSI program at the National Defense Intelligence College, now the National Intelligence University.  As one sees, the paper came after I was an intelligence officer for 30 years, not before.  I made the degree; the degree did not make me.  Then I taught a course of strategy as a matter of theory, but also experience.

It is up to Mr. Nevradakis, and those who think alike to decide whether they want to use their piece of paper for the benefit of their community or they would rather wrap fish in it.

May I remind them all of Aesop's Fable of the Fox and Grapes, 
«Ὃσα δέν φτάνει ἡ ἀλεποῦ, τά κάνει κρεμαστάρια».

​5) In a very unfortunate online Facebook post, the Pan-Macedonian Association released a picture of some of their executives and supporters holding a sign stating that "Whoever respects the agreement consents to the betrayal." Ironically, they posted that picture at around the same time they visited Skopje! Upon their return to Greece, and after getting flack from their followers, some of these executives went to great lengths to state that they showed Greek ID in order to avoid getting a stamp of "North Macedonia" on their foreign passports.  What can be said by that petty post?
PictureMembers of the Pan-Macedonian and POPSM
Some within this group of "super-patriots" had visited Skopje after the Prespa Agreement was in force to observe if the government of North Macedonia [sic] followed the Agreement.  They tacitly recognized the statehood of the "Republic of North Macedonia" and everything that it stands for.  The credentials to enter the newly baptized state made them welcome to the new country.  The same credentials automatically accepted the existence and the authority of the "Republic of North Macedonia" over them, its laws, and of course, its name in which the laws were enacted and implemented.  Of course, they recognized the Agreement.  After all, the Agreement changed, among other things, the name of the country.  

Recognition of a state merely signifies that the persons who recognize it accept the personality of the visited state with all the rights and duties determined by international and domestic laws.  Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.  After all, these self-proclaimed observers had to spend money in Skopje to eat, gas the cars, etc.  Even if they used credit cards instead of cash, they had accepted the authority of the Bank of North Macedonia as their transaction statements would declare.  They also had to mingle with Skopjans who were around them and hear their "Macedonian" language within the territory of "North Macedonia."

Given these "super-patriots” found the Prespa Agreement treasonous and of course illegitimate (they tried to revoke it), why did they care whether Skopje was in the process of implementing it?  Their act alone indicates that in their view, the Prespa Agreement was legitimate, and they wanted to ascertain that Skopje's Government followed the agreed provisions.  In doing so, they committed their own act of treason!


​6) ​Skopje has many regional players to satisfy in its bid for EU accession. However, since the Prespes Agreement was signed, Bulgaria has become extremely vocal in pursuing its National Interests concerning Skopje. What moves will Bulgaria make in relation to Skopje’s future EU accession?
The relationship between Bulgaria and Skopje is a special one.  It is reminiscent of a mother who loves to have her daughter close to her and a daughter who wants nothing to do with her mother.

There is a good reason for the daughter’s, i.e. Skopje’s feelings.  There is NO doubt that the 99% of the “Macedonian” revolutionaries were Bulgarians.  The one 1% accounts for some like Pitu Guli, a Greek-speaking Vlach, who was misled by the Bulgarians and consequently joined them.

There is also another valid reason that applies to the present state of Skopje.  The ethnicity of the Slavs of Skopje is readily dismissed as Bulgarian; facts belie such a conclusion.

The Slavic side of the country is an ethnic mishmash of three main Slavophone ethnicities: Serbian, Bulgarian, and those of the first Slavic tribes, which over the years have been intermarried.  This was the Skopje’s Slavic basis when the region officially seceded from Vardaska Banovina and became the Socialist Republic, formulating its own culture due to governmental intervention.  Now, some of the Slavic speaking inhabitants have spouses from Serbia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Bosnia, Russia, and even Greece.

During the early 1900s, Bulgarians had openly stated that they were fighting for the freedom of Macedonia.  In reality, the “Internal Revolutionary” organization was fighting to create a socialist state in Macedonia and Thrace in order to govern the country themselves, while the “External Revolutionary” organization was fighting for autonomy and the eventual incorporation of Macedonia and Thrace to the Bulgarian Principality.

Thus, Bulgaria is a very different element in the equation.  Bulgarian communists always had problems with the Marxist theory, as Lenin and Stalin had interpreted.
​

In “A Conversation with Stalin,” Dimitrov conceded that the Macedonians were a separate people only feebly pointing out in private that Marxist theory differentiated between “people” and “nation.” Such subtlety went unnoticed, as he publicly and continually confirmed that all Macedonians should be united in the eponymous Yugoslav Republic.  This was the principle adopted by the Tenth Plenum of the CC, on the 9-10 August 1946, when the B.R.P. (K) leaders also resolved to support the policy, already in progress of “Macedonizing” the inhabitants of Macedonia.  In addition to setting up Macedonian-language libraries and schools, a census was carried out in December 1946 in which the communist authorities forcibly registered the population as Macedonian rather than Bulgarian (Хаджиниколов 1982, p. 39 in Stankova 2010, p. 201- emphasis is mine).

Article 4 of the July 1924 Comintern Resolution states,
​

“The Congress at the same time emphasizes the fact that the revolutionary struggle of the Macedonian and Thracian people for their national and social freedom can only be successful when it is carried on in conjunction with the revolutionary workers and peasants in every one of the Balkan countries” (emphasis is mine).

​Article 5 of the same supports the above with,
​

The Communist Parties of the Balkans and the Balkan Federation must vigorously support the national revolutionary movements of the oppressed peoples of Macedonia and Thrace for the formation of independent republics (emphasis is mine).

One could argue that by “Macedonian” people, the resolution meant the Slavs of Macedonia, but how could one say that about the Thracian people as being of one ethnic group?  That alone means that by “Macedonian people”, the Comintern indicated all the people of Macedonia regardless of their ethnicity.  It is often forgotten that the entire title of the VMRO was “The Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization” with Adrianople stipulating Thrace.  Comintern used the word “narod,” which means people (λαός) without an ethnic qualification.

Bulgaria's recognition of the 'Republic of Macedonia'


Bulgaria recognized the ‘Republic of Macedonia’ on 15th January 1992.  Here are some details of the recognition.  The day began with a meeting of the Consultative National Security Council under President Zhelyu Mitev Zhelev, a Bulgarian politician and former dissident.  Present in the Council was Prime Minister Philip Dimitrov, the leaders of Parliamentary Parties, and Chairs of Parliamentary Committees.

The meeting was stormy and went into proceedings and maneuvers.  It was decided in principle to recognize Skopje as Macedonia but did not specify precisely when this would happen.  Dimitar Ludzhev, Minister of Defense and Svetoslav Luchnikov, Minister of Justice, were cautious and thought that Bulgaria should slow down the announcement of the recognition of Skopje as Macedonia.  Finance Minister Ivan Kostov had abstained because he considered that the absence of the Foreign Minister, Stoyan Ganev, from the meeting would be an obstacle to the announcement of the recognition.  Vice President Atanas Semerdjiev was also against the recognition.

Then the former foreign affairs adviser to the President of the Republic of Bulgaria and recently re-assigned Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Tafrov, requested information from Bulgaria’s Ambassadors from other Balkan states and then expressed the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; that Bulgaria must recognize Skopje as Macedonia, the soonest.

He allegedly had evidence that Turkey was also getting ready to recognize Macedonia[sic] something that Sofia should not allow to happen, given the historical roots of Slavic-Macedonians with Bulgaria.  Tafrov, however, had lied.  Ankara had no intention to be the first to recognize the former Yugoslav Republic. Nobody else except Tafrov had heard of such plans in the foreign policy objectives of Turkey, but Tafrov kept lying about it.  Turkey was waiting for another country to do it first.  And so, based on Tafrov’s lie, Bulgaria recognized Macedonia, but NOT its nation or language.

To avoid full recognition, Bulgaria clearly stated that it recognizes only the existence of the state under the name “Macedonia,” but NOT the ethnicity and the language of the Slavic majority.

From Skopje’s perspective, the Republic of Bulgaria recognized the former Yugoslav Republic long before the European states. This act can be assessed as a show of determination.

With the hasty recognition of the Republic of Macedonia by some external observers, the Republic of Bulgaria withdrew from the position declared by President Zhelyu Zhelev in October 1991 that “Bulgaria is ready to recognize the independence of the Yugoslav republics that have declared it democratically.” Such a recognition would be a blanket acceptance for everything and anything the Republic of Macedonia[sic] stood for.

So, Bulgaria bypassed the hurdle by recognizing the statehood of Macedonia[sic] but NOT the existence of a Macedonian nation in a sociological sense. The language is a slightly different story.

Regarding the dialect/language, one may refer to my article, Is it a Dialect or is it a Language?

The question is, given Bulgaria had problems with the Skopjan ethnicity and language, why didn’t it get involved in the Interim Accord?

Whether Bulgaria had any legal standing in the matter of the Interim Accord was a matter that Greece could bring up, but it would be inappropriate.  At that time, the issue was the name of Skopje and only the name for which Bulgaria did not have any problem.  Greece’s positions became increasingly fluid and accordingly weaker, while Skopje’s positions remained adamant.  Simultaneously, Skopje was let free to do whatever its politicians wanted while the politicians of Greece, their aides, and advisors were becoming progressively distressed and bewildered in a constant quandary lacking expertise on the issue. They sought an easy way out, but always ready to declare victory.

Due to Mrs. Bakoyanni’s incompetence (Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time), Mr Meimarakis’ irrelevance (Minister of Defense), and Mr. Karamanlis' indifference (Prime Minister), the naming issue progressed to matters of ethnicity and language.

While Bulgaria has reservations around ethnicity and language, it still won't change anything because Bulgarians already call the Slavs, "Macedonians", as a matter of demonym, (not as a matter of genonym). It is a political issue like the issue of the glossonym.  After all, Misirkov, a Bulgarian, had suggested that the speech of Ohrid-Bitola-Prilep should become the literary language of “Macedonia.”

He wrote:
​

Even when not engaged on official work, the Macedonian intellectuals should always speak to one another in the central Macedonian dialect (that of Veles, Prilep, Bitola, and Ohrid) and this language should be introduced as a compulsory subject in all religious and national teaching, even in the Turkish schools.  The central Macedonian dialect should become the literary language of Macedonia (K. P. Misirkov 1974, 59 - the emphasis is mine).

​The fact is that whatever name Skopje chooses to baptize its language, Greece would have to agree as a matter of law. However it should be noted that the Prespa Agreement will not fade away and the signatories would need to replace this text with a new legal act.

7) What is your opinion about the Albanian population within Skopje?
We see many VMRO-DPMNE politicians and Skopje’s diaspora organizations pursuing an outright racist and nationalistic anti-Albanian agenda.  At the same time, there are several existing issues in Skopje that the Slavs do not consider.

​T
o begin with, the Albanians hold the balance of power in the government of Skopje.  They will be the definite majority group within Skopje in a not too distant future.  As it currently stands, the Slavs are a majority-minority.  That means that when one compares the Slavs on a one to one basis against another ethnicity, then they are the majority.  However, when one compares them against all other ethnicities together, the Slavs are a minority.  This is the formal setting based on the flawed census of 2002.  I say flawed because not one government of Skopje has completed an accurate tally since its independence.

The second issue of the Albanians is the National Anthem of Skopje.

The third is the full implementation of the 13th August, 2001, Ohrid Agreement regarding the Albanian language.

The issue of nationality on travel documents as it is right now is redundant.  Article 1.3b of the Prespa Agreement states that nationality “shall be Macedonian/citizen of the Republic of North Macedonia.”  In my view, nationality should be either the name of the country as it is in the U.S. passports or no nationality at all according to the model of the passports of the SFRJ.  The title of the country was enough. If the country’s name is North Macedonia[sic], then the nationality of the bearer cannot be anything else. I am expecting it to change.

The fifth issue is, in my view, the most crucial issue for ALL inhabitants of the Skopjan republic.  It is about having a FULL, and EXACT population census by ethnicity.  Such a count of the population will put to rest a lot of “expert” conspiracies on all sides.  It will offer an accurate picture of ethnicities and their full strength, which will determine the political prestige of the Albanians, and of course, it will tilt the balance of powers in the country.

As for President Pendarovski, he will change his tune when he realizes that he might NOT have a country to be President of.  Under the Albanian Government, a referendum for the autonomy or secession of Ilirida could be legalized by the Parliament, and Skopje as a country will become part of history.  If Ilirida secedes for one reason or another, the rest of the country will be split into two pieces, i.e., between Serbia and Bulgaria.  It should be noted that the only way to have peaceful secession of a region within any country is a legally sanctioned referendum, which means with the consent of the controlling power.

For those in Greece and elsewhere who dream of re-acquiring Skopje’s southern areas of Ohrid, Bitola (Monastiri), and Gevgelija, I would remind them that in those areas most of the population by far is Slavic and Albanian.  After all these years of Serbian and Yugoslavian education, any Greeks that existed there in the 1920s or even 1940s might not be Greeks anymore.  Let us not do with Skopje what the Greek Government did in the early 1990s when they opened the borders of Albania, and every Tom, Dick, and Harry came to Greece as Northern Epirotes.

Here is the census in the whole area of the Republic of Skopje.
Picture
The manipulation of the numbers is clearly evident.

Bear in mind that when a country takes over a territory from another country, the country inherits all people regardless of ethnicity.  The following are the results of the 2002 census in the municipalities of Ohrid, Bitola, and Gevgelija.  Although its legitimacy has been understandably challenged, it gives people an idea about the ethnic groups Greece could inherit in its quest for lands that used to be inhabited by a vast Greek population.  What was right in the past, might not be right today.
Picture
Even if we assume that “others” are of Greek descent, we must compare the “others” with all the other populations.  Assuming all the Vlachs have a Greek national conscience, the total Greek population will be 3,738 people.  Is it worth receiving 135,684 people whose national conscience belongs to another state?

O
f course, only an accurate census will show the actual number of Greeks living in those areas.  Until that time, let’s avoid daydreaming.  We do not want to convert delusional thinking into a real nightmare.

8) You have dedicated over fifty years of your life on the Macedonian Question. Most people do not even know it, but as a young soldier in the Hellenic Army, you served on the front lines right at the Greek-Yugoslav border during a tense period.  On what you are allowed and are willing to disclose, give our readership a small glimpse of the daily life of a young Marcus - the soldier - whose eyes and ears were on Skopje.
Picture
I was born in the Macedonian Question.  I never hid the fact that my maternal family originates from what today is the Republics of Serbia and Skopje.  My sister and I, nevertheless, were born in Greece and pride ourselves as Greeks.  I devoted my whole life to Greece, which is more than 50 years.

The Greek Army

Serving the Greek Army was not just an honor and a privilege; it was a sheer pleasure and a translucent education.

I served 24 months, a simple private, from 22nd July to 30th September, 1969, in the Recruit Reception Center in Messolonghi (12 ΣΠ, today 2/39 Σ.Ε. of Evzones Regiment) for Basic Training and from 1st October, 1969, to 22nd July, 1971, at the Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC.) of 33rd Infantry Regiment (ΛΔ/33 ΣΠ, ΣΤΓ 912β).  I mostly worked at the 1st / 8th Staff Office.  I occasionally worked in the 2nd /7th Staff Office.

Picture
People do not realize that at regimental level, at that time, more than four staff officers operated: 

A1
> Personnel/Finances,
A2 > Security/Public Relations,
A3 > Training/ Operations,
A4 > Transportation/Supplies. 

Of course, that was then.  The military cannot and should not remain stagnant.  After all,
Τά πάντα’ ρεῖ (Heraclitus of Ephesus, EurLex-2). 

​As I said above, occasionally, I worked for the
A2 and occasionally worked in the cryptologic shop, which was next to A2, first floor, in the Administration Building of the Regiment.

Picture
The 33rd Infantry Regiment was part of the 2nd Infantry Division (ΣΤΓ 912), Edessa and its Commanding General was Lieutenant General George Nomikos.  I remember that the 3rd Infantry Regiment (ΣΤΓ 912α) was in Yanitsa and the 702nd Combat Engineers Battalion was in Skydra.  The units above were a component of the 2nd Corps, Veria.  

At that time, the CO of the 702nd Combat Engineers Battalion at Skydra was Lieutenant Colonel Lazaros Yannoukakos from Mani. The legendary Colonel Konstantinos Davakis was his uncle. The Commanding General of the 6th Infantry Division in Kilkis was General Victor Kharisis from the area of Korytsa.

The defense of Greece

Our Regiment’s Mission Essential Task List was the defense of Greece in that specific sector from a ground attack. The town of Polykastron is a communications link located about 14 km south of the borders and combines wheeled/track vehicle approach along with rail transport of vehicles or troops in case of a sizable ground attack.  Over and above that, it controls any possible offensive of small amphibian units by water as it restrains the flow of Axios.  Because of it, the avenue of approach from the north in that area is thoroughly checked.

The territory of military coverage included the National Guard Battalions of Aridaia (Τ. Ε. Αριδαίας) in the west and an area near Lake Doiran, from which the responsibility of the 19th Infantry Regiment, stationed at that time in Sidirokastron, started.

Our Regiment had the essential peacetime organization of any Infantry Regiment at the time.  It was the parent unit of the 503rd Infantry Battalion (IB) stationed in Goumenissa.  The 506th IB stationed in Axioupolis and the 525th IB stationed in Polykastron, near the Headquarters building of the Regiment. The Detachment of Telecommunications and Cryptology was attached to the above organic composition, to ensure the uninterrupted function of the Regiment and the Garrison.  

The mission of the 503 IB was the physical guarding of the borders with Yugoslavia.  It was responsible for the facilities and the rotation of soldiers who were equipped with the best communications apparatus of the time.

The other function of the 33rd Infantry Regiment was one of Garrison. Under that peacetime military organizational structure, the component units were:  HHC., 2nd Company of Recoilless Antitank Weapons (Πυροβόλα Άνευ Οπισθοδρομήσεως - ΠΑΟ), Detachment of Telecommunications and Cryptology, 104th Field Artillery Battalion, the 2nd Transportation Company, 2nd Ordnance Company, 2nd Quartermaster Company, 2nd  Medical Company, the 2nd and 6th Medium Tank Battalions (under the 6th Infantry Division, Kilkis), and of course the Regiment’s component units as stated above.

When I arrived in Polykastron, the Regimental Commander was already transferred; I never met him. He was temporarily replaced by the Executive Officer (Deputy Commander) Constantine Papadopoulos.  The latter was promoted within a couple of months to Colonel and transferred as the Commander of 19th Infantry Regiment in Sidirokastron.

The new Commander of the Regiment was Infantry Colonel Osvaldos Fabrikezis from Corfu.  He later got promoted to Brigadier General and transferred to the Army Headquarters in Athens (Papagou).  He was replaced by the Infantry Colonel Achilles Tsoukalis.  Colonel Tsoukalis was my last regimental Commander.

The HHC had two Warrant Officers, Polymeris from Epirus and after he was transferred, he was replaced by Karatsirakis from Komotini.

The Commanding officer of the HHC was one of the Staff Officers of the Headquarters.  The Director of the 1st Staff Office and Commander of the HHC, Infantry Major Nikolaos Siakavelas from Lamia. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and transferred to the National Guard Defense Battalion of Lamia (Τάγμα Εθνοφυλακής - T. E. Λαμίας).

He was replaced by the Director of the 4th Staff Office, Infantry Major Orestis Marinakis, from Chania in both jobs, the Director of the 1st Staff Office and the Commander of the HHC.

Picture
​2nd Staff Office. Infantry Major George Grylakis from Crete.  When he was transferred, he was replaced by Infantry Major Con. Koulas from Epirus.

3rd Staff Office.  Infantry Major Con. Tombras.  When he was transferred to another position, he was replaced by Infantry Major Con. Papadopoulos.

4th Staff Office.  Infantry Major Orestis Marinakis. He took over the 1st Staff Office after the transfer of Lieutenant Colonel Siakavelas. Major Menealos Afendris from Chalkis replaced him.  Shortly before I left the service, Infantry Major Menelaos Afendris took command of the HHC, from Major Marinakis while he kept the functions of the 4th Staff Office.

Picture
At that time, staff officers of the Army required six months' Command to advance.
 

In 2006 I wrote a letter to my old Commander Infantry Major Orestis Marinakis.  His wife called me from Chania to let me know that my CO had already passed away in September 2001.  His son was at that time in Tunis, working at the Greek Embassy.  I believe Maria Marinaki of the Greek MFA is his daughter.  Major Marinakis used to own a beige sedan Toyota Corona.

Because of my position, I was involved with commissioned officers, graduates of the Hellenic Army Academy (Στρατιωτική Σχολή Ευελπίδων), and of the Infantry School at Chalkis (Σχολὴ Πεζικοῦ Χαλκίδος), Supreme Joint War College (Ανωτάτη Διακλαδική Σχολή Πολέμου -ΑΔΙΣΠΟ near the American Farm School, Thermi, Thessaloniki).

My professional association with professionals of such high caliber helped me educate myself in more than discipline and responsibility.  I learned about military organizational tables, aka order of battle (OB or ORBAT), and such.  OB is the structure of an armed force participating in a military operation or campaign indicating the hierarchical organization, command structure, strength, disposition of personnel, and equipment of units and formations of the armed force.  In addition, I learned all about the Army Ἐπετηρίδα, because I had to update it any time changes were coming from the Headquarters of the Army.  Once a year, we would receive the whole book.  Ἡ Ἐπετηρίς is a long list of officers’ hierarchies.  It is essentially a Yearbook.

I had also participated in Field Training Exercises (FTX) as well as in one Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT) and one Map Exercise (MAPEX).  Working at the staff offices as a private, I also learned about inter-border communications of border units using a particular system that I will not explain since I am not aware of whether it is still used or not.  The main reason was to let the other side know whether animals were passing from one side to another, e,g. horses.  The Yugoslav side also notified us of possible corpses of people drowned within Yugoslavian territory assuming that the flow of the River Axios would bring them to Greece.  A few of them did.  Other common occurrences were patrols passing from one country to another, missing the benchmarks due to the height of the crops.  Within half an hour, the incident was filed away.  With the present Global Positioning System (GPS) used, the problem does not exist, I hope.  Once, we went to Gevgelija for a day of talks on common border issues, nothing unusual.

Over the years, the regiment was upgraded and today exists as the 33rd Motorized Brigade with its HHC and 33rd Communications Company, 33rd Engineer Company, 33rd Anti-Tank Battalion, 33rd Medium Tank Battalion, 104th Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion (SPARTY), 506th Motorized Infantry Battalion, 525th Motorized Infantry Battalion, 33rd Support Battalion.

Picture
I want to add that after a full week of Army Small Arms Championship (45 caliber) competition within the 2nd Division, I wound up first in the Division receiving the gold medal of the Military Games within the 2nd Infantry Division. It was on 7 April 1970.  Of course, I was only 22 with a very steady hand. About 30 years ago, my hand was still stable. Immediately after I joined the task force for Panama in early 1990, I had qualified a sharpshooter using a Beretta 92 (9 mm) sidearm.


9) Before we end, and since we discussed your military service, give us one final response into your language training with the US Army.
The United States Army - A typical Day at the Defense Language Institute - Foreign Language Center ​​(DLI-FLC)
 

I'll shed some light as to what it means to study a language at the Defense Language Institute-Foreign Language Center ​​(DLI-FLC), located in the Presidio of Monterey, California.

Anyone who thinks that this is a vacation should think again.  Bear in mind that each military service has its own schedule for Physical Training.  Also worth noting is that the Presidion is on a hill with greatly uneven roads.

A typical day starts at 6:00 a.m. breakfast

7:30 a.m. until 11:30 a.m. (4 hours of lessons)
11:30 a.m. until 1:30 p.m. lunch
1:30 p.m. until 3:30 p.m. (2 hours lessons)
3:30 p.m. until 4:30 p.m. Physical training (showers).
5:00 p.m. until 6:30 p.m. Dinner


As the language learning progresses, afternoon hours are dedicated to one on one conversation with teachers in the target language.

Study Hall/homework: 4-6 hours daily after dinner.

Details: The courses include target language, history, culture, geography of the country that speaks the target language.  If languages ​​such as Portuguese, French, Spanish, Arabic, and a few others spread to many countries, the student learns about the country or region to which he or she has been assigned.

Physical Training (PT) includes a military average of 35 push-ups, 40 sit-ups depending on the age group, and 2-mile jogging, i.e., about 3 km).

Once, sometimes, twice per month formation at 5:00 a.m. for jogging 5 miles, i.e., about 8 km.

Weekends USUALLY include excursions into anything related to culture which includes cooking native foods and eating them, depending on the language and country being studied.  One of these things could be a restaurant to taste the food of the country or get together with Native Officers of the Naval Graduate School.  Other than that, the weekend is free.  However, we must never forget that one has classes on Monday and must perform.  So, prepare your homework, syntax, grammar, and especially your vocabulary which keeps accumulating.

Target language: The student must pass oral and written exams and in written exams a student must answer a question in the form of a report in the language being studied.  It is similar to a composition. The idea is that the student understands how an indigenous speaker thinks and his culture.  The more he understands the native culture the better he can do his job.

Other tests include:

Rapid Fire Number Dictation, and the geography of the country.  No limit on how many times one takes these tests, but you have to pass both before graduating.  The duration of the course depends on the language.

Depending on the difficulty of the language as determined by the School, the duration of the courses is ​​64 weeks, 48 weeks, 36 weeks.  The previously stated length of classes excludes a two-week academic break, national holidays, and the organization day of school, which is on 24th June.  The DLI-FLC is a U.S. Army Post.

The Academic Library is at Fort Ord, CA.  

Most students attend once; fewer students attend twice, and very few attend three times.  

As far as I know, I am the only student who has attended the DLI-FLC four times (Czech, Serbo-Croatian, Castilian Spanish, and Turkish). I am also the only person who delivered a valedictorian speech in Slovak, although I had studied Czech. I spoke about my birth city of Thessaloniki and the Contribution of her sons, Saints Cyril and Methodius to the Enlightenment of the Slavs. After all, the famous Velehrad (Capital) is located in the Uherské Hradiště District of Zlín Region of the Czech Republic. I studied Czech in 2003-4 when the country was united under the name Czechoslovakia. We only took 50 hours of Slovak. 

Courses are interdisciplinary, and the senior in military rank is the Class Leader. Being a class leader is a big responsibility. 

Classroom size is a maximum of nine students, and ONLY in urgency goes up to 10.

​-----​
About Marcus A. Templar
Professor Marcus A. Templar is a former U.S. Army Cryptologic Linguist (Language Analyst), Signal Intelligence and All-Source Intelligence Analyst.  During his career as a U.S. Intelligence Officer, besides organizational duties, he discharged the responsibilities of a U.S. Army Observer/Controller, Instructor of Intelligence Courses specializing in Deconstruction of Strategies, Foreign Disclosures Officer, and Translator Interpreter of Serbo-Croatian. 
 
He is the Macedonian League's National Security Advisor.

About the Macedonian League
We are an international professional Hellenic advocacy group. Our primary purpose is to advance our interests to informed and responsive governments on issues concerning Greece's national security and territorial integrity.

As of 12 February 2019, the Macedonian League's main focus is on the “Prespes Agreement", as this Agreement is a serious national security issue that threatens the territorial integrity of Greece and the regional stability of the Balkans.

The Macedonian League also focuses on exposing and combating anti-Hellenism and analyzing political developments in Skopje.


For more information, follow us on: Website, Facebook, Twitter
_____
[1] http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/obituaries/articles/2005/04/12/archbishop_iakovos_led_greek_orthodox_in_americas/ (accessesd June 1, 2020)
0 Comments

The 2019 Macedonian League Annual Assessment with National Security Advisor Marcus A. Templar

7/28/2019

0 Comments

 
In the 2019 Macedonian League Annual Assessment, we talk with Marcus A. Templar for an in-depth analysis of the Prespa Agreement.
Picture
Marcus, the Prespa Agreement is now reality. Before we discuss the agreement briefly explain the number of MP's that voted for the agreement in the Greek Parliament. Why didn’t we see the three-fifths requirement for this issue, as required by the Greek Constitution? And, what do you make of all the noise that followed and sensationalist views in the Greek media?

It is fashionable in today’s world for people to treat logic as the enemy and truth as an inconvenience. Everyone has strong opinions in areas that are out of their academic or professional background. Comprehension is compromised because they base their faulty knowledge on preconceived notions that support their ideology, their beliefs, or what they wish to prove. Nobody seems to remember that in 2008, when Mr. K Karamanlis was the Prime Minister, and Mrs. D. Bakoyanni was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Athens was discussing the name “Upper Macedonia” or even “New Macedonia” for the FYROM.

For a year now, people bicker about the wrongs of the Agreement and how it can be reversed. I have yet to see anyone’s thoughts on how it is going to be implemented and the future of the region. Under such a mentality, the Agreement becomes the proxy action for one’s decision. As a result, the first question asked is usually “how much did they pay you”? The same individuals see others as they see themselves. Having a very educated opinion that differs from one’s preferred solution and expressing such a view does not mean that one is a “traitor,” “sold” or “paid,”; furthermore, it does not mean what one is talking about.

Should the Prespa Agreement have been ratified by three-fifths of the number of Representatives? Of course, it should. It is an issue of Greece’s core National Interest. In Greece, Constitutions and laws do not mean much, if anything. Nonetheless, there exists a precedent set already by the political elite of Greece and over the years accepted by the people of Greece as they keep voting to office people of similar or identical mindsets. In this manner, the Greek public has legitimized the roots of the political instability. Disinformation runs rampant for the benefit of a political party or the populist “guidance” of political hacks regardless of their partisan orientation. The Greek public even allows actors of third countries to purposely agitate extremist elements on both political sides, aiming at creating havoc. Through this confusion they generate a negative perception against anything that would benefit the country. In reverse they generate a positive perception of the political hacks of one ideology or another.

In your opinion, which parts of the Prespa Agreement give you cause for concern and could such a concern lead to the invalidation of the agreement?

There are some parts in the Prespa Agreement that make sense and others that I see as a compromise. However, one part, the nationality of the people of that republic, I find ill-advised. However nothing makes the Agreement invalid. It is a legally valid diplomatic instrument and in addition it has set the precedent of expression of nationality in international law by using the expression “Macedonian/citizen of the Republic of North Macedonia,” The nationality of the country should have been “North Macedonia” period.

There is NO rule in international law that nationality has to be in an adjectival form. If that is the case, it should have been “North Macedonian”. U.S. passports denote as nationality “The United States of America.”

There is NO rule that passports need to have the “Nationality” clause on them. For instance, the passports of the “Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia” had NO reference to nationality whatsoever. However, logically speaking with the bearer of a U.S. passport which nationality would one expect him to be? There is a very logical explanation for it. The possession of a passport of a particular country makes one a national of that country.

The issue of stateless persons is different since they are not issued a passport, but travel documents according to the “Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons” of September 28, 1954, under the aegis of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It looks like a passport and Identification Card. A stateless person is someone “who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.” Usually, stateless persons are those refugees who cannot reach the home country in order to receive a passport.

Whether or not one holds passports of three different countries is irrelevant. One may enter a country using only one passport. Also, it makes no difference to the Immigration Officer of any country, whether one obtained the passport by natural birth or through a naturalization process. The Officer’s job is to check whether the passport is genuine.

In essence, then, all this chatter we hear in Greek media and by certain groups about nullifying the agreement because of a concern like nationality or parliamentary procedure or, even, the ratification process itself has no substance...

Let’s look at the facts. The Interim Accord of 1995 never saw the light of day in the Greek Parliament, but we don’t remember ANY of the elected officials complaining or the same radical elements of the Greek public protest. The same is true for the media. Others demand the nullification of the Agreement knowing full well that the Agreement is final and may not be revoked, but it is safe to make noise for personal promotion.

Both the Interim Accord and the Prespa Agreement are equally binding, and of equal significance. The issue of ratification of both diplomatic instruments by the Parliament of Greece is irrelevant since the first one is already implemented and the second is in force as of February 12, 2019. Under the norms of international law, both are considered ratified, and the gears have started working, the moment they were implemented. Such norms apply to the Prespa Agreement, as well.

The Prespa Agreement was ratified by votes 153 for and 146 against.

“In addition to the 145 SYRIZA MPs, the deal was supported by independent MP and Minister of Tourism, Elena Koundoura (formerly of ANEL), ANEL MP Thanasis Papachristopoulos (who is expected to be expelled from the party following the vote), Deputy Minister of Civil Protection (and former ND minister) Katerina Papakosta, leader of the Democratic Left Party (DIMAR), Thanasis Theocharopoulos (whose decision to back the agreement led to the dismantling of the coalition between DIMAR and PASOK), and three MPs of the centrist party To Potami – leader Stavros Theodorakis, Spyros Likoudis and Yorgos Mavrotas” (Neos Kosmos, Prespa agreement ratified by the Greek Parliament 26 January 2019).

From the beginning of the SYRIZA/ANEL government, everyone blasted only SYRIZA. I wonder, why while SYRIZA was negotiating, the ANEL were silent waiting for the outcome of the negotiations? Nobody can tell me that Kammenos and the rest had no idea that negotiations on Skopje’s name were in full swing. The same goes for all the hypocritical political parties which now are against the Agreement.

Staying on this subject, since ratification, we have seen a remarkable uptick in "experts" discussing the revoking of the Prespa Agreement. Often, it seems that these "experts" are playing on emotions over facts. Can you explain to us, what will happen if Greece or Skopje takes such unilateral action to nullify the Agreement?

The Prespa Agreement went into force on February 12, 2019, according to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. That date is the end of some activities and the beginning of others referred in the Agreement.

The so-called “experts” understand the issue of diplomatic instruments much less than I understand the existence of a universe before the Big Bang. I have yet to see experts on International Law and Diplomacy with personal first-hand knowledge of the issue, suggest this Agreement could be nullified for any legal reason. If miraculously the agreement is revoked, the country whose government cancels it will face severe consequences – I hope that the country is Skopje.

Regardless of the country, a withdrawal from this Agreement will bring it in direct contempt of the International Court of Justice. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is compulsory because Greece at the time of the adjudication disallowed the jurisdiction of the ICJ only in cases of military action; it should have been in cases of Greece’s national security with prejudice under terms and conditions that Greece would determine herself. National Security is the safeguard of Greece’s national interests and transcends sources and methods that are not restricted to military operations. To put it bluntly, the legal department and/or the politicians of Greece’s MFA had blundered back in the 1990’s. At that time, they saw only the obvious physical aspect of national security disregarding the psychological characteristics of the matter. It is the modern case of the drunk Archias’ statement, "serious business for the morrow" aka «ἐς αὒριον τὰ σπουδαῖα» (Plutarch's Lives/Pelopidas, 10:9).

I had mentioned the issue to a couple of politicians of Greece explaining and proposing a change, but the first one was too busy getting reelected and the other one had no power to propose it. Finally, the modification of the particulars of compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice came about when the Samaras-Venizelos government was in power. Nobody had re-visited the issue of jurisdiction until after Skopje had filed its grievance against Greece. Issues of national interests and national security must be revisited often depending on geopolitical circumstances and definitely when issues of geostrategy arise.

Withdrawing from the Prespa Agreement will constitute contempt of the UNSC decisions of 1993 and of the ICJ which along with the UNSC declared that Greece and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had to follow such decisions. One must bear in mind that the whole name issue started because of Greece. Whether such an objection was justified or not was and is immaterial to both the UNSC and ICJ. After all, in 1993, Prime Minster, Con. Mitsotakis representing Greece declared that Greece was ready to compromise accepting names as North Macedonia, Upper Macedonia even New Macedonia. In the eyes of the political world Greece was the instigator of the problem by not accepting the name Macedonia. Also, at that time the Balkans were at war and in 2001 the Albanians took up arms against Skopje. Any rejection of the Agreement by Greece will most likely precipitate another armed insurgency in Skopje with the Albanian sector seceding creating a political and economic instability in the region. Such an insurgency would open the gates of hell for Greece unable to stop refugees who once in Macedonia will make it ethnically worse than 1903.

Unless one lives on another planet, one knows that Russia has been trying very hard to dismember the EU and NATO; it is why it feeds the ultra-nationalists (whether fascists or national socialists, i.e., Nazis) by any means, including but not limited the Russian Orthodox Church. Any such upheaval will invite NATO and Russia to a political and information warfare, i.e., cyberwar that could end up in some hot incident with unexpected consequences. But then do not forget Turkey, which is seeking trouble.

It is nice if one is openminded instead of using only tunnel vision.

The inclusion of specific provisions in the Prespa Agreement makes no sense to me, the enclosure of others follow the norms of international law and precedent, and while the insertion of others favor Greece. Looking back at the history of the Slavic population of the Republic of Skopje, I find some provisions of the Agreement need stronger guarantees than they provide (e.g., Articles 3.4, 8.1). In both cases, the parties leave the matter of enforcement to the benevolence and perhaps compassion of their governments. Of course, such stipulations are standard in normalization cases, but regarding Skopje, they are not sufficient. There is an issue of trust.

Most people, including ALL the “experts,” have read the Agreement as if it were a symbiotic arrangement between two ethnic groups, the Slavic and the Greek; instead it is an agreement between two countries. One must bear in mind that, unlike the Greeks in Greece, the Slavs are not a majority in the country that according to the Agreement takes the name “North Macedonia”[sic]. The Republic of Skopje is a multicultural society in which the Slavs are a “majority-minority”. By “majority-minority” I mean that although they constitute the majority of the population against the Albanians when all other ethnic groups are put together, they are a minority.

The Prespa Agreement is the result of Greece’s disagreement over the name of the Republic of Skopje, not Skopje’s independence or existence. The Convention of Montevideo of 1934 is evident in this. Article 3 of the Convention states, “The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states.” That means that Skopje as a State existed whether anyone had recognized it or not. That was a de facto recognition. A de facto recognition of Skopje said that Greece was represented in Skopje by the Liaison Office, not by an Embassy. Under the current de jure recognition, Greece is represented by an Embassy.

Allow me to regress a little bit. Greece’s objection to the name on the grounds of its national security and the stability of the region was an automatic obstacle to Skopje’s petition to join the United Nations. Skopje could not ascend to UN membership for security reasons. Then the representatives of the EU and permanent members of the Security Council (Britain, France, and non-permanent member - Spain) submitted a plan of confidence-building measures proposing the temporary name “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” without flag raising privileges. The UNSC only then recommended Skopje’s membership to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) which voted unanimously to admit it on April 8, 1993. In the meantime, the current Prime Minister of Greece Constantine Mitsotakis advised the newly elected President of the United States on January 26, 1993, that Greece was ready to compromise on the name issue. Later he revealed that the name of Skopje would be composite and suggested that could be “North Macedonia” “Upper Macedonia” or even “New Macedonia” because in ten years nobody will remember the name Macedonia.

The problem is that in International Law, once the bird gets out of the cage, it does not return to it.

On February 12, 1993, UN forces had already deployed in the territory of Skopje to prevent another regional war. The fact is that the Agreement resulted from the Security Council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), and were witnessed by Matthew Nimetz. That alone is enough for one who understands the contemporary political reality. One must bear in mind that the permanent members of the UNSC with veto power are: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. These countries are those who count, and they had sanctioned it.

The Interim Accord of 1995 was designed to afford both countries and the region Confidence-Building Measures which, essentially means it was intended in giving the countries space and time aiming at a slow but gradual in-house cleanup on both sides. The Greek team never took Skopje seriously, treating that state with pity while simultaneously leaving national interests and the national security of Greece unprotected. The Greek side let Skopje run the show leaving the door open to Skopje’s radicalism.

The Communists of Skopje bred the plan of deceit since 1939 basing it on faulty logic and cunning political views. Skopjans weaponized the ancient history of Macedonia (that had nothing to do with any of the Slavic tribes) as a tool for the distraction of the Greek population, and their populist politicians, and still do. Meanwhile, the Skopjans worked (and continue to work) in a similar style that Boris Sarafov had pioneered in 1902. At that time, while Bulgaria supplied the VMRO in its insurrection against the Ottoman Empire, it sent Boris Sarafov to western capitals to win the hearts and minds of high societies and indirectly governments, through propaganda.

However, in 1902, not one Greek thought that the history of ancient Macedonia was the root of the Bulgarian aggression in Macedonia. Not one Bulgarian from within or outside the Principality referred to ancient Macedonian history. Misirkov, the so-called father of Macedonianism, never uttered a statement that connected the Slavs to the ancient Macedonians. After all, he knew better. He was born in Pella and attended a Greek school.

The development of a “Macedonian” society out of the Bulgarian culture started as gradual Bulgarian expansionism, both in the Principality and Macedonia that grew out of a conflation of religion, language, and ethnicity, incorporated into a Bulgarian nationalism while simultaneously Pan-Slavism had been nurtured. However, then, something very thought-provoking happened. The previous convergent state transpired into a dichotomic condition. On the one hand, it enhanced the emergence of a “Macedonian” regionalism out of a Bulgarian background. In turn, the “Macedonian” regionalism espoused Communism as an advocate and vector of equality among the conglomeration of ethnicities of the Ottoman-held region of Macedonia in hopes of gaining their desired objective.

Meanwhile, the Bulgarians of the Principality faithful to their nationalistic sentiment employed every opportunity and privilege that the autonomous political status within the Ottoman Empire afforded to them, and consequently they deployed propagandists to Western European societies seeking assistance in overthrowing the oppressing Ottoman government and replacing it with a “legitimate” Christian lord. Of course, both sides used means of deception aiming solely at achieving their coveted goal, the land of Greek Macedonia. Thus, although the methods of both groups were different, the goal was the same.

Effectively, through the Interim Accord, Greece negotiated anything that proprietarily belonged to her, such as the name Macedonia and Article 7.3, while it allowed Skopje to keep anything it inherited from Yugoslavia, (Interim Accord, Article 12), and also, anything else Skopje’s communist past had provided to it as a matter of precedent. The language of specific provisions in the Interim Accord allowed non-governmental institutions as well as Skopje ultra-nationalistic organizations internally and externally to propagandize against Greece, its culture and inheritance.

The Prespa Agreement, although bilateral, has regional range and one could argue global consequences. It falls under the auspices and mandate of the UNSC for the political side, and after the decision of the ICJ for the legal side, neither State may withdraw from it. Article 3 of the Prespa Agreement solidifies the matter.

I have heard arguments from the “experts” like, “how come the United States had withdrawn from the Convention on Climate Change? Greece could do the same”. The answer here is simple. The people who said such a thing have NOT read the Convention and what it is about. It is a narrow–minded way of seeing things. The Framework Convention on Climate Change (Paris, 30 November to 11 December 2015), provides a stipulation for withdrawal in Article 28. However, Article 20. 9, states, “The provisions of this Agreement shall remain in force for an indefinite period and are irrevocable. No modification to this Agreement contained in Article 1(3) and Article 1(4) is permitted.”

Also, the Prespa Agreement is not voluntary. It derived from the obligation that both parties undertook under the Security Council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993). Unlike the Municipal Law, which commonly is known as Domestic Law that is based mostly on statutes designed to the particularities of each country, International Law is based on enacted “treaties, international customs, general principles of law as recognized by civilized nations, the decisions of national and lower courts, and scholarly writings, which create many precedents and norms.”

Addressing the specific question, some people believe that if Greece withdraws from this Agreement (I have no idea how), the countries automatically will regress to their Interim Accord. The Interim Accord, which as the word “Interim” alludes to is a Preliminary Agreement between two countries in dispute. They are interconnected.

According to Article 1 of the Prespa Agreement, “[t]his Agreement is final and upon its entry into force terminates the Interim Accord between the Parties signed in New York on 13 September 1995”. That means that Interim Accord is dead – the safety net is gone.

The Interim Accord was never designed nor intended to be the staging point from which the two countries could retreat each time the public opinion on either side nitpicks and waivers its national political choices du jour. Only in the game of Monopoly, one can go backwards – the UNSC is not Monopoly.

Greece’s withdrawal from the Agreement will precipitate celebrations in Skopje and its diaspora. Skopje would return to its “Republic of Macedonia” name while simultaneously getting rid of anything that the Prespa Agreement restrained it from doing; the blame game starts, and every single country in the world will recognize it as Macedonia and eventually Greece will do the same. Domestic instability in Greece could produce mobs who will find and lynch all those who led the country to its potential demise. Skopje will retain all, and everything it inherited from Tito’s Yugoslavia, mainly any bilateral agreements Greece and Yugoslavia signed on June 18, 1959, which includes the Free Zone in Thessaloniki (see Article 12 of the Interim Accord and Article 13 of the Prespa Agreement). Moreover, finally, Turkey will be free to exploit the situation to the fullest. The above is not pure rhetoric – it is genuine.

Returning to the matter of the language, the Agreement on Border Facilitation of June 18, 1959, allowed nationals on both sides of the borders to cross for one day, shop or see relatives without a passport or visa. Political refugees and those communists who committed war crimes in Greece were exempted. Nevertheless, identity cards issued by the Yugoslav side had information printed in Greek, Serbo-Croatian, and “Macedonian” languages. Those given to Greek nationals, the identifications cards included only the Greek and Serb-Croatian languages. The above constituted an indirect, but undisputable recognition of the “Macedonian” language under international law. When you see something wrong, and you do not correct it, you have just accepted a new reality.

As it is now, it is up to Greece to allow or restrain Skopje’s usage of the Free Zone in Thessaloniki. After Greece’s withdrawal from the Prespa Agreement, Skopje could easily demand applicability of the Law of the Sea Article 62.2 “Utilization of the living resources,” Article 69 “Right of land-locked States” and Article 70 “Right of geographically disadvantaged States.” Also, Skopje could easily invoke the Declaration Recognizing the Right to a Flag of States Having no Sea Coast, co-signed in Barcelona April 20, 1921, by Greece and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Skopje, as an heir of that kingdom, has the right to build its commercial fleet. Also, Convention on the High Seas of 1958, Article 3 refers to states with no coast, e.g., Skopje, have the right to their merchant fleet if they so choose. Such merchant fleet will have the same rights and privileges as the merchant fleet of the littoral states. Whether Skopje is capable of doing it or not is irrelevant at this point.

Greece will not be able to do anything to stop Skopje or Turkey and why not Albania and Bulgaria because it will be the pariah of the world and has NO independent professional lobby in Washington DC to somehow help. I would not expect anything from a “lobby” where members are self-deceived patting themselves on the back. For as long as governments of Greece finance such a "lobby" they choose to include docile people who depend on money but also favors from politicians. The fact is that not one Greek politician wants to see us politically dynamic and united. Not one.

One MUST always bear in mind:

International Law supersedes Municipal Law (aka Domestic Law);

If it’s a treaty or an agreement, especially those that include recognition of international frontiers, it is irrevocable;

If the diplomatic instrument is in force, it is considered ratified. There is NO way back. The Prespa Agreement is in effect as of February 12, 2019.

​In your opinion, what will the next 5 to 10 years look like because of the Prespa Agreement?

It is impossible for anyone to predict the future in general and the outlook of countries, especially the prospect of the region. Nonetheless, I could easily say that I foresee a border adjustment in the area; the question is whether it is going to occur in ten or 20 years from now, what form it is going to have.

I do expect changes in the Republic of Skopje. Whether such changes would be gradual through a series of legislative processes or impetuous as a result of political mishandling of given situations. Only time will tell. It will be an issue of geopolitical and geostrategic necessities of the time. The world political climate is drastically changing, and it will become worse; a mixed bag of populism, sensationalism, and egocentricity diminishes leadership skills among governing behaviors. Education, foresight, and vision will become more and more a thing of the past, giving way to “what is in it for me” attitude of emulously ambitious individuals.

I do feel that as soon as the Albanian population of Skopje becomes the majority of the country, it will hold a referendum for self-determination sanctioned by its own Albanian led government. The foundation for that will be Article 1.3.b of the Prespa Agreement. The next step will be Ilirida as Albanians of Skopje call their region and will unite with Kosovo. Whether these two Albanian led governments will unite with Albania will depend on their citizens and not on the citizens of Albania. The latter culturally has fallen behind as a result of very long-term isolation. Catching up with the Albanians of the former Yugoslavia will take some time. Although international law allows self-determination of a region under certain conditions, it does not permit the region’s secession from the parent country.

Greece, on the other hand, had better be careful, leaving the mentality of «Ωχ, αδελφέ, δε βαριέσαι. Όλοι περαστικοί είμαστε από αυτόν τον κόσμο• μήπως οι άλλοι είναι καλλίτεροι; όλοι αδέλφια, Χριστιανοί είμαστε» leaving it to someone else, or they might not have a country to call home. I fail to see why only Greeks are the bleeding and compassionate hearts.

As it concerns the region, it is time for the Balkan Peninsula to start emphasizing its geostrategic prominence by initiating an international system of waterway/canal (Axios - Morava Rivers) from Belgrade to Thessaloniki for commercial use, diminishing thus the already corroded importance of the Straits and consequently of Turkey. Such a system would allow all countries of Central Europe and the Black Sea to use the Seaport of Thessaloniki as the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea, to Gibraltar, and Suez (Templar 2014). Economic growth is always the window to prosperity. That is what makes people happy.

And, a question specifically for us in the diaspora...will the Greek and Skopje Slav diasporas ever reconcile their differences? What will need to happen for this reconciliation to take place?

To begin with, Diasporas are easier to galvanize than those who live in the home countries. Diasporas tend to keep traditions to resist assimilation by other cultures. Perhaps not much at present because of communications, but in the past, they lived in a time warp. Those of the diaspora that often travel home are milder than those who were born abroad or rarely visited their ancestral land.

Slowly a reconciliation will happen, when all con artists from both sides wise up and find another way to make a living than bilking financially the naïve and emotionally disturbed individuals, save a deplorable incident, they will reconcile their differences. Greeks have to be vigilant. Greeks by culture forget easily; Slavs do not. It will take about 100 to 150 years with the right education to achieve it. It is not love for the country as the extremists proclaim; it is sick egocentricity because whatever has happened, it had not in the fashion they wanted it to happen. Instead of oil, they rub salt on the wounds of the past. When both extremists understand that their home countries must live in peace, then reconciliation will transpire. I am NOT saying it will be easy, but it is a must.

However, for now, we have to deal with political Pharisees, whom St. Matthew suggested to “Stay away from them. They are blind leaders. Moreover, if a blind man leads another blind man, then both men will fall into a ditch” (Gospel of St. Matthew, chapter 15, verse 14).

Although you are very well known in political circles in Greece, why do you think successive Greek governments have never asked for your advice or help?

Politicians of Greece of ALL parties seek and receive advice only from those they know to agree with their shenanigans. One could call such people wishy-washy. Such people are those who somehow depend on various governments of Greece either for monthly income to “promote” the interests of Greece and the Greek culture abroad, but also those who have properties in Greece which somehow happened to have some fiduciary facilitation. Anytime something big is going on in Greece, one sees the same people are sought for advice. Even a downright stupid one would have assessed the perpetual failings of such policy. When one sees the advice one gets from the same people, it is wise to change advisors. However, such a thought would impede the mutual “understanding” of both parties.

About 12 years ago, it was suggested that I help Greece on the issue of Skopje’s name dispute. The message that came from the Greek Embassy in Washington, DC, was, “Μα, αυτός μας βρίζει.” Sidetracking the fact that at that time, social media was nonexistent except e-mails, it seems there were a good number of “well-wishers” that passed my e-mails to the Greek Embassy. Nonetheless, to my knowledge, nobody from the MFA questioned themselves “why” was I cussing them? Had they done something for the benefit of Greece, I would not say anything wrong; I would have applauded them. Mrs. Bakoyanni, Dei gratia Prime Minister Con Karamanlis, was selling Greece to Mr. Milososki, one centimeter per day.

However, political parties in Greece have no national legislative agenda that boosts the standard of living of the Greek populace nor have they a foreign policy that supports and galvanizes Greece’s national interests and national security. The last two institutions are based on the goals the declaration of independence of Greece had set in 1822. Goals or reasons that Greeks declared their independence in Epidavros in January of 1822 were Justice, Personal Freedom, Ownership, and Honor. These goals cannot and have not changed. The [s]elected politicians of the Greek spectrum are those who have not changed their mindset. They still operate under the mentality that the Sultanate allowed them to govern the rayas. The people of Greece have only changed masters from the Sultan to the local kodjabashis and hospodars who from first-tier slaves to the Sultan now they are first tier slaves to their ego and personal prosperity. Moreover, to succeed in their endeavor, they bribe their constituents, awarding them with government positions (θεσούλες) as if the loyalty of the people is to the party and its representatives instead of the country.

I have talked to a couple of politicians who in my personal belief have earnestly tried to do something for the country. Their predicament was that people based on political contacts and connections expected a special treatment to the detriment of others who did not have the privilege to know someone.

These people and their “yes men” entourage have only one goal. When they are in opposition, the only aim they have is to remove the governing party from power. Conversely, when they are in government, their task is to stay in government. So, it comes down to this: it makes NO difference who governs. They govern the same way no matter what the political party. They do anything to achieve such goals. Such is the ONLY policy they have and goes across the political spectrum. Also, the hiring system has nothing to do with merit. It has everything to do with who knows whom.

When I see someone thinking about the national interests and national security of Greece in earnest, I will help, provided I am asked to help, not by a specific political party in power, but to help Greece.

One must keep in mind that politicians have shaped the mentality of the Greek people through the education they’ve enacted. To understand the mindset of the Greek politician, the same politician who “educates” the people of Greece, one must read the book, The Education of a Russian Statesman, the Biography of Nicholas Karlovich Giers, by Charles and Barbara Jelavich, Berkeley: University of California, 1962. The Introduction of Part 2 of the book is especially relevant to the behavior of the Greek politician of today.

Here are a couple of segments found on page 125 of the book above:
​

“However, for the political future of the principalities [Walachia and Moldova], the social system inaugurated under this rule was far more significant than the immediate economic effect of Phanariote corruption. The Greeks in their dealings with the local inhabitants duplicated in tone and performance the attitude which their Moslem overlords adopted toward the subject Christians. Contemporary travelers in the principalities were appalled by the atmosphere of the courts and the "pure despotism exercised by a Greek prince who is himself, at the same time, an abject slave." (William MacMichael, Journey from Moscow to Constantinople in the Years 1817, 1818 (London: John Murray, 1819), p. 107)”.

“The Phanariote princes were overbearing and arrogant toward their subordinates. To make their own fortunes and to meet the payments to Constantinople, they sold the offices under their control and exacted extraordinary taxes and contributions to the fullest extent of their power. Corruption, initiated at the top, extended down to the lowest levels of administration. Since all offices were sold, the holder of any position tried to recoup his losses from those below him. Moreover, even among the few most powerful families, no common accepted standards of conduct existed.

“In the words of a member of a great Phanariote family, Nicolas Soutzos: "[How] to prevail over its competitors and [how] to achieve this, [and] to employ insidious means whose use was only encouraged by the Turks, was the constant occupation of the Greeks of the Phanar: a ceaseless struggle whose stake was always their fortune and often their life." (the original text: "L’emporter sur ses compétiteurs et pour y parvenir, employer les moyens insidieux dont l'usage n'était que trap encourage par les Turcs, telle était la constante occupation des Grecs du Phanar: lutte incessante dont l' enjeu était toujours leur fortune et bien souvent leur vie." Nicolas Soutzo, Memoires du Prince Nicolas Souizo, Grand Logothete de Moldavie, 1798-1871 (Vienna: Gerold, 1899), p. 4.”

Last year the Macedonian League publicly sought the stability of the Greek government. Some agreed. Many fought against the position and attempted to skew our call for stability. Explain the need for stability of the Greek government.

At first, I must explain that the Macedonian League's call for political stability took place about six months before it was announced that a final agreement between Skopje and Athens had taken place. One of the very relevant politicians of Greece thought that I was in favor of Skopje’s name that would include the word “Macedonia.” I gave him a couple of names that I would go for, as Central Balkan Republic, South Slavonia. However, I knew in my heart that it would be impossible because of the position of the Greek MFA since the party of New Democracy (2004–2009), which not only had accepted a name that would include “Macedonia” with a geographic designation, but also Mrs. Bakoyanni (Feb 15, 2006 – Oct. 7, 2009) was entertaining the idea that any name would be for “international use only”.

Greece has seen a lot of instability. Since 1821, Greece had three civil wars, five bankruptcies, a few political upheavals, which had resulted in The National Schism. The latter brought the defeat of the Greek Army in Sangarios River and Afion Karahisar the reasons behind the loss of Smyrna. Another one of the political upheavals in the 1960s brought the seven-year dictatorship (1967-1974) to the stage which was followed by the tilting of Greece, dangerously I might add, to the left. The organization ΑΣΠΙΔΑ (Αξιωματικοί Σώσατε Πατρίδα, Ιδέα, Δημοκρατία, Αξιοκρατία), which until late 1980 was treated as a total lie which was used as an excuse for the 1967 dictatorship. Of course, nobody was talking about the involvement of Andreas Papandreou. In reality, the whole affair was very accurate.

In the middle of March of 1967, at the call of Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Αριστερά (ΕΔΑ) in silent cooperation with Ένωση Κέντρου (ΕΚ), farmers brought tractors, threshing machines and other farming equipment and other vehicles coming from all over had effectively sieged Thessaloniki. Brigadier General Andreas Erselman of the III Army Corps was ordered to send armored units to open all roads leading to Thessaloniki. About one month later, the Colonels took over. I had just turned 19.

Consequently, I do not want to see Greece suffering the consequences of characters with limited understanding of the present world. Tunnel vision is not a way of seeing the world. They should take a few steps back and then they can see. All the clueless individuals lead movements!

My birthplace has suffered enough in the hands of irresponsible politicians since the assassination of Count Ioannis Kapodistrias in September of 1831. The last thing Greece needs at this point is a bunch of egomaniacs who in the name of their pseudo-patriotism are ready to throw the country into chaos and even bloodshed destroying the crumbs of prosperity and dignity the people of Greece have left with, in order to get the desired results for their kicks.

The fact is that the political leadership of the country regardless of political leanings and social capital with their silence have sanctioned the auction of the national interests and endangerment of the national security of Greece since 1950 and especially since 1991. They cared more about their political party and ideology than the welfare of their country.

Greece’s adventures start in the mindset of its citizens who when they enjoy the fruits of corruption, forget that they will pay for their choice in the future. However, when it is time for them to pay, they forget their past choice claiming that it is not their fault. There is a Greek word which encapsulates the behavior of individuals that use no common sense, who instead, repeat the same mistakes many times over while maintaining an attitude of self-righteousness. It is up to the reader to figure it out.

The issue of the Macedonian State goes back to 1924 and specifically regarding Skopje it retrogresses to November 1950 and the normalization process of Greece with Yugoslavia. For those who now scream foul it is too late. Where had they been ten, twenty, or even twenty five years ago? I was yelling “national security,” and their answer was “Alexander the Great was Greek.” I still have the e-mails.

Finally, we also need stability in the diaspora. I received the following message from Melbourne. It refers to the issue of the Melbourne University Macedonian [sic] Student Society - MUMSS and their alliance with the Turk and Albanian students against anything Greek.
​
“Unfortunately, all the good and intelligent members of the community have been disheartened, blocked and have moved away from the Greek Community. Most who get involved have no experience in lobbying. The ones involved with the community are mainly professionals who have a Greek background and want to promote themselves and then the Greek culture. In comparison with the Skopjan lobby groups in America, Australia and Canada, they have been able to sway politicians' minds and made them support the Skopjan narrative. Look at the fine inactivity by our NUGAS, AMAC and Pan Mac organisations in Australia. They still have not taken any action or even made a statement, regarding the Skopjan Student university association!

I suppose they [Greek organizations] are in winter hibernation!

Anyway, dear sir, it will be up to the individuals to take on the might of the Turkish, Albanian and Skopjan Lobby groups head on."

​I concluded with the following statement [to him]: “If
I were to write a book on IMRO and Skopje, leading to the Prespa agreement, I would call it:
Greece’s path to the Prespa Agreement:
A centennial journey through endless governing ineptitude,
political arrogance, institutionalized ignorance and widespread gullibility.
0 Comments

The 2018 Macedonian League Annual Assessment with National Security Advisor Marcus A. Templar

7/12/2018

0 Comments

 
In the 2018 Macedonian League Annual Assessment, we talk with Marcus A. Templar for an in-depth analysis of the Macedonia Name Issue; the Greek political establishment; Greek diaspora affairs and our future.
Picture
Not taking into account the recent Prespes Agreement, where did the Greek political establishment go wrong on domestic and foreign policies, especially as it concerns the “FYROM Name Issue?”

The answer is simple, EVERYWHERE!
 
Modern Greece does not have a clear, coherent national goal. The national objectives of the Greek revolutionaries as expressed at the Declaration of Independence, Justice, Personal Freedom, Ownership, and Honor, over the years have become irrelevant as politicians interpret these goals as part of their personal, not national aims. They have the mentality of the kodzabashis, i.e. the appointed heads of village councils, and the Phanariot hospodars, i.e. the masters who ruled the Rum millet as a second governing tier. This mentality has overshadowed the spirit of the 1821 revolution. 

​Like the Phanariots of the old times, who “sold the offices under their control and exacted extraordinary taxes and contributions to the fullest extent of their power.  Corruption, initiated at the top, extended down to the lowest levels of administration” (Jelavich, 1962). Nikolaos Soutzos expressed decadence of the Greek political crème de la crème as follows, “The prevalence over their competitors and their dominance through the use of insidious means, which the Turks highly encouraged, became the constant pursuit of the Phanariots. It was an incessant struggle, especially when the stakes were linked to their fortune, and often their life." (Soutzo, 1899, 4).  
​

PictureMarcus A. Templar, National Security Advisor,
Macedonian League
But the kodzabashis the headmen of the enslaved Greece, were not any better. They had prolonged the enslavement of Greece and through their spiritual offspring continue to ensure the maintenance of their Ottoman mentality. This time the terminology and the names are different, but not the narrative. Nothing has changed since. Expressions such as «Ξες ποιος είμαι
εγώ, ρε;» or «μία θεσούλα στο δημόσιο,» «το μέσον» and a few other similar expressions explain why Greece is a mentally Ottoman province. The political elite of Greece and their cohorts govern the country as if they are the hospodars, kodzabashis, and kaymakams of the estate. The sad part is that Greek voters have entrusted them and preserve them with their vote. No matter which party is in government it controls the country through the use of advertising funding in the media. Not only have they managed the country, but they also restrain the diaspora using the same method. No wonder nothing happens in Greece.  
 
The problem is that the above “masters” have downgraded the social education of the Greek nation by indirectly bribing the means of formal, informal, and non-formal education. Such a downgrade benefits the crème de la crème of the Greek ruling society. Under this downgraded learning, patriotism has turned into nationalism and sometimes ultra-nationalism, and hard-core communists give lessons on something they do not understand – democracy. 
 
Only those who understand the full meaning of Socrates’ Crito can fully comprehend the meaning of homeland.  Greeks have lost the ideals of their ancestors and the direction that those ideals could lead the country into the 21st century and beyond.  Democracy does not work when people think only of themselves and not the general good.  Also, people in Greece did not learn and have not learned how to think.    
 
The lack of articulate national goals has resulted in Greece’s lack of coherent national interests. It is why Greece is deprived of proper foreign and domestic policies. Thus Greece has partisan interests which are reflected in foreign and domestic policies. If a country does not arrange a national path for the future it cannot develop a strategy to achieve any goal. Greeks think emotionally based on stories that only those who believe what they read in the “National Enquirer” would believe.
 
Since 1829, Greece’s foreign and domestic policies revolve around personal interests, direct and indirect reward of the political elite which is reactive, not proactive, to external pressures, movements, events, and circumstances that feed decision-making and behavior of its politicians.
 
It is said that possession is nine-tenths of the law. This adage means that ownership is easier to maintain if one has possession of something, or difficult to enforce if one does not. In the case of Skopje, Skopje possesses the name “Macedonia” since 1943 as a constituent republic within Marxist Yugoslavia with full government structure whereas Greece had Macedonia as an administrative unit and often the Press of Athens would call it Northern Greece. Even now, the Athenian Press continues to call Macedonia Northern Greece, never mind the cop-out they give when asked. I understand that in using Northern Greece the Athenian government meant Macedonia and Thrace; however, as Northern Greece or later as Macedonia-Thrace, Macedonia did not have the international exposure that Skopje had.
 
Yugoslavia started having indications and warnings of political upheavals in 1990. The 14th and last Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists took place on January 20-22, 1990, the Slovenian and the Croatian delegations left during the Congress. That move by the delegations should have been a warning that something serious was going to happen. By May of 1991, despite the draconian efforts of Vasil Tupurkovski to keep the Republic together, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was over.  Greece as a neighboring country directly affected by any political and military turmoil should have monitored the situation and it should have assessed the fallout of any mishap in a wide range of possibilities that could affect the region, especially Greece. 
 
The following would hit Greek politicians on the head – on January 3, 1992, and during the informal meeting that took place in Athens between Greek and FYROM experts, the talks were deadlocked because of the insistence of Skopje delegates not to discuss the name of their country. That should have been a very serious indicator and warning of things to come. However, as we say in Greek «πέρα βρέχει» and «τα βόδια μου αργά». On January 26, 1993, six days after Pres. Bill Clinton took office the Greek Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the new President stating that Greece was ready to compromise with Skopje on the name issue. Greece surrendered before the first shot of the war was fired. The same man stated later that in 10 years nobody would remember Macedonia. 
 
Most Greeks and especially politicians and their advisors do not know the national strategic culture of Greece’s neighbors. Greece’s present electoral system does not help either. Most politicians and their advisors not only don’t know Greece’s neighbors but worst of all, they don’t know Greece. They do not care what occurs north of Thebes and south of Corinth. If they knew Greece’s neighbors and Greece itself, the issue of Skopje’s name would not exist at all. But nobody cared. What kind of impression should one form when people in Rhodes say that they lived better under the Italians?
 
I have talked with a few diplomats and politicians of Greece, and was shocked by their naiveté. They could not even distinguish the difference between how many countries have recognized the FYROM, in general, from those countries that have recognized Skopje under its so-called constitutional name. Skopje keeps promoting that about 130 nations have recognized them, which means nothing. About ten years ago, they claimed something similar until it was revealed that out of 110 or so countries, only 78 of them had recognized them as “Republic of Macedonia.”
 
So they should have three numbers.
 
1) How many countries have recognized the FYROM?
 
2) How many countries have recognized the FYROM as “Macedonia”? Was it a bilateral or erga omnes recognition?
 
3) How many countries have recognized the FYROM under its provisional name?  
 
Clearly, the Greek MFA has no idea because Greece does not have a functional intelligence process within the MFA. The A3 is as busy as the Maytag repairman under the principle «δε βαρυέσαι» and «ωχ αδερφέ.» The less they know, the better it is for the boss! He can always truthfully say, “nobody told me”. They are supposed to be professionals; it is their job to know.
 
What is happening today, reminds us of what had happened in 1902. The Bulgarians had sent Sarafov, a Supremist, to Western Capitals to push for the Bulgarian cause over Macedonia. 
 
The Greek government was asleep then as it is today, including the Greek people! Pavlos Melas wrote to Bishop Karavangelis, «Διάβασα τήν ἐκθεσί σου στο ὑπουργεῖο. Μά ἐδῶ κοιμοῦνται. Τί νά σοῦ κάνω ἐγώ;»  Moreover, the weapons (Gras, Mauser, Mannlicher-Schönauer) were transported to the Bulgarian komitadjis in Macedonia by Greek mule drovers or αγωγιάτες, so that the Bulgars can fight against and kill Greeks in Macedonia.
 
On at least one occasion, one of the chief komitadjis, Vasil Tsakalarov, went in person to Athens to buy weapons. There’s no difference today. Skopje has its fifth phalanx in the Greek Parliament itself.
 
I remember one diplomat had mentioned that Skopje would change its name, as did Myanmar which changed its name from Burma. When I told him that Myanmar was Burma’s ancient name and asked him to name the old name of the FYROM region; he could not even come up with Paeonia.
 
While Skopje governments implemented the strategy of protraction as they negotiated under the Turkish model of negotiation, it simultaneously bolstered excuses for Greek politicians to procrastinate, as they wanted to avoid signing a treaty on the name that would make them and their party appear as betraying Greece.
 
While this was taking place, Skopje threw ashes into the eyes of the Greek people, entertaining the thought of being descendants of the ancient Macedonians who miraculously were not Greeks. ALL subsequent governments of the FYROM used denial and deception via non-state and illicit actors working in the background and successfully persuading foreign governments to recognize them as “Republic of Macedonia.” The FYROM diplomacy was and is extraordinarily active on the name issue and recognition of the state as “Macedonia.” They’ll do anything to show their flag!   
 
In contrast, Greece employed extremely dormant and reactive diplomacy lacking a strategy of deterrence with tactics of a courteous, but fatalistic policy. Even the reactive tactics of Greece’s foreign policy proved to have been through an entirely personal lens of her politicians and diplomats who cared more about pleasing their bosses than doing their job by committing to their homeland and protecting the national interests of Greece.
 
Under such peculiar circumstances, the answer to your question is “Greece went wrong everywhere,” starting in 1951, the year Greece had recognized Marxist Yugoslavia. Would the same politicians direct negotiations of their real estate in a similar manner as they have negotiated the future of one-quarter of Greece’s land and indeed Greece’s future territorial integrity? 
 
The fact is that all governments of Greece, and by their silence the politicians of Greece, have created the problem that Greece has in the form of a self-inflicting wound. Some countries in the world had or still have names such as the Federal Republic of Brazil, Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of Germany, and United States of America. These countries were or are known under the name portrayed last: Brazil, Yugoslavia, Germany, America. What did, if anything, the Greek MFA think that the popularized name of “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” would be? Patagonia?
 
They only looked at the official name of the country, not the popular name that people would be using, especially when we all know people do not care about official names, not even diplomats. Didn’t they know that while Greece would be in its usual lethargic state, Skopje would launch any power in the world to achieve what it wanted and still wants?

Some would argue that during the second century AD, the Romans had called the region of the FYROM, Macedonia Secunda or Salutaris. Doesn’t this justify the present name of the republic?
 
The argument that the area of the FYROM was called Macedonia Secunda (or Macedonia Salutaris) and this justifies the present name of the Republic is very weak.
 
To begin with, depending on the time and type of Administration in the Roman Empire, provinces used to change names as well as borders. On one occasion, we see Macedonia starting just north of Stobi excluding Skopje which was in Dardania, and continues south of Lamia, leaving for Epirus a slice of land from Dyrrachium to Messolongi. Romans called south Greece, Achaea, and we had two lands named Epirus: Epirus Vetus and Epirus Nova. Another mess with names comes to us from what are today France, Belgium, and Northern Italy. There we see Gallia Belgica, Gallia Narbonensis, Gallia Lugdunensis, but in other times we know the name Gallia Lugdunensis and Gallia Narbonensis as Celtica while the toponym Gallia is found as Gallia Cisalpina and Gallia Transalpina around Switzerland. At that time one also finds Palaestina Salutaris or Palaestina Tertia and Galatia Salutaris and so on.
 
The whole naming of a region had to do with whether the administration was in the hands of the Emperor or the Senate. It is also immaterial because not one Macedonian King had named the region of the FYROM as Macedonia. Alexander the Great and his Greeks had reached India, China, and Uzbekistan, but none of these can claim to be ‘Macedonia’.
 
It is true that King Philip VI of Macedonia had conquered the area up to about the Shar Mountains, but he never changed the name of the region and did not move any Macedonians from Macedonia to Paeonia and Dardania. So, the ethnicity of the local population from Paeonian and Dardanian never changed ethnically to Macedonian Greek.
 
Romans had occupied some territories of Alexander the Great and his Diadochi and they also occupied almost all of Europe. They did not change the human terrain of the regions they occupied. They had local garrisons and used Latin as their lingua franca of their wide Empire. 
 
Another example is the Ottomans who ruled the area of the Western and South Balkans for about 500 years. They could not alter the local populations even though they settled Turks in the occupied regions and some of the locals changed their religion to Islam.  They succeeded in changing the religion of some Slavs like those in Bosnia, who were mostly Serbs, but these people remained Slavs. Muslims of Bosnia are proud of their Slavic heritage and they are first to claim it.
 
Conquest does not mean occupation with resettlement. On the contrary, when the Byzantine Emperors resettled about half a million Slavs from Macedonia to Bithynia the resettled Slavic population amalgamated with the indigenous population.Over the years and after numerous political and ethnic fusions, the Slavs ended up Turkified (Türkleştirme). That means what actually happened is exactly the opposite of what the FYROM Slavs advocate.

Although the Prespes Agreement is not a done deal yet, what are the national security implications for Greece if the final name of the FYROM includes “Macedonia?”  Are its ethnically diverse citizens of the republic going to be recognized as “Macedonians?”
 
The final name of the FYROM is significant not just to Greece’s national security and territorial integrity but is also essential to the national security of all countries adjacent to FYROM, including the stability of the Peninsula and the Middle East.   
 
The issue of the country’s name is different from the subject of the ethnicity of its citizens. What is important is the name of the ethnic group of the Slav people who have no ethnic surname. According to international norms, nationality follows the name of the country regardless of the actual or perceived ethnicity of the person. Holders of passports of multiethnic nations as the United States, Canada, Australia, etc. see the name of the land next to “Nationality.” Thus, the issue comes down to one segment of the FYROM citizens who until November 29, 1943, were considered as part of the Serbian nation along with Montenegrins. This is evident from the Comintern Resolution of January 11, 1934.
 
Thus if we assume (without taking into account the Prespes Agreement) that the country’s final name is Povardarie, then the passports of Povardarie will indicate as “Nationality: Povardarie,” even if the bearer is ethnically Albanian, Turk, or Greek. In general, ethnicity of individuals is something personal. On the other hand, the ethnicity, language, and heritage of the Slavic population as far as I am concerned should be ‘Jugosloveni’ or South Slavs. This better reflects their slavic heritage, which constitutes an ethnic and linguistic transition zone between Bulgaria and Serbia.
 
It is a thorn in the whole agreement. The government of the FYROM cannot say on one hand that they are Slavs, but on the other, they call themselves “ethnic Macedonians.”  Even Misirkov did not call them “ethnic” Macedonians; He made sure he mentioned them as Slavs. ‘Macedonians’ for Misirkov was a regional name and applied to all people of Macedonia regardless of ethnicity.By “Macedonian people”, Comintern meant all the people of geographic Macedonia regardless of ethnicity (Hristo Andonov-Poljanski. 1981, v. 2). 
 
I am not even touching the issue that the region of the FYROM became officially “Macedonia” in 1900. I consider myself a Macedonian of Greek heritage since I was born within the geographical area of the ancient kingdom. Who are these people to take away my right to call myself a Macedonian?  
 
I would push for the name “Central Balkan Republic” or “Jugoslavonija”, or better “Povardarie”. It is an existing name within the FYROM and all its people are very familiar with it. It is also a name of the Bishopric of Veles and Povardarie.

Let’s stay on the previous topic and focusing only on the Slavic population of the FYROM, why is the issue of ethnicity, language and heritage so contentious for both sides these days?
 
The Interim Accord was only about the name of the country. Here’s my argument that Greeks do not know their neighbors. 
 
What about the National Anthem of the FYROM, which is being played outside of the country as well? Nobody thus far has answered this simple question: How can the state change its name “Macedonia” but keep its national anthem intact? Does anyone in Greece know its lyrics? The first verse calls the nation “Macedonia” (Today over Macedonia, the new sun of Freedom is being born).
 
Has anyone in the Greek MFA thought about it? Or are they going to conveniently claim that the national anthem is a domestic issue as are the ethnicity, language, heritage and all other derivatives of “Macedonia”?
 
The claim that the “Macedonian” language was recognized by the UN in 1977 is absurd.  The UN recognized Taiwan, a country with a vital economy, since the 1945 San Francisco Conference. The country was a Charter member of the UN. Despite such a status, Taiwan was expelled by the General Assembly of the UN on October 25, 1971. It was unrecognized for political reasons. The issue of recognition of a language by the UN is not linguistic, but political; it may and can be unrecognized. The question is whether Greece has ever recognized anything “Macedonian”. We are referring to one-quarter of purely Greek land, not the ciftlik of Nasreddin Hodja.
 
Typically, the issue of ethnicity, heritage, and language are issues of domestic use, but  in this case, they are very important. When Greece signed the Interim Accord, the people responsible should have known better. They messed up due to their ignorance and personal convenience, so they can’t expect others to get the snake out of its den. And, what about the last failure? Whose fault is it? This has been going on for 75 years, however, the Greek political elite keep governing like ostriches. 

We have seen many Greek organizations demand that Greece withdraws from negotiations altogether. Let’s say the recent Prespes Agreement fails, what would happen if Greece withdraws from future negotiations with the FYROM on the name issue?
 
My first recommendation is that all Greeks who follow the moves of the FYROM Slav diaspora should stop imitating them. They are nonsensical and their goals are different from the aims of Greek people. This idea of withdrawal from the talks started by the Skopje diaspora about ten years ago and I was hoping that Skopje under Gruevski had listened to them. I was thinking, “get more rope to hang yourselves,” but unfortunately it did not happen. 
 
I have read some Greeks are calling for such a thing. It shows how little these people understand the international political scope of the issue.
 
In answer to your question, Greece could withdraw from the negotiations if the issue were bilateral. It would be with little or no political cost for the country. Skopje has tried to make it bilateral in the past; and luckily Greece fought against it. This is one of the correct things Greece has done on the issue. 
 
On a bilateral basis, the Interim Accord would be null and void making the erga omnes and inclusion of the name in the FYROM’s Constitution irrelevant and illogical. Every single country would recognize the FYROM as “Macedonia” leaving Greece on its own. The FYROM would get into the EU and NATO and in every organization it wishes, since the name issue would not exist. Greece would have to deal with Skopje being alone and without international support. I do not believe that any Greek wants such a thing.
 
All those people who want Greece to withdraw from negotiations because it cannot give the name Macedonia to the Slavs, in fact, become agents of Skopje on the issue because they’re thinking with their heart and not their head. I would say the same thing for those who want Greece out of the EU and NATO. They think that Russia will help Greece. That might be true, but knowing the foreign interests of Russia one of those interests is the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its move from Constantinople to Moscow. Such is the goal of Russia. Russia will also help its Pan-Slavic friends, which means that Thessaloniki will go to the FYROM and Kavala will become part of Bulgaria leaving Alexandroupolis to Turkey.
 
If this is what the Russophile Greeks want, then their wish will materialize. It should be known that since Aleksey Mikhailovich, father of Peter the Great, Russia’s main national interest is to support its goal for World supremacy and consequently Russian domestic and foreign policies reflect just that. This explains why the Russian Patriarch was absent from the Synod in Crete a few years ago although the preparation for the Synod had started about 35 years earlier.
 
The Vatican Newspaper, Il Osservatore Romano, had indicated that if the Patriarch of Moscow attended the Synod, the Orthodox Church would split because of the demands of the Russian Church. Their argument is that they lead 350 million Orthodox faithful whereas the Ecumenical Patriarch leads only about 1,500 souls. Such a statement indicates that the Patriarch of Moscow does not consider the Patriarch of Constantinople as Ecumenical, but only a local bishop with a limited flock. In reality, an Ecumenical Patriarch includes all Orthodox faithful of the World including the Russians; it is why he is called Ecumenical, not because of the number of his direct followers.
 
Greeks should be careful what they wish for regarding the Russians because they might get it. Then they will not be able to blame others, but themselves. International law is not case law or statutory law, but a common law. To quote Wikipedia, “The defining characteristic of “common law” is that it arises as precedent. In cases where the parties disagree on what the law is, a common law court looks to past precedential decisions of relevant courts, and synthesizes the principles of those past cases as applicable to the current facts.” In the case of treaties, the precedents seek answers from previous similar treaties. The UN is in possession of such treaties.   
 
Some international norms, precedents, and guarantees regulate international talks and treaties as they are incorporated into the set of rules generally accepted as binding in relations between countries, aka international law. 
 
Greece is not in a position of prestige because the people are disunited and the political parties deal with their micro-political scheming issues, just as the kodzabashis did two hundred years ago. Greece is only a European country geographically speaking. It is progressively becoming worse in a disappointing way.

Some erroneously believe that the name issue is a uniquely Greek issue. But, that is not the case. Explain how other countries deal with similar issues of shared regions.

Let me start by saying that many countries in the world share regions. Luxembourg, for instance, shares the French prefecture with the same name. Vojvodina (Serbia), Romania, and Hungary split the region of Banat. The Flemish, i.e., Dutch-speaking part of Belgium is the continuation of the Netherlands, and the French-speaking is a continuation of France.  The name Great Britain goes back to Britany in France; both names go back to the Bretons, a Celtic tribe. There are two European regions with the name Galicia, one in Spain and one in Eastern Europe. Hungary, Croatia, and Serbia share the territory of Baranya or Baranja. Let us not forget Thrace. 
 
The name is not the problem. The United States has a state named New Mexico, and Mexico has a state called Baja or South California. I can go on with similar examples.  
 
Let’s go a little bit further than that. The most striking element of the National Anthem of the Netherlands is at the end of the first stanza. It states, “The prince of Orange I am; afraid of nothing; I have always remained loyal to the king of Spain.” It is a remnant of the Napoleonic Wars, but I have not heard any Spaniard claiming the Netherlands.  Therefore, the whole matter goes to the mentality of the people of the south Balkans.   
 
The name of the region of FYROM as Macedonia is the result of political events:

  • Some intellectuals participating in a convention in Belgrade in 1865 envisioned the Balkan Federation in a politically socialist basis, not in a religious sense as Rhigas Pheraios had done many years before.
 
  • The Berlin Conference of June 1878 deprived Serbia of expanding west although Serbia received other means of compensation from Austria. Serbia thus extended south, a move that conflicted with the territorial aspiration of Bulgaria even after its territorial folding. Bulgaria had maintained its national ambitions long after its defeat in the Berlin Conference. It moved its Capital to Sofia (1879), annexed Eastern Rumelia (1885), which the Berlin Conference had made an autonomous territory within the Ottoman Empire. To balance the domestic political scene, the current Bulgarian government also made the Eastern Bulgarian dialect its literary language (1899).
 
  • Communism took advantage of the Bulgarian expansionist foreign policy and proceeded with a strategy that even if Bulgaria were not directly involved, she would have a lot to say on the Federation of Macedonia and Thrace. 
 
I have translated the three primary documents that are related to Macedonia; the six-page 1924 “May Manifesto”; the nine-page III Communist International, Fifth Congress - June 17–July 8, 1924 "Resolution on National Question in Central Europe and Balkans,” which includes the Macedonian and Thracian Questions. I have also translated the three-page Comintern Resolution 11 January 1934 “The Macedonian Question and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - United (IMRO-U)”.
 
When the three documents are studied, one understands that the main objective was a federal Macedonia and Thrace under the administration of the communist IMRO. It is obvious that the word “nation” in those documents referred to a multicultural nation-state or a nation as in “United Nations,” not an ethnic one. Such multicultural nations were the answer to the Communist “National Question.”

Based on your experience, what is the driving force behind the FYROM’s irredentist claims on the northern Greek province of Macedonia? Using past examples how could these irredentist claims serve to affect Greece’s national security.
 
Briefly put, the driving force is the territorial expansion over Macedonia by military occupation; it cannot be done otherwise. Their strategy hides this fact behind the imaginary issue of the so-called human rights of “Macedonians.” They do it because they think in a Court of Law such nonsense prevails; it does not. They see other cases of legitimate minority complaints around the world, the intervention of great powers in setting new borders and they hope they can identify themselves with such matters. But to do it, they employ deceiving and criminal means. Photoshop is one of the methods they employ. The bottom line is that they cannot Photoshop facts.
 
For the second part of the question the answer is that they work with two domestic Greek groups – the communists of Greece who still support Comintern’s resolutions under the doctrine “Comintern might not have been right, but it was not wrong”, and the ultra-right wing who believe that they are the only ones who care about Greece. Most members of these two groups do not even know the modern history of Greece and how Greece’s political instability has affected the country so far. Both groups live in a parallel universe.
 
The brief history of Modern Greece is as follows:
 
Greece declared independence in 1821 (officially on January 26, 1822, in Epidavros). However by 1827, while fighting the Turks, Greeks engaged in two civil wars while the Turko-Egyptian Ibrahim was threatening to suppress the revolution. After its independence in 1829, the first political parties that sprang up were the "Russian," "English" and "French," while the newly established country was already bankrupt.  Nicholas Karlovich Giers of the Asian Section of the Russian Foreign Ministry stated the following regarding the assassination of Capodistrias: “the assassin, Mavromichalis, belonged to one of the most distinguished families of the region, who looked with envy upon [Capodistrias] rise. The only thing that has changed since then are the names of the political parties, not the mentality of the Greeks. Personal ego, especially among those disqualified to speak, feeds Greece’s political instability.
 
The “Μαύρο '97” or “Ατυχής πόλεμος του 1897” (Eng: “Black ’97” or the “Unfortunate War of 1897”) took place because of people’s wishful thinking instead of weighing up reality and waiting. The result of that war was an Ottoman military victory after which Greece ceded small parts of Thessaly to the Ottoman Empire. It would be nice if people read the background of the war and the full outcome to understand that ultra-nationalistic overtones brought Greece to humiliation and bankruptcy. The embarrassment came when the commander of the Ottoman Army stated ostentatiously that he was ready to march to Athens and drink coffee on the Acropolis. Thankfully the Great Powers of Europe intervened stopping the Turks from advancing south of Olympus.
 
That was not enough. Following this, we had the National Schism between 1914 and 1917. The National Schism set the foundations for the foolish overconfidence of an unprepared, almost defunct Army to at least control Ionia and a government to lay claim on Constantinople. Instead of being satisfied with whatever the ally victors had given to Greece, they wanted more. They proceeded to capture and destroy Ankara. The Battles of Sakarya and Dumlupınar (26–30 August 1922) brought Greece to reality. Ionia was damaged, and Constantinople was lost. Turks still remember the date of their victory.  August 30 every year is the date of military promotions and new positions.
 
Due to National Schism, the loss of prestige and non-existent political will, Greece could not even enforce the Autonomy of Northern Epirus. 
 
In the case of the Greek-Italian War (1940-1941), Greece was a clear victor delivering to the Allied Powers not only a physical victory but also a tremendous moral victory; it was the first Allied victory they so badly needed. One must consider the defeat of the UK at the beaches of Dunkirk, Belgium, and the annihilation of France by Germany that rendered the Maginot lines a simple hurdle. For that decisive victory, Greece was awarded the Dodecanese.
 
Despite the prestige that Greece had enjoyed, due to securing the first allied victory in defeating an Axis power, the domestic instability, and fanfare during the WWII Peace talks in Paris (1946-1947) was responsible for Greece losing Cyprus. The United States wanted to pass Cyprus to Greece. However, the domestic turmoil in Greece and the usual fanfare and bogus claims of some Greeks from Florida brought the intention of the United States in the open and found stiff resistance by the Soviet Union and the UK.
 
Between 1966 and 1967, Greece was in political turmoil changing governments as often as people change their shirts. I witnessed it firsthand. I still remember the blockade of Thessaloniki by land about a month before the coup of April 21, 1967. Communist-led farmers had closed the co-capital of Greece from all nine land connections. I was in Thessaloniki, and I know what happened. Such domestic instability led to the revolt of April 21, 1967. Following seven years of uncertainty, another coup, dual at this time, took place. The first one resulted in the displacement of the Papadopoulos regime. The new military government, feeling that it was their “patriotic” duty to unite Cyprus with Greece launched a coup in Cyprus under the EOKA fighter Sampson giving the excuse to Turkey to intervene to “protect” its minority. The Greek Generals and the “inactive” politicians behind them should have known better. Turkey wanted to do the same in 1962, but its invasion was averted by the United States. The situation worsened because in 1964 the United States wanted to see Cyprus united with Greece under certain conditions (Acheson Plan). Both Archbishop Makarios and the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou rejected it because the plan included “a sovereign Turkish base on the island that would limit enosis and give Ankara too much say in Cyprus’ affairs”.
 
Between 1829 and the present, Greece has gone bankrupt five times each time bringing the nation into further instability; as if the political instability was not enough. Uncertainty in Greece means calamity for the country. It will be beneficial for Greece if her people start thinking in these logical terms.

Now to the hot topic on everyone's mind lately: the "North Macedonia Agreement” at Prespes. What are your views on this Agreement?
 
This Agreement goes far beyond the scope of the Interim Accord of 1995, which only applied to the name of the country. It seems that the FYROM’s negotiators seized this opportunity during negotiations. The Greek side should have refused to negotiate anything more than the name of the country. It seems however, the Skopje’s negotiators got the hint that Greeks were easy prey from the manner Mrs. Dora Bakoyanni had negotiated and accepted the adjective “Macedonian” as ethnicity, language, and heritage. Actually, at that time, she had accepted and pushed the name to the Greek American diaspora not as erga omnes, but “for international use” claiming that it was the same thing. Actually, Mr. Panagopoulos or Panagiotopoulos, I do not exactly recall, of the Greek Embassy in Washington was the bearer of the news. The Greek side should stick to its guns and refuse to talk about issues that were not included in the Interim Agreement. Bulgaria was not stupid to have done so.
 
Having said that, I was hoping that it would not be an Agreement, but a Treaty. I am against this Agreement for a number of reasons especially the fact that it does not clearly address the false informal and non-formal education that the FYROM diaspora disseminates to themselves and their posterity, including the influence of their Church.  In addition, I have a problem with the FYROM diaspora that injects hatred in their offspring against the Greek nation. It offers lip service to such a vital issue. 
 
To me, the most important issue is that it is NOT a Treaty, but an Agreement. Although in international law, there is no real difference in validity, they do differ in the manner that the two are handled and the level of their standing. The difference is often the number of votes needed in a country’s Parliament to ratify an Agreement or a Treaty.  As Greeks know, although the Interim Accord was ratified by the Parliament in Skopje, the Simitis government never brought it to the Greek Parliament for ratification because it was an Accord or Agreement. The problem I always had is, although the governing party was silent on the issue, the official opposition was silent as well. Agreements do not have to be brought for ratification. It is true that it was a command of the UNSC, the law enforcement body of the United Nations, but it should have still been offered to Parliament for discussion and ratification. Mr. Papoulias would have had a lot of explaining to do. 
 
Coming to the present issue, Nikos Voutsis, the present Speaker of the Parliament, declared that the matter will be offered to the Parliament for discussion and ratification. What is unclear is that he mentioned ratification of this agreement will require a very large majority in the Greek Parliament. “There is no constitutional provision for 180 votes, but for such a serious matter, the larger the majority will be, the better for all”. Really?
 
What exactly does the Article 28.2 of the Greek Constitution stand for? It states,  
 
“Authorities provided by the Constitution may by treaty or agreement be vested in agencies of international organizations when this serves an important national interest and promotes cooperation with other States. A majority of three-fifths of the total number of Members of Parliament shall be necessary to vote the law ratifying the treaty or agreement (website: Parliament of Greece).
 
Mr. Voutsis is the Speaker of the Parliament, but he has no reading comprehension.  The whole article 28 deals with international law, but he cannot find the reason for legal approval of a treaty or agreement?
 
As for the Agreement itself, between 1950 to 2015, Greece, directly and indirectly, gave up about 80% of what the FYROM wanted. The name “Macedonia” was given indirectly in 1950 when Greece established a Consulate General in the Capital of the People’s Republic of Macedonia. The mere establishment of an official Greek diplomatic office within the former Yugoslavia implied an indirect recognition.
 
So in essence, the negotiations between the FYROM and Greece did not start subject to a clean slate. International law is common law based on precedent unlike Greece's domestic law, which is based on statutes. Thus as time passed since the 1951 normalization of relations between Greece and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, SFRJ, Greece kept giving away or recognizing institutions and agreements. Also, by ignoring developments on the Macedonian issue, even as a side effect, such acts kept accumulating. Thus by 1995, Greece had already given about 50-60% of what they wanted as fait accompli. Most of the time under the upsetting procrastination and indifference expressed by «ωχ, αδελφέ» «δε βαριέσαι», «ε και τι έγινε», «και ποιος θα το μάθει;». According to the former MFA of Greece, Dora Bakoyanni, by 2010 Greece had already awarded Skopje 80% of what it sought by constantly giving in. Thus, Skopje had no incentive to allow Greece to receive the remaining 20%. Holding to the already possessed 80%, it negotiated the remaining 20% adhering to the dictum “what is mine is mine, what is yours is negotiable.” It has been Skopje’s traditional approach to the name issue since 1991(Templar, August 28, 2014).
 
Upon reading the entire agreement, the deficiencies were evident as if it were put together by a group of 15-year-old high school students who wrote their individual pieces and compiled the agreement without even reading it.
 
The agreement covers legal issues at the government level. It offers lip service to how legal definitions and provisions would be used by the people of Greece and its Macedonian Greek diaspora. It provides ethnic cover for the Macedonian Slavs, but it does nothing to protect the regional identity of Macedonian Greeks like me. As the diaspora of the FYROM has embraced the Macedonian national identity, they will have a very solid stance to declare that they are rightfully Macedonians. Nobody among the common international community would care about the Agreement, nor that their history has nothing to do with THE ancient Macedonians. The so-called experts in the Greek MFA have started an inferno that will die when the Macedonian region of Greece gets incorporated into ‘North Macedonia’. The geniuses of humanity from the ‘Republic of Athens’ have NO idea whom they are dealing with. They should come to Australia next year to learn a thing or two and leave their conceit back in Greece. 
 
Some parts of the Agreement make sense, but others do not; their vagueness will hurt Greek national interests but mostly the relations of our diaspora. Making the FYROM Slavs “Macedonians” even under the definition that Misirkov offered in his book On Macedonian Matters deprives the Macedonian Greeks of their true Macedonian Heritage. Other provisions nullify or even contradict stipulations of the same article or muddy other articles of the agreement. 
 
In general, Article 3, for instance, reinforces the Peace, Friendship and Mutual Protection between Serbia and Greece signed in Thessaloniki on June 1, 1913, by the Greek ambassador to Belgrade, Ioannis Alexandropoulos, and the Serbian ambassador to Athens, Mateja Bošković; it is known as the Koromilas - Bošković Protocol. Under article 3, Skopje accepts the borders of 1913.
 
Then we jump to the issue of citizenship or legal nationality.  Article 1.b in the Agreement is unacceptable.
 
The Agreement offers two meanings in the term "nationality". In international law, the term nationality is a loose term of citizenship. American passports for instance bear as nationality “United States of America”; it does not state “American”. In the case of this agreement, the two parties should have done the same; on the issue of nationality, the name of the country should be written, not the adjective Macedonian as it refers to ethnicity in article 7. That would have prevented part of the future headaches.
 
The agreement sees all citizens of the FYROM as “Macedonians” from the scope of a community of descent. So according to this agreement, the FYROM is 100% Slavic, but also North Macedonian. Thus the people of FYROM are given a choice, the Slavs are Macedonians in nationality, but the rest of them are North Macedonians. The problem from the point of international law is simple. There are two countries, one is Macedonia with its own nationals and the other one is North Macedonia with its own nationals. But how can citizens belong to a country under the name Macedonia that does not exist?

Coming to the issue of history, it correctly deprives the Slavs of any part of Greek history. However, the real issue was not, is not, and will never be ancient history as most Greeks believe. There is nothing in the history of the Slavs that connects them to ancient Greek history. Misirkov born in Pella knew extremely well who and what the ancient Macedonians were. He had never mentioned ancient history at all.
 
The history myth started in 1936 in Melbourne from the followers of the Bulgarian General Mihajilov and it continued later by their posterity under the thought, "if we are Macedonians, we must be descendants of the ancient Macedonians; otherwise what kind of Macedonians are we?" It was based on faulty logic and stories that their grandparents told them. 
 
Some historians doubt that the ancient Macedonians were Greeks on various pretexts, but not a single historian connects the Slavs a historical continuity to the ancient Macedonians, not one. Nobody considers the sermon of Pribojevic and the Book of Orbini as historical theses.
 
But the issue is very different from what the agreement addresses. Even if the FYROM had signed treaties that excluded the name Macedonia in their name, language, ethnicity and heritage the morons of VMRO-DPMNE, their Golden Dawn type (and there are plenty of those), will still claim ancient Macedonian ancestry. I had a numerous conversations with Hungarians and Croats of the Golden Dawn type and I could not believe the absurdities they said.
 
But what concerns me is not only the combination of the entire Article 1, Article 7 (paragraphs 2, 3, 4) and Article 8 (paragraphs 1, 2, 5), but in particular, Article 8.5. 
 
As previously stated, I wonder if anyone in the A3 has ever read and understood the national anthem of the FYROM. The agreement does not indicate anything of the kind.  Despite the explanations in article 7, the agreement considers the country to be “Macedonia” and treats it as such, since it does not touch its national anthem. If everything is erga omnes, the FYROM under the name “North Macedonia” cannot have a national anthem that pertains to Macedonia, which is a region of Greece. 
 
In addition, what exactly does paragraph 7.5 mean in relation to Article 7 as a whole?
 
The main concern is, who will be scientists and experts from the Greek side that will negotiate the history of Greece, including ancient history, and the history of the Macedonian struggle? If the Minority Research Center (KEMO) and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) get involved in “negotiating” the agreement, then:

  • a) All the Vlach-speaking Greeks of Krushevo, that is the victims of Ilinden, will be renamed "ethnic Macedonians"
 
  • b) the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (EMEA) will be proclaimed an "ethnic Macedonian Liberation Movement" with philanthropic and benevolent intentions, forgetting their terrorist acts of the “Boatmen” and the “Miss Stone Affair”
 
  • c) Pavlos Melas, the Metropolitan Germanos Karavangelis and so many other Greeks who gave their blood for Macedonia will be called "terrorists"
 
  • d) The approximately 30,000 kidnapped children from all over Greece will end up being boy scouts going camping with the blessings of their parents 
 
One must always bear in mind that even though the Agreement states the preservation of Greek history within Greek contexts, it does NOT explicitly and unambiguously state that ancient Macedonian history is an integral part of Greek history.
 
Do not assume that this is implied by the wording of the Agreement. Such an issue can be resolved by the exchange of letters between the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Skopje. Exchange of letters is a regular institution in diplomatic services.
 
What makes it particularly intriguing is Article 8.
 
Article 8.1 cannot be clearly understood. What I have not yet understood is the issue of Article 8.1. This article is an exact copy of Article 7.3 of the Interim Agreement. It is the same article that helped Gruevski and others steal Greek history and transplant it to their Slavic country. Why did they put it back, particularly when Article 8.5 exists? Have there been no lessons learned by the MFA?
 
8.2 Gives the government in Skopje six months to consider whether the statues are historical or not. What have they done so far?
 
8.3 In this article, the last paragraph allows any Slav to make copies of whatever Greek they want (e.g., Sun of Vergina) and sell them anywhere. These copies can be in clothes, flags, etc. Its prohibition under Article 8.3 applies only to the government and any organizations affiliated with the Skopje government, either directly or indirectly. Unless I have missed something, it does not apply to the private sector. This means that the spread of Skopje can follow their own drummer.
 
8.4 This is standard practice in the official gazetteer. It is no longer Solun or Monastiri in official documents. But this is normal for all official documents. Names used in the interior of a country are preferred by names used abroad. These names will be used in the list of UN names, i.e., gazetteer.
 
As for Article 13, it deals with the former Serbian> former Yugoslavian> current Serbian Free Zone at the harbor of Thessaloniki. Greece has already passed part of the same Zone to Skopje.
 
Never mind the explanation of Article 7. Greek-Australians should prepare for the fight of their lives. Greece has ensured that they and their offspring will be fighting against the FYROM Slav diaspora for as long as they live. 
 
The negative side of this agreement is that the Greek diplomatic corps, following the official line of the Agreement, will assist the FYROM Slav diaspora, declaring that the Slavs are actually Macedonians and the Macedonian-Greeks are just Greeks who live in Macedonia. The Slavic diaspora is not interested in the agreement or the emphasis on different historical context and cultural heritage. This Agreement actually strengthens their effort to “explain” why they are Macedonians.
 
Until now, the FYROM Slav diaspora only had academics side against them. Even Badian and Borza were clearly stating that the modern “Macedonians” could not claim a historical continuity with the ancient Macedonians. Now they have the official political side stating that they can be called Macedonians, because they moved to Macedonia during the 6th-7th centuries, and their name comes from their habitation. It gives them a regional, not a sanguine disposition but it still gives them the historical name. It clearly states their Slavic origin and it does the same with their language and heritage. 
 
I’m assuming that according to Article 15, visitors from the FYROM to archaeological sites will follow the rules of the Ministry of Culture that only certified guides will explain any and all historical facts related to the site. This must apply especially to the students, who until now they had their own “learned” teachers to explain.
 
From the composition of the Agreement, it looks like after the negotiating teams finished their job, someone took a superficial glance over the Agreement and approved it, without considering possible redundancies or conflicting statements in different sections. To put it bluntly, the Agreement was rushed kicking the tin away for others to get the snake out of its den. Eventually, and I suspect sooner than later, the snake will prove to be a gargantuan komodo dragon with lethal saliva.
 
As it is, the Agreement needs many explanatory notes and exchange of official letters like the ones that accompanied the Interim Agreement, but very few people know about those letters.
 
When one regresses to 1822, the connection to issues associated with the problems that Greece has becomes apparent. Political expediency, along with ignorance of the real world outside of Athens, is the source of all evils created by Athens. Because the creators of the problems are either incapable or politically unwilling to solve them, they turn around and ask for foreign help, whilst simultaneously releasing their partisan henchmen to tacitly “inform” the public that the Germans or the Americans are behind all of Greece’s calamities. Of course, they are behind them – their own boss had asked them to help.
 
For the sake of Greece’s survival, the Greek MFA needs to understand that Greece is far beyond the real estate between Thebes, Sounion, and Corinth – Athens is not Greece; it is simply part of Greece. Greece includes all of us who expect guidance and enlightenment from our home country, but all we get is a luminous darkness of corruption, conceit, and indifference that amounts to political immaturity.
 
The way politicians govern Greece is reminiscent of the Phanariots of Wallachia and the kodzabashis of the Sultan. The Sultan is dead, but their spirit lives on in the Parliament of Greece.
 
They better go back and re-write this Agreement before it is too late to save Macedonia.
 
​If you were tasked with changing something in the Constitution of the Hellenic Republic, what would it be?
 
Oh, that’s easy. We have to try to at least keep the politicians honest:

1. Residence
All elected officials shall physically reside within the district they are elected and represent for at least 10 years before they register their candidacy. Such a clause shall apply to all elected officials including the leaders of all political parties in the Parliament without exception. They shall be Greek citizens by birth or naturalization. No elected official shall be allowed to hold any other nationality but Greek. It also applies to residents of the diaspora unless the law changes to allow representatives of the diaspora in the Greek Parliament.  

* Explanation: As it is today if a person from the diaspora wants to run for office in Greece this person will have to follow the same rules that apply to all residents of Greece who want to be elected in the Parliament.

2. Nationality
Civil servants no matter how high or how low in rank or position shall have only Greek nationality. Such a requirement shall apply to all and any military personnel with any kind of Security Clearance. If such personnel have dual or multiple nationalities, the same personnel shall renounce all foreign nationalities before they enter the service or force. As the New Testament states, "No one can serve two masters. Either you will hate the one and love the other, or you will be devoted to the one and despise the other.”

3. Referendum
a. The Parliament will decide on issuing a notice of a referendum concerning specific matters within its sphere of competence by a simple majority vote of the total number of Representatives. The decision of the majority of voters in a referendum shall be adopted on condition that more than half of the total number of registered voters had voted. 

b. The Parliament will be obliged to issue a notice of a referendum if one is proposed by at least, say, 5% of the registered voters. The decision made in such a referendum will be binding.     

4. The President of the Republic will be elected directly by the people
The President of the Republic will be elected in general and direct elections, by secret ballot, for a single six-year term. The President of the Republic shall physically reside for a minimum of ten years within Greece at the day s/he is elected to office. The President of the Republic shall be a national of the Hellenic Republic by birth and only of the Hellenic Republic even if she/he resides abroad.  A person may be elected President of the Republic if over the age of at least 40 on the day of the election. A person may not be elected President of the Republic if, on the day of the election, he/she has not been a physical resident of the Hellenic Republic at least ten years in a row. Owning property in Greece while physically living abroad does not qualify one as being a physical resident.  
 
Greeks in Greece and in the diaspora held rallies on the “Macedonia” name issue sporadically. Some of these rallies were quite large, but the question remains: was there a message attached to those rallies or did the outside world penalize the message and Greece along with it?
 
Many messages used in those rallies make sense only to Greeks; however, they give the wrong message to foreigners with no understanding of the issue. Either the organizers do not seem to care, or they feel like isolating people who genuinely care about Greece. People have to understand that what makes sense to us is not necessarily a useful tool to spread our message. ‘One message fits all’ is the wrong concept. We can satisfy our pride and our ego, but simultaneously sacrifice our message or play it smart and spread the right message without over-dramatization, sensationalism, and ultra-nationalism.
 
To foreigners, slogans such as “Macedonia is Greek” sounds like it hides an ultra-nationalistic message with an expansionist connotation against the FYROM. Strabo said, “Indeed, Macedonia is part of Greece”; however, one must consider that at his time Greece was only a geographical term under the Romans; it was not a country. The Hellenic Peninsula was divided into two administrative segments, one of which included Macedonia.
 
In my view, people who prepare advertising should take Strabo’s statement and present in a way that the word “Macedonia” does not refer to the FYROM in any way and form, but to Greece. Something like “Macedonia is already a part of Greece”; “No state with the name Macedonia”; “Macedonia IS in Greece”; something like that would be more effective and to the point. People should stop thinking emotionally and start thinking strategically. People in the advertising industry are genuinely creative.   
 
I love Greece, I truly do, but loving something or someone does not mean I have to be blind; it means I should face reality and distinguish between what is right and wrong. I cannot restrict my mind of the truth whilst ignoring facts. It is said that love is blind; however, it does not have to be senseless.
 
People have the right to hold rallies and they should. In a democracy, it is the right and obligation of the citizens to petition their government. However, the same demonstrators and especially their leadership must debilitate all elements who misdirect the tide of the demonstration whether they come from the extreme right or extreme left. Leaders are responsible for anything that takes place in protests. About ten years ago, I suggested that we demonstrate before Greek diplomatic missions, not in front of foreign government buildings but I was turned down flat. Ten years later, they decided to do it, but it's too late. Even when I had suggested it, it was late; now it is much worse.     

Australia, USA, and Canada are home to an extensive Greek diaspora. However, we are a diaspora divided especially on advocacy. Why is this?
 
We are divided because those in leadership not only undermine each other but also don’t know what they are doing.  Others accept bribes from subsequent Greek governments about 25 to 35 thousand U.S. dollars monthly under the guise of promoting Greek causes or advertisement. This is true for some well-known Greek NGOs and mass media of the Greek Diaspora. Since it is an issue pertaining to all Greeks, where is the voice from key Greek American NGOs? They are silent on the matter of Macedonia because they are probably on the take.  
 
In some cases, those who think of themselves as superior homeland patriots are in fact so irrational that they end up collaborating with the FYROM Slavs without even realising it. Some go as far as getting their supporters to troll both Greeks and Slavs online and to exchange absurd nonsense as if they were Karagiozis (Karagöz) and Hatzivatis (Hacivat). The fact is the Sultan hung them both. More recently these ‘patriots’ have even put people’s lives in danger by “outing” some of our FYROM Slav supporters in the diaspora who work for the Greek cause. These trolls consider these public outings as an “achievement.” However, it never occurred to them that the people they have outed may be providing very useful information to Greece. A nation cannot survive with such people and is doomed to fail.
 
How can the Greek diaspora create advocacy groups when they have such members? One does not find this kind of behavior in the FYROM Slav camp.
 
Ultimately, intelligent Greeks of the diaspora become non-inclined towards involvement in such destructive organizations.

How would you describe the FYROM Slav diaspora organizations and the methods they employ to get their message heard not only within their community but also in the public sphere?
 
From the efficiency of their work, they are very well-organized with discipline and attention directed toward their goal not at each other. Their lobby works under a strategy that employs professional experts in disciplines where the lobby needs to spread the word. Their experts are not FYROM Slavs and they often resort to proxy struggle just like the VMRO in the early 1900s.
 
Also, FYROM Slavs have money, and the methods they employ are put together professionally. The coordination of tactics as part of a strategic purpose is apparent.  Their community takes “guidelines” from both Skopje and Ankara - Turkey is helping them a lot and supports them unquestionably. Not one of the members of the various groups would dare disobey it. When it comes to “Macedonia” they face it with religious reverence. It is exactly why the FYROM is where it is. Additionally, they don’t troll each other, nor divulge or out their sources, or attack each other, because they take the issue seriously.

Going back to the Greek diaspora, you are an advocate for the creation of a Greek lobby. Many in the diaspora already believe that there are Greek lobby groups at work to protect the interests of both the diaspora and to lobby their respective governments. What are the facts on this issue?
 
The myth about the Greek lobby started after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. As I understand it, a couple of Greek restaurant owners went to the U.S. Congress to talk to their Congressman about the invasion. As they were leaving the office, someone asked who these men were; one of the present office workers said “the Greek lobby.” More or less, it is how the myth started.   
 
Well, if so many lobby groups existed, Greece would not have been continuously on the receiving end. Since Greece never had a lobby, most Greeks do not know what a lobby is, what it needs to operate, nor the amount of money involved. Greeks are also tribal. They do not have the national unity necessary to address domestic and national security issues. I have been attacked as a pro-Skopje Slav only because my last name is not Greek. If they take the telephone book of, say, Athens, they will be surprised how many so-called Greek names are Arabian, Persian, Turkish, Slavic, Albanian, etc. A name ending such as “-is” does not make a name Greek, by the way. A name ending in “-oğlu” which is a possessive genitive of oğul (son) cannot be purely Greek. Papazoğlu, for instance, is purely a Turkish name. The Greek word for a priest is “ἱερεύς,” not papas. Papas is remnant of Greece’s Ottoman past. In Turkish “papaz” means “Christian priest.”
 
Skopje has only ONE national issue, their survival as a state. They have Turkish-trained personnel on issues of lobbying and their experts listen to professional advice. In the United States, lobbyists for other powers are required to register as Foreign Agents (FARA). The President of the UMD is a designated Foreign Agent. Additionally, the Ministry of Culture of the government of the FYROM, has for 10 years now employed people full-time to work solely on articles published in Wikipedia promoting the “Macedonian Heritage” of the Slavs turned “ethnic Macedonians”. 
 
Greece on the other hand has five national security issues; (Macedonia, Northern Epirus, Thrace, EEZ, and Aegean Air Space) and two national topics (Cyprus, and the Greek Genocide). Each one of them needs a separate lobby. 
 
The reason why we don’t have a lobby is because the political establishment of Greece does not allow it and does everything possible to subvert, sabotage, and weaken any attempt for a valid and honest lobby. Secondly, those who want to lead a lobby do not have any idea what a real lobby entails – dreams don’t count. Lobby means M-O-N-E-Y and expertise (love for the homeland or I want to help are fine, but they do not count as expertise). Just to open its doors for example, an active lobby requires a minimum of three million U.S. dollars. The operating costs reduce as the organization depreciates its assets but salaries and other operational expenses need to be factored in. If this sum seems exorbitant, one must start working in a Cost Accounting manner and without discounting any costs. 
 
A lobby is a fully organized operation consisting of adequately staffed and equipped teams with a single scope tasking that does not lose its peripheral vision. A team is a group whose identity reflects the consensus of its members without suppressing their individuality.
 
A lobby needs teams of experts, groups of professionals with expertise in the specific cause they advocate without interference or meddling in the business of other teams.  The experts are dedicated to their field and they do not need to be of Greek descent.  Each of the lobby teams consist of experts on specific subject matters, as geologists, national security experts with a specialty in geostrategy, experts in avionics, attorneys specializing in international law, diagnosticians, analysts, strategists, tacticians, operationalists, a lot of full-time staffers; but most of all, a lobby needs famous spokespersons in the community they operate and FUNDING.
 
Lobbies are connected to foundations or nonprofit public policy organizations using all forms of mass and social media and mass communication to influence a government or individual politicians. They demonstrate that the public demands a particular action. Such is the advocacy side of the lobbies that works overtly through lectures and presentations. 
 
A real Greek lobby requires serious funding because our multiple causes have been neglected or marginalized for a long time. The number of personnel required for a lobby can be anywhere between twenty to thousands; it always depends on what the aim and objective is. A few years back, I met someone who worked for a lobby as a Human Resource Manager, but the lobby in my opinion was insignificant. Yet she still had close to 100 personnel on her payroll. Not only do we have no lobby in Washington, but we don’t have appropriate people to lead such a lobby. All those who lead numerous Greek organizations have no understanding what a true lobby is, no appropriate training, no suitable contacts, and lack leadership ability.
 
Lobbyists are naturally accountable to their supporters who usually remain anonymous; it is why professional lobbies work quietly and behind the scenes using covert techniques. 
 
On the public relations side, a simple garden party with a politician today will cost a lobby about US$400-500,000 in the United States. The only Greek-American firm registered in the United States as a public relations firm is Manatos and Manatos. This firm was charging US$300,000 for garden parties about ten years ago.  
 
Most organizations of the Greek diaspora that I’m aware of are organized under the scope of cultural, societal, or educational societies with appropriate by-laws. Their part-time leadership, boards, and sometimes paid employees, lack what it takes to undertake the duties of a lobbyist. Unfortunately, they seek ‘lobbyists’ among themselves, restricting any possible expertise in the realm of the Greek diaspora.  Such mentality hinders the achievement of goals. The people who believe they currently lead a lobby are unaware that they do not have the suitable skills and information to deliver what is required. Titles, academic standing, or military and social eminence do not provide what it takes to operate and lead a political or national security lobby group, nor do they provide appropriate methods and strategies to achieve set goals. 
 
Those involved, do not understand what a lobby is nor its definition. The most critical part of lobbying is an affinity for the cause, not lust for it. Affinity lends itself to using logic, but passion raises emotional ties which are counterproductive. What one loves to do does not mean that it is the right thing to do.  
 
However, the problem within the Greek diaspora is more profound.  When irresponsible people spread the news that they are lobbyists while they do nothing near lobbying, they raise expectations by throwing ashes into the eyes of those who hope that someone is doing something. If they were honest about it, people would not have such expectations, and they would take the issue seriously trying to do something to fill the gap instead of being complacent. 
 
Others believe that educated people know what they are doing. To begin with, it is a faulty assumption. Let us take a teacher. There is a difference between teaching a five-year-old from teaching a 60-year-old. It is worse when a teacher of English is trying to teach English as a Second Language to foreigners. In my Turkish language class, for example, there were three engineers from Turkey teaching us Turkish as a Second Language. It was a farce. 
 
Another way of looking at the knowledge and expertise required for an effective lobby is like this. The human body and a house use plumbing. The gastroenterologist and the plumber do similar jobs.  They both take care of the plumbing, the first one of the human body and the second one of the house. The question is simple; would you visit a plumber to perform a colonoscopy?
 
I remember a Greek Cypriot professor of Political Science who teaches in the UK claiming that he knew a lot about Turkey. When he read my paper on the Strategic Culture of Turkey, he said: “I did not know all these details.” I am sure others would have presented a different set of details on the same subject. A lobby needs eloquent people to control the ground, spin the media, have credibility, sponsor a think-tank, neutralize the opposition without criminal means, control the web, and have access to government offices.
 
Most of the issues Greeks have arisen from targeting the wrong audience. They keep preaching to the choir. The message to the Greeks and non-Greeks can never be the same. They make videos in Greek explaining to the Greek audience that the ancient Macedonians were Greeks. Why? If the Greek audience does not know that, why are we attacking the FYROM Slavs for their historical ignorance? Why don’t the same people make a video in the language that the FYROM Slavs understand? What about in Serbian or even Russian? I am sure there are a few of Slavic descent who are willing to do it for a fee. They can even dub the voice. They can just narrate without showing their faces. It is exactly why a true lobby needs money. But who has the intelligence to think about it? According to Mr. Philip Christopher, President of the International Coordinating Committee – “Justice for Cyprus” (PSEKA), Turkey has spent US$102 million to professional lobbying firms such as Gephard, Livingston, Dole, Wexler, etc. Turks seek experts regardless of their ethnic background. Greeks look for people of Greek background. That alone limits the choices that Greeks have.  
 
In saying this, I want to clarify that I am not a lobbyist and will never be one. I do not have what it takes to be a lobbyist. I can organize a lobby without any outside interference and I can task the necessary research with a team of true researchers; that is what I can do.
 
We cannot end this interview without discussing our organization. Why has the Macedonian League resonated with so many people young and old? We see it from the constant communication and the enthusiasm of our followers. We see it with foreign government officials who follow us seeking answers to the name issue. What does the Macedonian League offer that other Greek organizations don't?
 
We are a small group of professionals specializing in various disciplines. Since its inception, our website and social media has remained and will remain clear of sensationalist articles with unproven “facts.” We welcome articles from professionals that have something to do with Greece’s domestic and national security issues. All of them pass through the editorial board. We have several professional editors who check the accuracy and the tone of articles.
 
What people like is the thoughtfulness behind the maintenance of our website and our social media sites. It is why foreign governments and intelligence agencies are our followers. It is only for a mature following and for people who want to learn something. It is precisely why the Australian Institute of Macedonian Studies (AIMS) has honored us with the Research Fellowship. People have noticed that anything we do is based on facts and not rumors or hallucinations.
 
It also depends on your readership. We do not care about spreading nonsense to gain readership. From the beginning we decided to keep our website content of high quality caliber and we stayed focused on the national security of Greece. Quality is always better than quantity. From a personal perspective, I’ve had many opportunities in life to follow popular movements and webinars. I did not do it because of the people I had to deal with and the direction the webinars would take. My father fought against fascists, Nazis and Communists and I would not forgo his example. I would never allow myself to be used by people who seek my knowledge on the matter to promote their pre-existing beliefs or political ideology.
 
Marcus Templar, your closing thoughts. Seeing that the global Greek community is extremely unhappy with this ‘Agreement’, going forward, what is the best way to protect Greece’s national security interests, and undo some of the damage done so far?

Well in closing, I wish that the governments and the people of Greece had woken up in 1990 regarding the name issue. Some Greek politicians have a problem with Skopje taking the name “Macedonia” as part of its final name, but I wonder where they had been since then? The demagogues who now take advantage of the issue could easily create social and political upheavals in the country by using toxic populism.
 
Having said that, the following course of action will help undo damage done so far:

  • Firstly, people whose education, employment and expertise have nothing to do with issues of political science (foreign affairs, national security, etc.) should stay out of these issues because they are unskilled in the craft. Imagine how senseless it would be if I got involved in their profession whether they were engineers, physicians, teachers of literature, etc? Serious issues are not for kafeneion discussion and Politicial Science is not kafeneion politics.
 
  • Secondly, establish Professional Lobby groups; one to lobby Greek politicians and others to lobby governments of the countries they live in.
 
  • Thirdly, hire a legal team of experts in international law to look into protesting and consequently annulling the present Agreement between Athens and Skopje under any or all of the following: 
 
                 – Ultra vires;
                 – Misunderstanding, fraud, corruption, coercion in accordance with Articles 46–53 of the Vienna
                    Convention on the Law of Treaties;
                 – Contrary to peremptory norms.

Then re-negotiate an Agreement based on the findings of the Legal Group and this time assign diplomatically relevant and politically competent negotiators instead of international nation-nihilistic organizations. The name of the multi-ethnic country must be Modern Yugoslavia or Yugoslavonia. The Nationality (which is a loose term of citizenship) must follow solely the name of the country and its Slav nationals should be designated as South Slavs speaking a South Slavic, with South Slavic Heritage. 

  • Fourthly, employ full-time multilingual personnel, dedicated to maintaining Greek-related content on Wikipedia in more languages than Greek. Never underestimate the influence of Wikipedia on people especially on children.
​
  • Finally, implement all the changes to the Greek constitution that were proposed in the report above.
 
Marcus Templar, The Macedonian League wishes to thank you for your genuine and in-depth analysis in presenting the causes and consequences of this serious national security issue.
 
Your academic and strategic insights are vital to the future direction and success of the Greek position on the Macedonian issue.

​--

About Marcus A. Templar
Professor Marcus A. Templar is a former U.S. Army Cryptologic Linguist (Language Analyst), Certified U.S. Army Instructor of Intelligence Courses, Certified Foreign Disclosures Officer, Certified Translator Interpreter of Serbo-Croatian, SIGINT / All-Source Intelligence Analyst. He is the Macedonian League's National Security Advisor.

​To read all his papers, please click here.

About the Macedonian League
We are an international professional Hellenic advocacy group. Our primary purpose is to advance our interests to informed and responsive governments on issues concerning Greece's national security and territorial integrity. 

The Macedonian League's main focus is on the “Macedonian name dispute”, as this dispute is a serious national security issue that threatens the territorial integrity of Greece.

The Macedonian League also focuses on exposing and combating anti-Hellenism and analyzing political developments in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

For more information, follow us on: Website, Facebook, Twitter

Department of Communications
Macedonian League 

0 Comments

    Media/News Center

    Keep up to date with the latest news and developments that impact Greece's national security and Balkan regional stability.


    Picture

    Επίσης Διαβάστε

    Τα άρθρα του
    Μάρκου Α. Τέμπλαρ
    στα Ελληνικά εδω.

    Categories

    All
    Annual Assessment
    Current Affairs
    FYROM Watch
    Marcus A. Templar
    Press Releases

    Please Visit & Support

    Picture
    Picture

    RSS Feed

    Highlighted Papers

    Skopje's NATO Adventures: A Conversation on Insanity and Megalomania. The FYROM: Bribing its Way to Membership
    ​
    -- by Marcus A. Templar
    Ilinden: A Story of the Web and the Harpoon - The “People’s Republic of Krushevo”
    -- by Marcus A. Templar
    Fallacies and Facts on the Macedonian Issue
    -- by Marcus A. Templar
    A Synopsis of the FYROM Name Issue
    ​
    -- by Marcus A. Templar
    The Treaty of Bucharest: Borders of the Balkan countries as of 10 August 1913
    ​-- by Marcus A. Templar
    III Communist International, Fifth Congress - June 17-July 8, 1924 "Resolution on National Question in Central Europe and the Balkans" The Balkans: Macedonian and Thracian Questions
    -- Comintern Journal #7
    An Introduction to and Remarks on the Comintern Resolution of 11 January 1934
    -- by Marcus A. Templar
    Eliminating Opposition One Way or Another: The Case of the Expelled Swabian Germans and the Kidnapping of Greek Children
    ​
    -- by Marcus A. Templar
(c) 2014-2020 The Macedonian League