As citizens of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) decide in Sunday’s referendum whether to change the country’s name to North Macedonia, proponents of the “yes” camp are concerned over the possibility of low voter turnout. 

​The referendum seeks to ratify the name deal – the Prespes agreement – signed in June between Athens and Skopje, which will allow Greece to lift its objections to the country’s bid to join NATO and the European Union. 

The question put to voters is: “Are you in favor of NATO and EU membership, and accepting the name agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece?”

According to registers, 1,806,336 people are eligible to vote. 

The government of Zoran Zaev has campaigned fiercely to get the deal approved and has urged citizens to vote as the referendum’s result will not be considered valid or credible if turnout is below 50 percent.

The main opposition VMRO-DPMNE party has repeatedly denounced the deal, but has said nonetheless that it will respect a “yes” vote if turnout figures are more than 50 percent.

The concern is further compounded by the mass migration of recent years, which has depleted many villages in the Balkan country. On Thursday, FYROM President Gjorge Ivanov told the UN General Assembly that by being asked to ratify the deal, his countrymen were effectively being asked to commit a “historical suicide.” 

He urged citizens to boycott the vote, describing the referendum as a “noose” and said that the proposed name change is “a flagrant violation of sovereignty.” 

Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras told the UN General Assembly on Friday evening that the agreement was not reached due to the imposition of the interests of a stronger party on a weaker one. “It was mutually acceptable, defending the dignity of both sides,” he said. 

FYROM’s Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs Bujar Osmani, who met on Friday with EU Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn, said that “citizens understand the importance of this moment” and the country is poised “to make history.” 

In response to Ivanov’s comments, Hahn told reporters a “boycott is not an expression of democratic majority.”

Ballot boxes in 80 municipalities will open from 7 a.m to 7 p.m. The vote will be monitored by some 2,500 local and 500 international observers.

Source: Kathimerini English

Amidst international expectations of a renewed push to jump-start Cyprus settlement talks, PM Alexis Tsipras and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed the full range of bilateral relations during a one-hour meeting today on the sidelines of the 73rd UN General Assembly in New York.

The two countries’ foreign ministers, Nikos Kotzias and Mevlut Cavusoglu were present at the meeting, as was Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar, who was serving as chairman of Turkey’s Joint Chiefs of Staff when he was tapped for the cabinet post.

This was the first meeting between the two leaders since Ankara released two Greek army officers that had been incarcerated in a Turkish prison for over five months, after being arrested in the Evros border region. The incident had heightened tensions between the two countries.

However, beyond the niceties and broad smiles, there were indications of a gradual normalisation of the two countries’ relations, as Erdogan invited Tsipras to Istanbul for talks.

Greek analysts and pundits have expressed the view that the crisis in US-Turkey reations has pushed Erdogan to seek to draw closer to the EU, and that Greece can play a key role in promoting that objective.

Aside from the prospect of renewed Cyprus talks, energy issues and Turkey’s hostile activity in Cyprus, the EEZ and the Aegean, Greek government sources said that Aegean tensions and implementation of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement were high on the agenda.

The Greek PM’s office publicised the meeting with a tweet: “Μeeting with the President of Turkey, Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on the sidelines of the 73rd UN General Assembly # UNGA”.

Source: To Vima

Twelve days before a referendum in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on whether the Balkan country should change its name to North Macedonia, a new opinion poll has shown that the "yes" vote has a small lead over the "no."

According to the survey, which was carried out by the firm Market Vision for the news website Mkd.mk, 51.1 percent of respondents said they would answer "yes" to the question of whether they accept a recent deal with Greece to change the country's name so that it can join NATO and the European Union.

The remaining 48.9 percent were opposed to the deal.

Only 33.4 percent of ethnic Slavs supported the deal with 66.5 percent rejecting it while 95 percent of ethnic Albanians were in favor.

Source: eKathimerini

ATHENS — The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said he very much welcomed seeing the Eastern Mediterranean region “through a Greek lens” as he finished consultations with his counterpart, Greek navy Adm. Evangelos Apostolakis, the chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff.

Marine Corps Gen. Joe Dunford told reporters traveling with him that the bilateral relationship between the two NATO allies “is probably as good as it has been in many, many years.”

Dunford and Apostolakis discussed the situation in the region. Greece looks north into the Balkans, east to the Middle East and south into Libya and the rest of North Africa. “[He] shared some thoughts about the region, and I greatly benefited from the perspective of the Greeks, who have a regional view,” the chairman said.

Increased Cooperation

The Greeks are open to increasing military cooperation with the United States, he said. “[They] made a general overture saying they would be willing to consider that, and I certainly was enthusiastic about the possibility,” Dunford said.

U.S. European Command and the State Department will work with Greek ministries to continue these conversations, he said.

“If you look at geography and you look at current operations in Libya and current operations in Syria, [and] you look at potential operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, the opportunities here are pretty significant,” the chairman said.

Dunford said hearing directly from the Greek military about their experiences with the refugee crisis gave him a better appreciation of the scope of the problem and the capabilities they brought to bear on it. “They also have some interesting perspectives on the Russian naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, as well,” he said. “I think we both agreed that we are seeing something we haven’t seen since the 1980s in terms of the operational patterns of the Russians in the area.”

The two leaders talked about the importance of sharing information and intelligence particularly in the area of counterterrorism, the chairman said.

Expanded Base Access

Dunford said the Greek defense chief “expressed interest in expanding our access to their bases.”

This access can be used to move personnel and equipment in and out of theater.

“We … have taken advantage of Souda Bay -- it’s a critical piece of infrastructure here in the region, and Greece has also been open to expanding training opportunities for our forces that are stationed in Europe, in particular for U.S. Army units to do training with helicopters,” he said.

The two men talked about deepening relationships through the International Military and Training program. This program increases military-to-military engagement through service member exchanges. Young Greek service members attend U.S. professional military education schools and young Americans attend Greek schools. He noted that Apostolakis attended the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Warfare School -- then the Amphibious Warfare School -- earlier in his career and the Greek army chief of staff attended a school in Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Finally, Greece also plays a unique role in the region in terms of bringing together multinational exercises. The United States is certainly amenable to participating in those exercises, Dunford said.

The U.S.-Greek relationship is in “a very positive place” today, a senior government official said here on background today, and the foundation to this turn of events has been the defense relationship between the two nations.

Regional Concerns

Greece has suffered through an economic crisis from which the country is still recovering. Yet the nation continued to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense -- a benchmark for NATO members.

“The Greeks live in this neighborhood and they have been looking around and seeing the same instability that we have,” the official said.

Greece is nervous about NATO ally Turkey and want that country to remain firmly rooted in the West, the official added. They also confronted the refugee crisis with limited resources, but see the possibility of it continuing.

“They are deeply concerned with what is happening in Libya and Africa, because even if Syria stabilizes, you’ve got Africa that is right on their doorstep,” the official said.

The Greeks, too, are worried about what the Russians are up to in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, the official said. “They are looking around, and the U.S. is still the best partner available to them.”

On the security front, more is happening. In addition to NATO forces, U.S. European Command, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Special Operations Command use the facilities at the Naval Support Activity in Souda Bay.

The U.S. Air Force is now operating MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles at Greece’s Larissa Air Force Base. The unarmed UAVs will focus on information-gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance in the region.

Both Dunford and the official said the United States is not looking for large bases in Greece. The U.S. footprint in the country will remain light. But there will probably be more American service members rotating in and out of the country for training, education and exercises.

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff

From fake statues of ancient Greek kings and heroes to Byzantine rulers...from Roman emperors to modern Bulgarian revolutionaries, if there is one thing that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is famous for it is theft and forgery of history [1].

From this very small and poor land locked republic, a whole industry of fake news production sprung up prior to the 2016 US elections where youth were cashing in to the tunes of thousands of dollars a day by churning out fake and outlandish news stories. Since that US election, the term "fake news" is still a topic of discussion and a household word. And, even as Facebook and other social media giants are attempting to fix the problem with fake news on their platforms, these young "news and media entrepreneurs" in the former Yugoslav republic are eagerly anticipating and gearing up for the US elections of 2020. [2] [3] [4] [5].

For Greeks however, fake news, outlandish stories and forgeries emanating out of the FYROM is not a new phenomenon. It has been a thorn in the side of Greece and Greeks ever since the former Yugoslav republic declared independence as the "Republic of Macedonia" in September of 1991. Greece opposed the name of the new republic from the very beginning and has rightfully argued that the Balkan nation's name as "Macedonia" points to territorial claims over the Greek geographical region in northern Greece called Macedonia.

In the early days of the internet, FYROM Slavs especially in the diaspora were busily plying their trade in promoting fake history and ancient forgery on the then new medium (i.e. the internet of the early days) in their hodge-podge attempt at linking the ancient Greek history of Macedonia to that of the then recently independent Yugoslav state. Unfortunately, the remnants of their early endeavors online from the mid-1990's is actually still available on websites which will forever be frozen in time. Today, anyone who attempts to search the terms "Macedonia" and "ancient Macedonia" on the internet will always without fail end up on fake history websites about 95% to 98% of the time - websites which are all laden with anti-Greek rhetoric and racism. In other words these early websites and news forums from the early days of independence simply fulfilled an ultra-nationalist agenda and nothing remotely of history.

The latest fake news emanating from the media in the FYROM targets both the US Postal Service and the modern history of the Balkans (in particular the modern history of Greece and Bulgaria respectively).

Desperately grasping at straws due to the upcoming September 30, 2018 "Name Change Referendum" which will seek to change the constitutional name from the "Republic of Macedonia" to the "Republic of North Macedonia," the ever crafty media in the FYROM and many ultra-nationalist, anti-Greek FYROM Slav diaspora Facebook and Twitter pages released a fake story between mid to late August 2018 [6] [7] [8] [9] that claims that: "back in 1928 the US Postal Service released stamps featuring a map of a "United Macedonia" along with the name of the country as "Macedonia" and its national heroes."

The obvious reason behind the fake news article is a very last ditch effort in attempting to sway a certain segment of the FYROM Slav population to boycott the name change referendum. The message that the FYROM media is trying to push onto this particular segment is: why should we change the name of the country to appease Greece, Bulgaria, the EU, NATO and the UN when even the US considered us simply as "Macedonia" back in 1928?" The target segment of the population that this hoax was geared for was obviously towards the hardcore ultra-nationalist element. However, this hoax also targets the more vulnerable and also the less educated in society who may not be able to determine if these stamps are authentic or not.

So, the question is: did the United States Postal Service ever release the above set of "Macedonia" stamps which also features a fantasy map of a "United Macedonia" in 1928 as claimed by the FYROM's fake news media and diaspora groups?

The answer is an emphatic NO!

All stamp collectors know that next to the stamps of the United Kingdom, the stamps released by the United States of America are some of the most recognizable and most desirable in the world. Every image of every US stamp is known. Every single one of them.

The hoax and the facts

The stamps featured above are claimed to be released by the US Postal Service in 1928. However, according to the Philatelic Learning Centre:

"When the fiscal budget for 1927, (July 1, 1927 through June 30, 1928), was reduced from the $8 million of the 1926 fiscal year to $7.5 million, the Postmaster was forced to tighten the belts of the stamp production process considerably. Chief among these was elimination of any new commemorative issues. It was an unfortunate coincidence that this period marked the 150th anniversary of some of the more famous events in the American Revolution, events that by all rights deserved to be commemorated by postage stamps. After much prodding, including from the then President Coolidge, Postmaster New authorized the production of the "Surrender of Burgoyne" and "Green Mountain Boys of Vermont" commemoratives in 1927. Further pressure was exerted to issue a stamp honoring the events at Valley Forge."

Therefore, the first thing to consider is, if the US Postmaster was forced to tighten the belts of the stamp production process in 1928 - on such an auspicious year - a year which marked the 150th anniversary of some of the more famous events in the American Revolution, how likely then would it have been for the US Postal Service to almost forego the printing of US commemorative stamps altogether but, in turn, spend limited funds and resources to print stamps of a then non-existent country in the southern Balkans? As stated above by the Philatelic Learning Centre, even President Coolidge personally intervened and then even further pressure was exerted by others just to print a few stamps honoring a few of the most famous events in the American Revolution.

The second thing to consider is that all US stamps have been heavily documented and catalogued for decades. Taking into account the point above then, due to financial constraints on the US Postmaster, according to all stamp catalogues, in the year 1928, the US Postal Service printed only six different themed stamps for the entire year. According to all stamp catalogue sources, none of those printed were the stamps features above with the legend "Macedonia" as promoted by FYROM Slav organizations. The stamps, therefore, are a hoax.

The third thing to consider is that the fake "Macedonia" stamps don't even look like US postage stamps. First, they are missing the words "U.S. Postage" featured on all US stamps in that particular [protected] font of that era. Even more importantly they are all missing the value of the stamps which was also a main feature on all US stamps of the era.

Sources: An inside look inside the catalogues of United States postage stamps
1) The six types of US stamps printed in 1928 can be seen here: United States Stamps of 1928.
2) The entire catalogue of all US stamps ever printed can be seen here: United States Stamps since 1847.

Other stamps printed by the US Postal Service include:
a) Panama Canal: The Canal zone 1904-1978; b) China: US Post China 1919-1922; c) Guam: Guam 1899-1930; d) Mariana Islands (Philippines postage) Mariana Islands 1899; e) US Cuba (Surcharged): US Cuba 1898-1899; f) Hawaii Postage: Hawaii 1851-1899; g) Confederate States: Confederate States; h) City Carrier Stamps: City Carrier Stamps; i) Postmasters Issues: Postmasters Issues.

Based on the fact that the above stamps are obviously not printed by the US Postal Service, the conclusion that can be drawn is that the fake stamps were more than likely created as a souvenir item among ultra-nationalists especially of the 1950's or more than likely a very recent Photoshop. Google and other image search engines also point back to the FYROM media articles and to FYROM Slav diaspora Facebook and Twitter pages that are promoting these fake stamps as "real US stamps of 1928." The oldest image we could find of the above fake stamps was from back in 2017, a search which led us on to a FYROM Slav ultra-nationalist website in which they "uncover the hidden truth" on subjects pertaining to the former Yugoslav republic.

Some chatter that we have seen online on certain FYROM Slav diaspora social media pages also posit that these stamps were printed in Yugoslavia. Others say Bulgaria. There is even a very small minority who promote an outlandish theory that these stamps were printed by "Slav separatists" within Greece under their own provisional government - a "provisional government" that is also based purely on fantasy or, as the term is stated today, "fake news."

Therefore, lest there be any doubt of our research by our FYROM Slav friends promoting this hoax, below and for good measure we also link the catalogues for these three countries to cover all the theories swirling about these "1928 stamps."

Yugoslavia: Yugoslavia stamps of 1928;
Bulgaria: Bulgaria stamps of 1928;
Greece: Greece stamps of 1920-1929.

We hope then, that by exposing the above "Macedonia" stamps as a verifiable hoax, that the generally anti-Greek media in the former Yugoslav republic and the ultra-nationalist FYROM Slav diaspora organizations which incessantly promote these sorts of fake stories for internal consumption will understand that their racist, anti-Greek fake news and Photoshop games aimed towards Greece and Greece's history will always be exposed by the Macedonian League to an extremely wide audience.

Department of Document Analysis
Macedonian League

About the Macedonian League
We are an international professional Hellenic advocacy group. Our primary purpose is to advance our interests to informed and responsive governments on issues concerning Greece's national security and territorial integrity.

The Macedonian League's main focus is on the “Macedonian name dispute”, as this dispute is a serious national security issue that threatens the territorial integrity of Greece.

The Macedonian League also focuses on exposing and combating anti-Hellenism and analyzing political developments in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

For more information, follow us on: Website, Facebook, Twitter

Anton Aldemir lives in Switzerland since June 2011. At the beginning of this year, he went to the Turkish Embassy in Bern to obtain a new passport. The Consular office of the Embassy took his old passport but told him that he would not receive a new one because Turkey had issued a warrant for his arrest on sight.

Anton Aldemir as he was growing up was raised by his family as a Muslim. As a result of inquiries, he found out from his father named Manav that on his mother’s side [Anton] was a Greek. He was born and reared in the center of Izmit (ancient Nicomedia) Province and learned through a DNA testing in 2012 that he is not an ethnic Turk from Central Asia, but Anton’s ancestors have lived in Asia Minor for thousands of years.

A tradition that attracted his attention led him to search for his identity. The fact that the Cappadocia Greeks played in folk songs using spoons just like they did in Anton’s family and realizing that his ancestors played “defi”, [an instrument] made from animal skin and a few other traditional characteristics led him to his [ethnic] identity. He learned that his grandmother's brother (Pehlivan Çakıcı İzzet of Izmit) was Greek speaking or Hellene.

Anton read many works written in this subject as books, articles, etc. and learned about the anguish that occurred in this land a hundred years ago. Similar tragedies happened to Armenians, Syriacs [Assyrians] and Greeks or Hellenes and he started discussions exchanging information with others about the matter.

2011 Haziran ayından itibaren İsviçre’de yaşayan Anton Aldemir, bu yılın başında Türkiye pasaportunu uzatmak için TC Bern Büyükelçiliğine başvurur. Konsolosluk eski pasaportunu alır ancak yeni pasaport alamayacağını söyler. Nedenini soran Anton’a ise Türkiye’ye hakkında yürütülen bir dava olduğunu, arandığını, görüldüğü yerde tutuklanması gerektiğini söyler.
​
Anton Aldemir çocukken ailesi tarafından Müslüman olarak yetiştirilmiş. Ailesi okulda kim olduğunu sorarlarsa biz baba tarafından Manav, anne tarafından Rumeli muhaciriyiz diye söylersin şeklinde telkinlerde bulunurmuş. İzmit Merkez ilçesinde doğan, çocukluğu ve gençliği de burada geçen  Anton 2012 yılında DNA testi yaptırır ve Orta Asya kökenli yani etnik Türk olmadığını öğrenir. Test sonuçları Anton’un atalarının binlerce yıldır Küçük Asya’da yaşadığını gösterir.
​
İlgisini çeken bir gelenek onu kimlik arayışına yönlendirir. Kapadokya Rumlarının kaşıkla oynadıkları halkoyunlarının neredeyse benzerini ailesindeki büyüklerin de oynuyor olması, hayvan derilerinden ‘def’ yapıp müzikler çalınması ve diğer kimi geleneksel motiflerden yola çıkarak soyunu araştırmaya yönelir.
Babaannesinin ağabeyinin (Pehlivan Çakıcı İzzet/ İzmit) Rumca/Helence konuştuğunu öğrenir.
​
Bu konuda yazılmış bir çok eseri, kitap, makale vb. okuyan Anton her şeyden önemlisi yüz yıl önce bu topraklarda yaşanmış acıları fark eder.  Benzer acıları yaşayan Ermeni, Süryani ve Rum/Helenlerle tanışır, sohbet eder, bilgi alış verişinde bulunur.

Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, has published its analyses of the situation in the Western Balkans in 2017 and in the first quarter of 2018.

The annual analysis points to a 92 per cent drop in the number of illegal border-crossings by migrants from outside of the Western Balkans region to roughly 19,000 from more than 260,000 in 2016. 

According to Frontex Western Balkans Q1 report, in the first three months of this year the number of illegal border-crossings by non-regional migrants fell 10 per cent compared to the same quarter of last year, as well as in the last quarter of 2017. 

The continued pressure along the Greece-Albania-Montenegro-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia sub-route remains indicative of migrants trying to bypass existing security measures along the main route via Serbia.

2017 Figures 

In all of 2017, the six Western Balkan countries reported 631 cases of document fraud, the second highest number since data collection began in 2009.

As in previous years, non-regional migrants continued to attempt to enter the Western Balkans across the southern common borders with Greece and Bulgaria before heading north and trying to exit the region largely at the northern common borders of Hungary, Croatia or Romania with Serbia.

Afghan and Pakistani were the two main reported nationalities, accounting for roughly 32% and 30%, respectively, of the overall number of detections involving non-regional migrants. Syrians ranked third in 2017 accounting for 8% of the total.

The largest number of illegal border-crossings of regional migrants occurred at the common land borders between Greece, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM]. 

Cooperation between law enforcement authorities and enhanced border control measures were key to reducing migration pressure in the region. 

Firearms and drugs smuggling

Cannabis, mostly grown in the region and trafficked internally or to the EU, was the main smuggled narcotic substance in the region last year. More than 23 tonnes were detected by Albania, Montenegro Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. There were also 209 detections of smuggled firearms and ammunition. Most of them were detected in Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Last year, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] dismantled two organised migrant-smuggling groups arranging the transportation of migrants from Greece towards Serbia and onwards.

Read the Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis report.

Read the Western Balkans Q1 report.

Source: Frontex

Source: Ekathimerini English

According to an opinion poll carried out by the Macedonian [sic] Center for International Cooperation (MCIC) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 41.5 percent of FYROM’s population plans to vote “yes” in the September 30 referendum on the agreement with Greece which sees the country’s name changing to North Macedonia.

The report on the poll, which was released Tuesday, said 35.1 percent oppose the deal.

Support for the deal was shown to be stronger among the country’s ethnic Albanian minority, with 88 percent in favor, whereas approval among the majority Slavs was at 27.4 percent.

A majority of 66.4 percent said they would take part in the vote.

The referendum question will be “Are you in favor of EU and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?”

Poll Source: MCMS

Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Borissov and his counterpart from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) Zoran Zaev held their second joint commemoration on August 2, 2018 of the 1903 Ilinden–Preobrazhenie Uprising.

The meeting of the two government leaders in the Bulgarian town of Blagoevgrad also marked the first anniversary of Borissov and Zaev signing the treaty of good neighbourliness between Bulgaria and the FYROM, subsequently ratified by both countries’ parliaments and which came into effect in February 2018.

Borissov and Zaev held talks before heading to Blagoevgrad’s Macedonia Square to pay tribute at a monument to Gotse Delchev, the VMRO leader who died in a clash with Ottoman forces in May 1903 while involved in the planning of the uprising.

​The Ilinden Uprising was an organized revolt against the Ottoman Empire, which was prepared and carried out by the Bulgarian Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO).

The history of the uprising and of figures such as Gotse Delchev have been contested between Skopje and Sofia for decades, including during and after the respective communist eras in Bulgaria and the former Yugoslav republic.

However, with the official warming of bilateral relations over the past year, Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslav Republic are seeking deeper formal dialogue over shared history, including through the formation of a joint commission on such issues.

Washington – The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action today targeting Turkey’s Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gul and Minister of Interior Suleyman Soylu, both of whom played leading roles in the organizations responsible for the arrest and detention of Pastor Andrew Brunson.  These officials serve as leaders of Turkish government organizations responsible for implementing Turkey’s serious human rights abuses, and are being targeted pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” which builds upon Treasury’s Global Magnitsky Act authorities. 

“Pastor Brunson’s unjust detention and continued prosecution by Turkish officials is simply unacceptable,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.  “President Trump has made it abundantly clear that the United States expects Turkey to release him immediately.”

Pastor Andrew Brunson has reportedly been a victim of unfair and unjust detention by the Government of Turkey.  He was arrested in Izmir, Turkey in October 2016, and with an absence of evidence to support the charges, he was accused of aiding armed terrorist organizations and obtaining confidential government information for political and military espionage.  

As the head of Turkey’s Ministry of Justice, Abdulhamit Gul is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 for being the leader of an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse. 

As head of Turkey’s Ministry of Interior, Suleyman Soylu is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 for being the leader of an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse.

As a result of these actions, any property, or interest in property, of both Turkey’s Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gul and Turkey’s Minister of Interior Suleyman Soylu within U.S. jurisdiction is blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.

Identifying information on the individuals designated today.

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury

The Turkish foreign ministry is warning foreign diplomats in the Republic of Cyprus not to overstep their authority, following comments by Israeli and Egyptian ambassadors in Nicosia during a diaspora conference last week.

On Monday, Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hami Aksoy accused the Republic of Cyprus of “disregarding the inalienable rights of Turkish Cypriots on natural resources.”

The statement came one week following remarks by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, who took to social media to say that Turkish Cypriots would not accept anything less than political equality in Cyprus.

“Greek Cypriots must stop acting like the sole owners of Cyprus. The fact that both sides on the island are politically equal will never change,” Cavusoglu wrote on Twitter.

But Aksoy’s statement went further, pointing fingers at comments made by foreign ambassadors in Nicosia, who spoke during an international conference of Greek Cypriot Diaspora last week.

“The remarks made by some Ambassadors during a recent conference in the Greek Cypriot Administration, in support of the unilateral hydrocarbon-related activities being conducted by the Greek Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean, are unwarranted,” he said.

Aksoy did not name the diplomats in his statement, except to say that his country would “recommend to the representatives of the relevant countries that they do not exceed their authority.”

According to Turkish media, the statement was a direct reference to the Israeli, Egyptian, and US ambassadors in Nicosia, who attended the Diaspora conference between July 25 and 27.

The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, addressed the conference where foreign ambassadors also took part in a round table discussion, offering their remarks on natural gas exploration in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Ambassadors in their own words

Israeli ambassador to Nicosia Sammy Ravel, according to CNA News Agency, told the audience that he “hoped military force would not be necessary against Turkish provocations.”

Egyptian ambassador Mai Taha Mohammed Khalil also spoke on the issue, saying “we hope we don’t reach the point where we will have to use the military in the area,” while adding “we will provide any possible assistance to Cyprus.”

US Ambassador Kathleen Doherty also reiterated the US position on natural gas exploratory drilling and the rights of the Republic of Cyprus, saying that the former US secretary of state had gone to Ankara and told his counterpart that “Turkey’s behaviour was unacceptable.”

Greek Ambassador Elias Fotopoulos also spoke in the conference, saying his country remained hopeful for a positive outcome in a possible new round of peace talks on Cyprus, “as long as Turkey shows the necessary will and the international community continues to support the process.”

Ankara recently upped the ante on rhetoric regarding a possible settlement in Cyprus, reiterating its position on political equality between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and insisting that no international agreements on Cypriot natural gas reserves could be signed without overall agreement between the two sides.

​Source: Kathimerini Cyprus

The Hellenic Cultural Commission sponsored a Panel Discussion on July 25 in Atlantic City, New Jersey.   The panel discussion transpired during the Convention of the Family Supreme Convention of the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA). 

​The moderator of the panel was Mr. Lou Katsos, and the participants in the discussion were Professor Alexander Kitroeff, former Ambassador Karolos Gadis and I. The subject of the discussion was, "Turkish Irredentism and the Finlandization of Eastern Mediterranean."

As it is known, Finlandization is the process or result of being obliged to favor, for economic reasons, or at least not to oppose, the interests of a great power as in the case of Finland the interests of the former Soviet Union despite not being politically allied to it.

The panelists suggested and discussed several points of view from historical, political, diplomatic and psychological aspects of Turkey and its present leadership especially of President Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan. Some of the opinions expressed below were also communicated during a radio program and individual conversations.

The core of the discussion was Erdoğan and the new Turkey as he has envisioned it and to implement his vision, even before he took an oath as President, he issued a published a 143-page dictum changing the operation of every single Ministry and other agencies under the Ministries. After that, Erdoğan continued issuing decrees after decrees making the Republic of Turkey, a fully functional dictatorship that Ataturk would be jealous and the Sultan disgusted. 

Controlling all political life, Erdoğan could essentially become President for Life whose psychopathic cruelty would make François Duvalier, also known as Papa Doc, of Haiti a Cub Scout. This man fundamentally holds an unchecked wicked authority as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Hungary’s Viktor Orban. They all used democracy to expand their influence in the same manner that the Communists had done in the past.

But Erdoğan’s vision for Turkey is magnificently ambitious and costly. Because the Straits are getting shallower and narrower, Erdoğan is determined to open a canal from the Black Sea – five km from Baklalı - to the Sea of Marmara – Küçükçekmece 25 km west of Istanbul; the name of the canal is, Canal Istanbul.  Erdoğan is determined to make the canal the rival of Suez and Panama. Erdoğan has brushed aside legal, environmental, and budgetary questions to make the canal a central plank of his re-election bid on June 24. The Financial Times has quoted Erdoğan saying, “One of my first projects in the new era will be to start building Canal Istanbul”… “There may be a Suez somewhere, a Panama somewhere else, but with Canal Istanbul, we will send the world a message.” (Financial Times, Ayla Jean Yackley, May 29, 2018)

The problem is monetary. When Erdoğan announced the Canal in 2011, the estimated cost was 13 billion U.S. dollars. Today it has increased to 15 billion U.S. dollars, and by the time the project ends its price could reach the 20 billion U.S. dollars.

Also, Erdoğan wants to build at least one runway, long enough to take care of taxiing needs of such a military aircraft as an F35. However, it always depends on specific variants as whether Turkey will be trusted to own such an aircraft, the capability for such a heavy and costly aircraft to maneuver (turn, climb, run), the specific models of the aircraft (traditional takeoff/landing versus vertical takeoff/landing), guns, and a few others. With a price tag of $94.6 million U.S. dollars each for only the basic F35A, the price for a more advanced model of F35 could increase its cost to 132.44 million U.S. dollars.

If we add the above sums to Erdoğan’s grand plan regarding the Istanbul Airport, we can quickly add the cost of 12 billion U.S. dollars. The idea is the improvement of the airport by adding six runways across a strip-like land. It will take about a decade to complete with the projection of making the busiest airport not just in the region, but also on the planet. The projected number of passengers could hit the 200 million people annually.

However, in a global economy, which is afflicted gradually by worries from an unfolding trade war to higher oil prices, Turkey could be very close to comfort. Turkey’s economy is 22nd in the world below that of the state of Illinois, which is 20th, and Russia, which is 13th in the world. Starting a business is not an easy venture, but including family in the governments is unwise. In a country whose finances constitute a bubble ready to burst it is the worst thing anyone wants to do; yet, Erdoğan has installed Berat Albayrak as the Finance Minister, who is a businessman and politician, but also his son-in-law. 

The question is whether Erdoğan will listen to his relative or he will tell his son-in-law to implement his personal policies. “It is abundantly clear that the president’s whim will appraise all future strategic decisions taken about anything in Turkey, and the new cabinet will function purely as a rubber-stamping forum,”… “The only constraints set to be imposed on Erdoğan are those likely to derive from bond and currency markets, which may inhibit any overtly reckless economic policymaking” (Bloomberg Businessweek, Onur Ant, July 10, 2018).

The changes in the function of the government are expected to have a severe impact on Turkish assets. It is assumed that “Turkish assets to remain under pressure unless policy measures address the country’s high inflation and external dependence. The central bank has not raised rates enough like some other countries given the government’s focus on GDP growth rather than inflation or currency stability” (Gopalakrishnan, DBS Bank). On the other hand, Turkey is likely to face many challenges ahead, as it’s running a massive fiscal deficit but “don't have savings to fund it.” 

Also, Erdoğan was the one who decided Turkey’s monetary policy, keeping the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey captive. He has recently prevented constraints attempted by the Central Bank. In the last two years under Erdoğan’s control of monetary policy helped the Turkish voters to do better by offering cash bonuses and other bribing methods. But Turkey has had extraordinarily relaxed both monetary and fiscal policy, which created a variety of issues: The Turkish lira has declined, the inflation rate is in the area of 12% although the target was 5% and also Erdoğan’s restriction of the Central Bank’s independence. Sitting on interest rates while opting for a monetary policy that prioritizes growth over controlling its inflation is a real problem.

Nevertheless, the voters preferred the man who as Mayor of Istanbul had cleaned the city even if their first choice was a bit shaky is an understatement. Democracy in Turkey suffers since its inception oscillating from the Socialists of Ataturk to the right wing Islamists of Erdoğan, and that includes about 1.5 million who live abroad most of them in Germany.

The burst of the economic bubble and the consequent implosion of the present political survival of Turkey is not a matter of supposition, but a matter of time.

About Marcus A. Templar
Professor Marcus A. Templar is a former U.S. Army Cryptologic Linguist (Language Analyst), Signal Intelligence and All-Source Intelligence Analyst.  During his career as a U.S. Intelligence Officer, besides organizational duties, he discharged the responsibilities of a U.S. Army Observer/Controller, Instructor of Intelligence Courses specializing in Deconstruction of Strategies, Foreign Disclosures Officer, and Translator Interpreter of Serbo-Croatian. 
 
He is the Macedonian League's National Security Advisor.

To listen to the panel discussion click here or on the picture below to be redirected to the East Mediterranean Business & Culture program by Lou Katsos directly on Soundcloud

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The National Federation of Cypriots in the UK and the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Cyprus held its annual Parliamentary Reception for Cyprus on Tuesday 10 July to mark the 44th anniversary of the illegal Turkish invasion and occupation of July 1974. During the event titled, ‘Cyprus: Prospects for a Solution’ the Government Spokesperson of the Republic of Cyprus, Prodromos Prodromou, updated a full house of Parliamentarians and members of the UK Cypriot community about the latest developments on the Cyprus issue.

Mr Prodromou outlined the latest developments on the Cyprus issue, including the appointment of Jane Holl Lute as the UN’s new special envoy on Cyprus. Mr Prodromou also conveyed President Anastasiades’ readiness to resume talks to reunify Cyprus from where the negotiations left off and based upon the framework set out by the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres. He also emphasised the need for thorough preparation for any talks in order to ensure they would lead to a solution of the Cyprus issue. Mr Prodromou called for respect in the negotiations process so that “a just and viable solution could be found that wouldn’t leave either side feeling like winners or losers but would instead address the concerns of both communities.”

In closing, the Cypriot Government Spokesperson paid tribute to the work of the APPG for Cyprus and National Federation of Cypriots in the UK, for strengthening the ties between Cyprus and the UK and for keeping the Cyprus issue on the agenda in Parliament. He also commented that the two countries would continue to have excellent relations even after Britain leaves the European Union.

Federation President, Christos Karaolis, welcomed guests to the event and spoke of the UK Cypriot community’s hope and determination to see a reunited Cyprus free from the outdated system of guarantees and without the presence of foreign troops. He said, “what we’re asking for is both fair and simple. A fully functioning state that is in line with the rule of law and is free from foreign interference. Put simply a “normal state” as the UN Secretary General said.”

Mr Karaolis also said that “the UK Cypriot community is clear in its demands that Turkey’s unacceptable demands [in the negotiations] and influence in Cyprus must end.” He referred to the Federation’s recent email campaign where MPs from Aberdeen to Exeter were contacted by constituents concerned about Turkey’s negative influence in Cyprus. Mr Karaolis emphasised that UK Cypriots would continue to have their legitimate concerns heard and would continue to campaign for a free, united Cyprus.

The High Commissioner for the Republic of Cyprus to the UK, Euripides Evriviades, addressed the event, thanked everyone for attending and expressed deep gratitude to the APPG for Cyprus for being “all-weather friends of Cyprus”. He also commented on the major contribution that the UK Cypriot community has made in the UK.

​Sir Roger Gale MP, who had earlier been re-elected Chair of the APPG for Cyprus, welcomed the guests to the event and emphasised that MPs were united across party lines in favour of the reunification of Cyprus. He said that he has spent the best part of his political career “trying to release Cyprus from occupation and to return the island to its rightful owners.” Sir Roger concluded by saying that “we shan’t give up until we achieve that”.

Speaking on behalf of the UK Government, Foreign Office Minister for the Commonwealth & UN, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, expressed gratitude to the High Commission for Cyprus to the UK, the National Federation of Cypriots in the UK and the APPG for Cyprus for their work in strengthening the ties between the two countries.

The Minister said that “the ultimate objective is to achieve a solution in line with the High-Level Agreements”. Lord Ahmad also stressed the importance of the Commonwealth to both the UK and Cyprus and said that both are working towards making it more secure and prosperous.

Fabian Hamilton MP, Shadow Minister for Peace and Disarmament, spoke on behalf of Her Majesty’s Opposition and reiterated the Labour Party’s steadfast commitment to the reunification of Cyprus commenting that, “security for Cyprus must be through the EU and not through old-fashioned guarantee systems nor by foreign troops nor by Turkey”.

The Rt Hon. Theresa Villiers, MP for Chipping Barnet, said that “it’s a tragedy that 44 years after the invasion, Cyprus remains divided” and that she “fights for a free, united Cyprus every day” by asking questions in the House of Commons and raising important issues with the UK Government such as the need to end the “outdated system of guarantees”. Ms Villiers reaffirmed her support for the abolition of the Treaty of Guarantee and foreign country intervention rights, as well as for the Republic of Cyprus’ right to explore and exploit natural resources in its EEZ.

The next MP to speak was Rt Hon. Joan Ryan, MP for Enfield North. Ms Ryan expressed her deep concerns that, under President Erdogan, Turkey is “sliding towards an authoritative regime” and that would have worrying consequences for Cyprus and the wider region. Ms Ryan also paid tribute to the UK Cypriot community and particularly their “important voluntary work”.

Bambos Charalambous MP for Enfield Southgate, and the only MP of Cypriot origin, highlighted the importance of resolving the tragic humanitarian issue of the missing persons. Mr Charalambous expressed his delight that the Federation was making its presence felt through its email campaigns which he said have “bombarded him with emails from constituents about Cyprus”. He also referred to questions he asked in Parliament about the Cyprus issue, torture by British soldiers in Cyprus in the 1950s, and Turkey’s aggression in Cyprus’ EEZ.

Catherine West, MP for Hornsey & Wood Green, said that “we must all work towards a bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal Cyprus”. Ms West also said she “supports peace, human rights and justice” and that she hoped to see the resumption of reunification talks very soon.

Mike Freer, MP for Finchley & Golders Green, said that “44 years after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, it’s important to remember that while time has passed, the issues haven’t gone away. We still have people dispossessed from their land and their homes, families with missing relatives, and an island still divided… we continue to strive for a just solution for Cyprus and a reunited island.”

Stephen Gethins MP, SNP Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, paid tribute to the contribution that the UK Cypriot community has made in the UK. He also said that he looked forward to seeing a reunified Cyprus in the future and hoped to work closely with the community in the future.

Lord Collins, Shadow Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, said that the event left him with “a sense of hope that we will achieve the justice and independence that we’ve so badly needed over the last 44 years”.

Roger Godsiff MP said that he “really hopes to see a solution to the Cyprus issue sooner rather than later” and also that he hopes that Cypriots continue to demand and campaign for a reunified island.

Other MPs in attendance were Khalid Mahmood (Shadow Minister for Europe) and John Penrose (MP for Weston-super-Mare).

Other distinguished guests in attendance included members of the Cyprus High Commission; Andreas Papaevripides, President of POMAK (the World Federation of Overseas Cypriots); Harry Charalambous, President of NEPOMAK UK (the youth branch of POMAK); members of the National Federation of Cypriots’ Executive Committee and Secretariat; and representatives from Cypriot communities in Birmingham, Cardiff, Manchester, and Leeds.

Source: National Federation of Cypriots in the UK

Not taking into account the recent Prespes Agreement, where did the Greek political establishment go wrong on domestic and foreign policies, especially as it concerns the “FYROM Name Issue?”

The answer is simple, EVERYWHERE!
 
Modern Greece does not have a clear, coherent national goal. The national objectives of the Greek revolutionaries as expressed at the Declaration of Independence, Justice, Personal Freedom, Ownership, and Honor, over the years have become irrelevant as politicians interpret these goals as part of their personal, not national aims. They have the mentality of the kodzabashis, i.e. the appointed heads of village councils, and the Phanariot hospodars, i.e. the masters who ruled the Rum millet as a second governing tier. This mentality has overshadowed the spirit of the 1821 revolution. 

​Like the Phanariots of the old times, who “sold the offices under their control and exacted extraordinary taxes and contributions to the fullest extent of their power.  Corruption, initiated at the top, extended down to the lowest levels of administration” (Jelavich, 1962). Nikolaos Soutzos expressed decadence of the Greek political crème de la crème as follows, “The prevalence over their competitors and their dominance through the use of insidious means, which the Turks highly encouraged, became the constant pursuit of the Phanariots. It was an incessant struggle, especially when the stakes were linked to their fortune, and often their life." (Soutzo, 1899, 4).  ​

But the kodzabashis the headmen of the enslaved Greece, were not any better. They had prolonged the enslavement of Greece and through their spiritual offspring continue to ensure the maintenance of their Ottoman mentality. This time the terminology and the names are different, but not the narrative. Nothing has changed since. Expressions such as «Ξες ποιος είμαι
εγώ, ρε;» or «μία θεσούλα στο δημόσιο,» «το μέσον» and a few other similar expressions explain why Greece is a mentally Ottoman province. The political elite of Greece and their cohorts govern the country as if they are the hospodars, kodzabashis, and kaymakams of the estate. The sad part is that Greek voters have entrusted them and preserve them with their vote. No matter which party is in government it controls the country through the use of advertising funding in the media. Not only have they managed the country, but they also restrain the diaspora using the same method. No wonder nothing happens in Greece.  
 
The problem is that the above “masters” have downgraded the social education of the Greek nation by indirectly bribing the means of formal, informal, and non-formal education. Such a downgrade benefits the crème de la crème of the Greek ruling society. Under this downgraded learning, patriotism has turned into nationalism and sometimes ultra-nationalism, and hard-core communists give lessons on something they do not understand – democracy. 
 
Only those who understand the full meaning of Socrates’ Crito can fully comprehend the meaning of homeland.  Greeks have lost the ideals of their ancestors and the direction that those ideals could lead the country into the 21st century and beyond.  Democracy does not work when people think only of themselves and not the general good.  Also, people in Greece did not learn and have not learned how to think.    
 
The lack of articulate national goals has resulted in Greece’s lack of coherent national interests. It is why Greece is deprived of proper foreign and domestic policies. Thus Greece has partisan interests which are reflected in foreign and domestic policies. If a country does not arrange a national path for the future it cannot develop a strategy to achieve any goal. Greeks think emotionally based on stories that only those who believe what they read in the “National Enquirer” would believe.
 
Since 1829, Greece’s foreign and domestic policies revolve around personal interests, direct and indirect reward of the political elite which is reactive, not proactive, to external pressures, movements, events, and circumstances that feed decision-making and behavior of its politicians.
 
It is said that possession is nine-tenths of the law. This adage means that ownership is easier to maintain if one has possession of something, or difficult to enforce if one does not. In the case of Skopje, Skopje possesses the name “Macedonia” since 1943 as a constituent republic within Marxist Yugoslavia with full government structure whereas Greece had Macedonia as an administrative unit and often the Press of Athens would call it Northern Greece. Even now, the Athenian Press continues to call Macedonia Northern Greece, never mind the cop-out they give when asked. I understand that in using Northern Greece the Athenian government meant Macedonia and Thrace; however, as Northern Greece or later as Macedonia-Thrace, Macedonia did not have the international exposure that Skopje had.
 
Yugoslavia started having indications and warnings of political upheavals in 1990. The 14th and last Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists took place on January 20-22, 1990, the Slovenian and the Croatian delegations left during the Congress. That move by the delegations should have been a warning that something serious was going to happen. By May of 1991, despite the draconian efforts of Vasil Tupurkovski to keep the Republic together, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was over.  Greece as a neighboring country directly affected by any political and military turmoil should have monitored the situation and it should have assessed the fallout of any mishap in a wide range of possibilities that could affect the region, especially Greece. 
 
The following would hit Greek politicians on the head – on January 3, 1992, and during the informal meeting that took place in Athens between Greek and FYROM experts, the talks were deadlocked because of the insistence of Skopje delegates not to discuss the name of their country. That should have been a very serious indicator and warning of things to come. However, as we say in Greek «πέρα βρέχει» and «τα βόδια μου αργά». On January 26, 1993, six days after Pres. Bill Clinton took office the Greek Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the new President stating that Greece was ready to compromise with Skopje on the name issue. Greece surrendered before the first shot of the war was fired. The same man stated later that in 10 years nobody would remember Macedonia. 
 
Most Greeks and especially politicians and their advisors do not know the national strategic culture of Greece’s neighbors. Greece’s present electoral system does not help either. Most politicians and their advisors not only don’t know Greece’s neighbors but worst of all, they don’t know Greece. They do not care what occurs north of Thebes and south of Corinth. If they knew Greece’s neighbors and Greece itself, the issue of Skopje’s name would not exist at all. But nobody cared. What kind of impression should one form when people in Rhodes say that they lived better under the Italians?
 
I have talked with a few diplomats and politicians of Greece, and was shocked by their naiveté. They could not even distinguish the difference between how many countries have recognized the FYROM, in general, from those countries that have recognized Skopje under its so-called constitutional name. Skopje keeps promoting that about 130 nations have recognized them, which means nothing. About ten years ago, they claimed something similar until it was revealed that out of 110 or so countries, only 78 of them had recognized them as “Republic of Macedonia.”
 
So they should have three numbers.
 
1) How many countries have recognized the FYROM?
 
2) How many countries have recognized the FYROM as “Macedonia”? Was it a bilateral or erga omnes recognition?
 
3) How many countries have recognized the FYROM under its provisional name?  
 
Clearly, the Greek MFA has no idea because Greece does not have a functional intelligence process within the MFA. The A3 is as busy as the Maytag repairman under the principle «δε βαρυέσαι» and «ωχ αδερφέ.» The less they know, the better it is for the boss! He can always truthfully say, “nobody told me”. They are supposed to be professionals; it is their job to know.
 
What is happening today, reminds us of what had happened in 1902. The Bulgarians had sent Sarafov, a Supremist, to Western Capitals to push for the Bulgarian cause over Macedonia. 
 
The Greek government was asleep then as it is today, including the Greek people! Pavlos Melas wrote to Bishop Karavangelis, «Διάβασα τήν ἐκθεσί σου στο ὑπουργεῖο. Μά ἐδῶ κοιμοῦνται. Τί νά σοῦ κάνω ἐγώ;»  Moreover, the weapons (Gras, Mauser, Mannlicher-Schönauer) were transported to the Bulgarian komitadjis in Macedonia by Greek mule drovers or αγωγιάτες, so that the Bulgars can fight against and kill Greeks in Macedonia.
 
On at least one occasion, one of the chief komitadjis, Vasil Tsakalarov, went in person to Athens to buy weapons. There’s no difference today. Skopje has its fifth phalanx in the Greek Parliament itself.
 
I remember one diplomat had mentioned that Skopje would change its name, as did Myanmar which changed its name from Burma. When I told him that Myanmar was Burma’s ancient name and asked him to name the old name of the FYROM region; he could not even come up with Paeonia.
 
While Skopje governments implemented the strategy of protraction as they negotiated under the Turkish model of negotiation, it simultaneously bolstered excuses for Greek politicians to procrastinate, as they wanted to avoid signing a treaty on the name that would make them and their party appear as betraying Greece.
 
While this was taking place, Skopje threw ashes into the eyes of the Greek people, entertaining the thought of being descendants of the ancient Macedonians who miraculously were not Greeks. ALL subsequent governments of the FYROM used denial and deception via non-state and illicit actors working in the background and successfully persuading foreign governments to recognize them as “Republic of Macedonia.” The FYROM diplomacy was and is extraordinarily active on the name issue and recognition of the state as “Macedonia.” They’ll do anything to show their flag!   
 
In contrast, Greece employed extremely dormant and reactive diplomacy lacking a strategy of deterrence with tactics of a courteous, but fatalistic policy. Even the reactive tactics of Greece’s foreign policy proved to have been through an entirely personal lens of her politicians and diplomats who cared more about pleasing their bosses than doing their job by committing to their homeland and protecting the national interests of Greece.
 
Under such peculiar circumstances, the answer to your question is “Greece went wrong everywhere,” starting in 1951, the year Greece had recognized Marxist Yugoslavia. Would the same politicians direct negotiations of their real estate in a similar manner as they have negotiated the future of one-quarter of Greece’s land and indeed Greece’s future territorial integrity? 
 
The fact is that all governments of Greece, and by their silence the politicians of Greece, have created the problem that Greece has in the form of a self-inflicting wound. Some countries in the world had or still have names such as the Federal Republic of Brazil, Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of Germany, and United States of America. These countries were or are known under the name portrayed last: Brazil, Yugoslavia, Germany, America. What did, if anything, the Greek MFA think that the popularized name of “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” would be? Patagonia?
 
They only looked at the official name of the country, not the popular name that people would be using, especially when we all know people do not care about official names, not even diplomats. Didn’t they know that while Greece would be in its usual lethargic state, Skopje would launch any power in the world to achieve what it wanted and still wants?

Some would argue that during the second century AD, the Romans had called the region of the FYROM, Macedonia Secunda or Salutaris. Doesn’t this justify the present name of the republic?
 
The argument that the area of the FYROM was called Macedonia Secunda (or Macedonia Salutaris) and this justifies the present name of the Republic is very weak.
 
To begin with, depending on the time and type of Administration in the Roman Empire, provinces used to change names as well as borders. On one occasion, we see Macedonia starting just north of Stobi excluding Skopje which was in Dardania, and continues south of Lamia, leaving for Epirus a slice of land from Dyrrachium to Messolongi. Romans called south Greece, Achaea, and we had two lands named Epirus: Epirus Vetus and Epirus Nova. Another mess with names comes to us from what are today France, Belgium, and Northern Italy. There we see Gallia Belgica, Gallia Narbonensis, Gallia Lugdunensis, but in other times we know the name Gallia Lugdunensis and Gallia Narbonensis as Celtica while the toponym Gallia is found as Gallia Cisalpina and Gallia Transalpina around Switzerland. At that time one also finds Palaestina Salutaris or Palaestina Tertia and Galatia Salutaris and so on.
 
The whole naming of a region had to do with whether the administration was in the hands of the Emperor or the Senate. It is also immaterial because not one Macedonian King had named the region of the FYROM as Macedonia. Alexander the Great and his Greeks had reached India, China, and Uzbekistan, but none of these can claim to be ‘Macedonia’.
 
It is true that King Philip VI of Macedonia had conquered the area up to about the Shar Mountains, but he never changed the name of the region and did not move any Macedonians from Macedonia to Paeonia and Dardania. So, the ethnicity of the local population from Paeonian and Dardanian never changed ethnically to Macedonian Greek.
 
Romans had occupied some territories of Alexander the Great and his Diadochi and they also occupied almost all of Europe. They did not change the human terrain of the regions they occupied. They had local garrisons and used Latin as their lingua franca of their wide Empire. 
 
Another example is the Ottomans who ruled the area of the Western and South Balkans for about 500 years. They could not alter the local populations even though they settled Turks in the occupied regions and some of the locals changed their religion to Islam.  They succeeded in changing the religion of some Slavs like those in Bosnia, who were mostly Serbs, but these people remained Slavs. Muslims of Bosnia are proud of their Slavic heritage and they are first to claim it.
 
Conquest does not mean occupation with resettlement. On the contrary, when the Byzantine Emperors resettled about half a million Slavs from Macedonia to Bithynia the resettled Slavic population amalgamated with the indigenous population.Over the years and after numerous political and ethnic fusions, the Slavs ended up Turkified (Türkleştirme). That means what actually happened is exactly the opposite of what the FYROM Slavs advocate.

Although the Prespes Agreement is not a done deal yet, what are the national security implications for Greece if the final name of the FYROM includes “Macedonia?”  Are its ethnically diverse citizens of the republic going to be recognized as “Macedonians?”
 
The final name of the FYROM is significant not just to Greece’s national security and territorial integrity but is also essential to the national security of all countries adjacent to FYROM, including the stability of the Peninsula and the Middle East.   
 
The issue of the country’s name is different from the subject of the ethnicity of its citizens. What is important is the name of the ethnic group of the Slav people who have no ethnic surname. According to international norms, nationality follows the name of the country regardless of the actual or perceived ethnicity of the person. Holders of passports of multiethnic nations as the United States, Canada, Australia, etc. see the name of the land next to “Nationality.” Thus, the issue comes down to one segment of the FYROM citizens who until November 29, 1943, were considered as part of the Serbian nation along with Montenegrins. This is evident from the Comintern Resolution of January 11, 1934.
 
Thus if we assume (without taking into account the Prespes Agreement) that the country’s final name is Povardarie, then the passports of Povardarie will indicate as “Nationality: Povardarie,” even if the bearer is ethnically Albanian, Turk, or Greek. In general, ethnicity of individuals is something personal. On the other hand, the ethnicity, language, and heritage of the Slavic population as far as I am concerned should be ‘Jugosloveni’ or South Slavs. This better reflects their slavic heritage, which constitutes an ethnic and linguistic transition zone between Bulgaria and Serbia.
 
It is a thorn in the whole agreement. The government of the FYROM cannot say on one hand that they are Slavs, but on the other, they call themselves “ethnic Macedonians.”  Even Misirkov did not call them “ethnic” Macedonians; He made sure he mentioned them as Slavs. ‘Macedonians’ for Misirkov was a regional name and applied to all people of Macedonia regardless of ethnicity.By “Macedonian people”, Comintern meant all the people of geographic Macedonia regardless of ethnicity (Hristo Andonov-Poljanski. 1981, v. 2). 
 
I am not even touching the issue that the region of the FYROM became officially “Macedonia” in 1900. I consider myself a Macedonian of Greek heritage since I was born within the geographical area of the ancient kingdom. Who are these people to take away my right to call myself a Macedonian?  
 
I would push for the name “Central Balkan Republic” or “Jugoslavonija”, or better “Povardarie”. It is an existing name within the FYROM and all its people are very familiar with it. It is also a name of the Bishopric of Veles and Povardarie.

Let’s stay on the previous topic and focusing only on the Slavic population of the FYROM, why is the issue of ethnicity, language and heritage so contentious for both sides these days?
 
The Interim Accord was only about the name of the country. Here’s my argument that Greeks do not know their neighbors. 
 
What about the National Anthem of the FYROM, which is being played outside of the country as well? Nobody thus far has answered this simple question: How can the state change its name “Macedonia” but keep its national anthem intact? Does anyone in Greece know its lyrics? The first verse calls the nation “Macedonia” (Today over Macedonia, the new sun of Freedom is being born).
 
Has anyone in the Greek MFA thought about it? Or are they going to conveniently claim that the national anthem is a domestic issue as are the ethnicity, language, heritage and all other derivatives of “Macedonia”?
 
The claim that the “Macedonian” language was recognized by the UN in 1977 is absurd.  The UN recognized Taiwan, a country with a vital economy, since the 1945 San Francisco Conference. The country was a Charter member of the UN. Despite such a status, Taiwan was expelled by the General Assembly of the UN on October 25, 1971. It was unrecognized for political reasons. The issue of recognition of a language by the UN is not linguistic, but political; it may and can be unrecognized. The question is whether Greece has ever recognized anything “Macedonian”. We are referring to one-quarter of purely Greek land, not the ciftlik of Nasreddin Hodja.
 
Typically, the issue of ethnicity, heritage, and language are issues of domestic use, but  in this case, they are very important. When Greece signed the Interim Accord, the people responsible should have known better. They messed up due to their ignorance and personal convenience, so they can’t expect others to get the snake out of its den. And, what about the last failure? Whose fault is it? This has been going on for 75 years, however, the Greek political elite keep governing like ostriches. 

We have seen many Greek organizations demand that Greece withdraws from negotiations altogether. Let’s say the recent Prespes Agreement fails, what would happen if Greece withdraws from future negotiations with the FYROM on the name issue?
 
My first recommendation is that all Greeks who follow the moves of the FYROM Slav diaspora should stop imitating them. They are nonsensical and their goals are different from the aims of Greek people. This idea of withdrawal from the talks started by the Skopje diaspora about ten years ago and I was hoping that Skopje under Gruevski had listened to them. I was thinking, “get more rope to hang yourselves,” but unfortunately it did not happen. 
 
I have read some Greeks are calling for such a thing. It shows how little these people understand the international political scope of the issue.
 
In answer to your question, Greece could withdraw from the negotiations if the issue were bilateral. It would be with little or no political cost for the country. Skopje has tried to make it bilateral in the past; and luckily Greece fought against it. This is one of the correct things Greece has done on the issue. 
 
On a bilateral basis, the Interim Accord would be null and void making the erga omnes and inclusion of the name in the FYROM’s Constitution irrelevant and illogical. Every single country would recognize the FYROM as “Macedonia” leaving Greece on its own. The FYROM would get into the EU and NATO and in every organization it wishes, since the name issue would not exist. Greece would have to deal with Skopje being alone and without international support. I do not believe that any Greek wants such a thing.
 
All those people who want Greece to withdraw from negotiations because it cannot give the name Macedonia to the Slavs, in fact, become agents of Skopje on the issue because they’re thinking with their heart and not their head. I would say the same thing for those who want Greece out of the EU and NATO. They think that Russia will help Greece. That might be true, but knowing the foreign interests of Russia one of those interests is the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its move from Constantinople to Moscow. Such is the goal of Russia. Russia will also help its Pan-Slavic friends, which means that Thessaloniki will go to the FYROM and Kavala will become part of Bulgaria leaving Alexandroupolis to Turkey.
 
If this is what the Russophile Greeks want, then their wish will materialize. It should be known that since Aleksey Mikhailovich, father of Peter the Great, Russia’s main national interest is to support its goal for World supremacy and consequently Russian domestic and foreign policies reflect just that. This explains why the Russian Patriarch was absent from the Synod in Crete a few years ago although the preparation for the Synod had started about 35 years earlier.
 
The Vatican Newspaper, Il Osservatore Romano, had indicated that if the Patriarch of Moscow attended the Synod, the Orthodox Church would split because of the demands of the Russian Church. Their argument is that they lead 350 million Orthodox faithful whereas the Ecumenical Patriarch leads only about 1,500 souls. Such a statement indicates that the Patriarch of Moscow does not consider the Patriarch of Constantinople as Ecumenical, but only a local bishop with a limited flock. In reality, an Ecumenical Patriarch includes all Orthodox faithful of the World including the Russians; it is why he is called Ecumenical, not because of the number of his direct followers.
 
Greeks should be careful what they wish for regarding the Russians because they might get it. Then they will not be able to blame others, but themselves. International law is not case law or statutory law, but a common law. To quote Wikipedia, “The defining characteristic of “common law” is that it arises as precedent. In cases where the parties disagree on what the law is, a common law court looks to past precedential decisions of relevant courts, and synthesizes the principles of those past cases as applicable to the current facts.” In the case of treaties, the precedents seek answers from previous similar treaties. The UN is in possession of such treaties.   
 
Some international norms, precedents, and guarantees regulate international talks and treaties as they are incorporated into the set of rules generally accepted as binding in relations between countries, aka international law. 
 
Greece is not in a position of prestige because the people are disunited and the political parties deal with their micro-political scheming issues, just as the kodzabashis did two hundred years ago. Greece is only a European country geographically speaking. It is progressively becoming worse in a disappointing way.

Some erroneously believe that the name issue is a uniquely Greek issue. But, that is not the case. Explain how other countries deal with similar issues of shared regions.

Let me start by saying that many countries in the world share regions. Luxembourg, for instance, shares the French prefecture with the same name. Vojvodina (Serbia), Romania, and Hungary split the region of Banat. The Flemish, i.e., Dutch-speaking part of Belgium is the continuation of the Netherlands, and the French-speaking is a continuation of France.  The name Great Britain goes back to Britany in France; both names go back to the Bretons, a Celtic tribe. There are two European regions with the name Galicia, one in Spain and one in Eastern Europe. Hungary, Croatia, and Serbia share the territory of Baranya or Baranja. Let us not forget Thrace. 
 
The name is not the problem. The United States has a state named New Mexico, and Mexico has a state called Baja or South California. I can go on with similar examples.  
 
Let’s go a little bit further than that. The most striking element of the National Anthem of the Netherlands is at the end of the first stanza. It states, “The prince of Orange I am; afraid of nothing; I have always remained loyal to the king of Spain.” It is a remnant of the Napoleonic Wars, but I have not heard any Spaniard claiming the Netherlands.  Therefore, the whole matter goes to the mentality of the people of the south Balkans.   
 
The name of the region of FYROM as Macedonia is the result of political events:

• Some intellectuals participating in a convention in Belgrade in 1865 envisioned the Balkan Federation in a politically socialist basis, not in a religious sense as Rhigas Pheraios had done many years before.

 

• The Berlin Conference of June 1878 deprived Serbia of expanding west although Serbia received other means of compensation from Austria. Serbia thus extended south, a move that conflicted with the territorial aspiration of Bulgaria even after its territorial folding. Bulgaria had maintained its national ambitions long after its defeat in the Berlin Conference. It moved its Capital to Sofia (1879), annexed Eastern Rumelia (1885), which the Berlin Conference had made an autonomous territory within the Ottoman Empire. To balance the domestic political scene, the current Bulgarian government also made the Eastern Bulgarian dialect its literary language (1899).

 

• Communism took advantage of the Bulgarian expansionist foreign policy and proceeded with a strategy that even if Bulgaria were not directly involved, she would have a lot to say on the Federation of Macedonia and Thrace. 

 
I have translated the three primary documents that are related to Macedonia; the six-page 1924 “May Manifesto”; the nine-page III Communist International, Fifth Congress - June 17–July 8, 1924 "Resolution on National Question in Central Europe and Balkans,” which includes the Macedonian and Thracian Questions. I have also translated the three-page Comintern Resolution 11 January 1934 “The Macedonian Question and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - United (IMRO-U)”.
 
When the three documents are studied, one understands that the main objective was a federal Macedonia and Thrace under the administration of the communist IMRO. It is obvious that the word “nation” in those documents referred to a multicultural nation-state or a nation as in “United Nations,” not an ethnic one. Such multicultural nations were the answer to the Communist “National Question.”

Based on your experience, what is the driving force behind the FYROM’s irredentist claims on the northern Greek province of Macedonia? Using past examples how could these irredentist claims serve to affect Greece’s national security.
 
Briefly put, the driving force is the territorial expansion over Macedonia by military occupation; it cannot be done otherwise. Their strategy hides this fact behind the imaginary issue of the so-called human rights of “Macedonians.” They do it because they think in a Court of Law such nonsense prevails; it does not. They see other cases of legitimate minority complaints around the world, the intervention of great powers in setting new borders and they hope they can identify themselves with such matters. But to do it, they employ deceiving and criminal means. Photoshop is one of the methods they employ. The bottom line is that they cannot Photoshop facts.
 
For the second part of the question the answer is that they work with two domestic Greek groups – the communists of Greece who still support Comintern’s resolutions under the doctrine “Comintern might not have been right, but it was not wrong”, and the ultra-right wing who believe that they are the only ones who care about Greece. Most members of these two groups do not even know the modern history of Greece and how Greece’s political instability has affected the country so far. Both groups live in a parallel universe.
 
The brief history of Modern Greece is as follows:
 
Greece declared independence in 1821 (officially on January 26, 1822, in Epidavros). However by 1827, while fighting the Turks, Greeks engaged in two civil wars while the Turko-Egyptian Ibrahim was threatening to suppress the revolution. After its independence in 1829, the first political parties that sprang up were the "Russian," "English" and "French," while the newly established country was already bankrupt.  Nicholas Karlovich Giers of the Asian Section of the Russian Foreign Ministry stated the following regarding the assassination of Capodistrias: “the assassin, Mavromichalis, belonged to one of the most distinguished families of the region, who looked with envy upon [Capodistrias] rise. The only thing that has changed since then are the names of the political parties, not the mentality of the Greeks. Personal ego, especially among those disqualified to speak, feeds Greece’s political instability.
 
The “Μαύρο '97” or “Ατυχής πόλεμος του 1897” (Eng: “Black ’97” or the “Unfortunate War of 1897”) took place because of people’s wishful thinking instead of weighing up reality and waiting. The result of that war was an Ottoman military victory after which Greece ceded small parts of Thessaly to the Ottoman Empire. It would be nice if people read the background of the war and the full outcome to understand that ultra-nationalistic overtones brought Greece to humiliation and bankruptcy. The embarrassment came when the commander of the Ottoman Army stated ostentatiously that he was ready to march to Athens and drink coffee on the Acropolis. Thankfully the Great Powers of Europe intervened stopping the Turks from advancing south of Olympus.
 
That was not enough. Following this, we had the National Schism between 1914 and 1917. The National Schism set the foundations for the foolish overconfidence of an unprepared, almost defunct Army to at least control Ionia and a government to lay claim on Constantinople. Instead of being satisfied with whatever the ally victors had given to Greece, they wanted more. They proceeded to capture and destroy Ankara. The Battles of Sakarya and Dumlupınar (26–30 August 1922) brought Greece to reality. Ionia was damaged, and Constantinople was lost. Turks still remember the date of their victory.  August 30 every year is the date of military promotions and new positions.
 
Due to National Schism, the loss of prestige and non-existent political will, Greece could not even enforce the Autonomy of Northern Epirus. 
 
In the case of the Greek-Italian War (1940-1941), Greece was a clear victor delivering to the Allied Powers not only a physical victory but also a tremendous moral victory; it was the first Allied victory they so badly needed. One must consider the defeat of the UK at the beaches of Dunkirk, Belgium, and the annihilation of France by Germany that rendered the Maginot lines a simple hurdle. For that decisive victory, Greece was awarded the Dodecanese.
 
Despite the prestige that Greece had enjoyed, due to securing the first allied victory in defeating an Axis power, the domestic instability, and fanfare during the WWII Peace talks in Paris (1946-1947) was responsible for Greece losing Cyprus. The United States wanted to pass Cyprus to Greece. However, the domestic turmoil in Greece and the usual fanfare and bogus claims of some Greeks from Florida brought the intention of the United States in the open and found stiff resistance by the Soviet Union and the UK.
 
Between 1966 and 1967, Greece was in political turmoil changing governments as often as people change their shirts. I witnessed it firsthand. I still remember the blockade of Thessaloniki by land about a month before the coup of April 21, 1967. Communist-led farmers had closed the co-capital of Greece from all nine land connections. I was in Thessaloniki, and I know what happened. Such domestic instability led to the revolt of April 21, 1967. Following seven years of uncertainty, another coup, dual at this time, took place. The first one resulted in the displacement of the Papadopoulos regime. The new military government, feeling that it was their “patriotic” duty to unite Cyprus with Greece launched a coup in Cyprus under the EOKA fighter Sampson giving the excuse to Turkey to intervene to “protect” its minority. The Greek Generals and the “inactive” politicians behind them should have known better. Turkey wanted to do the same in 1962, but its invasion was averted by the United States. The situation worsened because in 1964 the United States wanted to see Cyprus united with Greece under certain conditions (Acheson Plan). Both Archbishop Makarios and the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou rejected it because the plan included “a sovereign Turkish base on the island that would limit enosis and give Ankara too much say in Cyprus’ affairs”.
 
Between 1829 and the present, Greece has gone bankrupt five times each time bringing the nation into further instability; as if the political instability was not enough. Uncertainty in Greece means calamity for the country. It will be beneficial for Greece if her people start thinking in these logical terms.

Now to the hot topic on everyone's mind lately: the "North Macedonia Agreement” at Prespes. What are your views on this Agreement?
 
This Agreement goes far beyond the scope of the Interim Accord of 1995, which only applied to the name of the country. It seems that the FYROM’s negotiators seized this opportunity during negotiations. The Greek side should have refused to negotiate anything more than the name of the country. It seems however, the Skopje’s negotiators got the hint that Greeks were easy prey from the manner Mrs. Dora Bakoyanni had negotiated and accepted the adjective “Macedonian” as ethnicity, language, and heritage. Actually, at that time, she had accepted and pushed the name to the Greek American diaspora not as erga omnes, but “for international use” claiming that it was the same thing. Actually, Mr. Panagopoulos or Panagiotopoulos, I do not exactly recall, of the Greek Embassy in Washington was the bearer of the news. The Greek side should stick to its guns and refuse to talk about issues that were not included in the Interim Agreement. Bulgaria was not stupid to have done so.
 
Having said that, I was hoping that it would not be an Agreement, but a Treaty. I am against this Agreement for a number of reasons especially the fact that it does not clearly address the false informal and non-formal education that the FYROM diaspora disseminates to themselves and their posterity, including the influence of their Church.  In addition, I have a problem with the FYROM diaspora that injects hatred in their offspring against the Greek nation. It offers lip service to such a vital issue. 
 
To me, the most important issue is that it is NOT a Treaty, but an Agreement. Although in international law, there is no real difference in validity, they do differ in the manner that the two are handled and the level of their standing. The difference is often the number of votes needed in a country’s Parliament to ratify an Agreement or a Treaty.  As Greeks know, although the Interim Accord was ratified by the Parliament in Skopje, the Simitis government never brought it to the Greek Parliament for ratification because it was an Accord or Agreement. The problem I always had is, although the governing party was silent on the issue, the official opposition was silent as well. Agreements do not have to be brought for ratification. It is true that it was a command of the UNSC, the law enforcement body of the United Nations, but it should have still been offered to Parliament for discussion and ratification. Mr. Papoulias would have had a lot of explaining to do. 
 
Coming to the present issue, Nikos Voutsis, the present Speaker of the Parliament, declared that the matter will be offered to the Parliament for discussion and ratification. What is unclear is that he mentioned ratification of this agreement will require a very large majority in the Greek Parliament. “There is no constitutional provision for 180 votes, but for such a serious matter, the larger the majority will be, the better for all”. Really?
 
What exactly does the Article 28.2 of the Greek Constitution stand for? It states,  
 
“Authorities provided by the Constitution may by treaty or agreement be vested in agencies of international organizations when this serves an important national interest and promotes cooperation with other States. A majority of three-fifths of the total number of Members of Parliament shall be necessary to vote the law ratifying the treaty or agreement (website: Parliament of Greece).
 
Mr. Voutsis is the Speaker of the Parliament, but he has no reading comprehension.  The whole article 28 deals with international law, but he cannot find the reason for legal approval of a treaty or agreement?
 
As for the Agreement itself, between 1950 to 2015, Greece, directly and indirectly, gave up about 80% of what the FYROM wanted. The name “Macedonia” was given indirectly in 1950 when Greece established a Consulate General in the Capital of the People’s Republic of Macedonia. The mere establishment of an official Greek diplomatic office within the former Yugoslavia implied an indirect recognition.
 
So in essence, the negotiations between the FYROM and Greece did not start subject to a clean slate. International law is common law based on precedent unlike Greece's domestic law, which is based on statutes. Thus as time passed since the 1951 normalization of relations between Greece and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, SFRJ, Greece kept giving away or recognizing institutions and agreements. Also, by ignoring developments on the Macedonian issue, even as a side effect, such acts kept accumulating. Thus by 1995, Greece had already given about 50-60% of what they wanted as fait accompli. Most of the time under the upsetting procrastination and indifference expressed by «ωχ, αδελφέ» «δε βαριέσαι», «ε και τι έγινε», «και ποιος θα το μάθει;». According to the former MFA of Greece, Dora Bakoyanni, by 2010 Greece had already awarded Skopje 80% of what it sought by constantly giving in. Thus, Skopje had no incentive to allow Greece to receive the remaining 20%. Holding to the already possessed 80%, it negotiated the remaining 20% adhering to the dictum “what is mine is mine, what is yours is negotiable.” It has been Skopje’s traditional approach to the name issue since 1991(Templar, August 28, 2014).
 
Upon reading the entire agreement, the deficiencies were evident as if it were put together by a group of 15-year-old high school students who wrote their individual pieces and compiled the agreement without even reading it.
 
The agreement covers legal issues at the government level. It offers lip service to how legal definitions and provisions would be used by the people of Greece and its Macedonian Greek diaspora. It provides ethnic cover for the Macedonian Slavs, but it does nothing to protect the regional identity of Macedonian Greeks like me. As the diaspora of the FYROM has embraced the Macedonian national identity, they will have a very solid stance to declare that they are rightfully Macedonians. Nobody among the common international community would care about the Agreement, nor that their history has nothing to do with THE ancient Macedonians. The so-called experts in the Greek MFA have started an inferno that will die when the Macedonian region of Greece gets incorporated into ‘North Macedonia’. The geniuses of humanity from the ‘Republic of Athens’ have NO idea whom they are dealing with. They should come to Australia next year to learn a thing or two and leave their conceit back in Greece. 
 
Some parts of the Agreement make sense, but others do not; their vagueness will hurt Greek national interests but mostly the relations of our diaspora. Making the FYROM Slavs “Macedonians” even under the definition that Misirkov offered in his book On Macedonian Matters deprives the Macedonian Greeks of their true Macedonian Heritage. Other provisions nullify or even contradict stipulations of the same article or muddy other articles of the agreement. 
 
In general, Article 3, for instance, reinforces the Peace, Friendship and Mutual Protection between Serbia and Greece signed in Thessaloniki on June 1, 1913, by the Greek ambassador to Belgrade, Ioannis Alexandropoulos, and the Serbian ambassador to Athens, Mateja Bošković; it is known as the Koromilas - Bošković Protocol. Under article 3, Skopje accepts the borders of 1913.
 
Then we jump to the issue of citizenship or legal nationality.  Article 1.b in the Agreement is unacceptable.
 
The Agreement offers two meanings in the term "nationality". In international law, the term nationality is a loose term of citizenship. American passports for instance bear as nationality “United States of America”; it does not state “American”. In the case of this agreement, the two parties should have done the same; on the issue of nationality, the name of the country should be written, not the adjective Macedonian as it refers to ethnicity in article 7. That would have prevented part of the future headaches.
 
The agreement sees all citizens of the FYROM as “Macedonians” from the scope of a community of descent. So according to this agreement, the FYROM is 100% Slavic, but also North Macedonian. Thus the people of FYROM are given a choice, the Slavs are Macedonians in nationality, but the rest of them are North Macedonians. The problem from the point of international law is simple. There are two countries, one is Macedonia with its own nationals and the other one is North Macedonia with its own nationals. But how can citizens belong to a country under the name Macedonia that does not exist?

Coming to the issue of history, it correctly deprives the Slavs of any part of Greek history. However, the real issue was not, is not, and will never be ancient history as most Greeks believe. There is nothing in the history of the Slavs that connects them to ancient Greek history. Misirkov born in Pella knew extremely well who and what the ancient Macedonians were. He had never mentioned ancient history at all.
 
The history myth started in 1936 in Melbourne from the followers of the Bulgarian General Mihajilov and it continued later by their posterity under the thought, "if we are Macedonians, we must be descendants of the ancient Macedonians; otherwise what kind of Macedonians are we?" It was based on faulty logic and stories that their grandparents told them. 
 
Some historians doubt that the ancient Macedonians were Greeks on various pretexts, but not a single historian connects the Slavs a historical continuity to the ancient Macedonians, not one. Nobody considers the sermon of Pribojevic and the Book of Orbini as historical theses.
 
But the issue is very different from what the agreement addresses. Even if the FYROM had signed treaties that excluded the name Macedonia in their name, language, ethnicity and heritage the morons of VMRO-DPMNE, their Golden Dawn type (and there are plenty of those), will still claim ancient Macedonian ancestry. I had a numerous conversations with Hungarians and Croats of the Golden Dawn type and I could not believe the absurdities they said.
 
But what concerns me is not only the combination of the entire Article 1, Article 7 (paragraphs 2, 3, 4) and Article 8 (paragraphs 1, 2, 5), but in particular, Article 8.5. 
 
As previously stated, I wonder if anyone in the A3 has ever read and understood the national anthem of the FYROM. The agreement does not indicate anything of the kind.  Despite the explanations in article 7, the agreement considers the country to be “Macedonia” and treats it as such, since it does not touch its national anthem. If everything is erga omnes, the FYROM under the name “North Macedonia” cannot have a national anthem that pertains to Macedonia, which is a region of Greece. 
 
In addition, what exactly does paragraph 7.5 mean in relation to Article 7 as a whole?
 
The main concern is, who will be scientists and experts from the Greek side that will negotiate the history of Greece, including ancient history, and the history of the Macedonian struggle? If the Minority Research Center (KEMO) and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) get involved in “negotiating” the agreement, then:

• a) All the Vlach-speaking Greeks of Krushevo, that is the victims of Ilinden, will be renamed "ethnic Macedonians"

 

• b) the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (EMEA) will be proclaimed an "ethnic Macedonian Liberation Movement" with philanthropic and benevolent intentions, forgetting their terrorist acts of the “Boatmen” and the “Miss Stone Affair”

 

• c) Pavlos Melas, the Metropolitan Germanos Karavangelis and so many other Greeks who gave their blood for Macedonia will be called "terrorists"

 

• d) The approximately 30,000 kidnapped children from all over Greece will end up being boy scouts going camping with the blessings of their parents 

 
One must always bear in mind that even though the Agreement states the preservation of Greek history within Greek contexts, it does NOT explicitly and unambiguously state that ancient Macedonian history is an integral part of Greek history.
 
Do not assume that this is implied by the wording of the Agreement. Such an issue can be resolved by the exchange of letters between the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Skopje. Exchange of letters is a regular institution in diplomatic services.
 
What makes it particularly intriguing is Article 8.
 
Article 8.1 cannot be clearly understood. What I have not yet understood is the issue of Article 8.1. This article is an exact copy of Article 7.3 of the Interim Agreement. It is the same article that helped Gruevski and others steal Greek history and transplant it to their Slavic country. Why did they put it back, particularly when Article 8.5 exists? Have there been no lessons learned by the MFA?
 
8.2 Gives the government in Skopje six months to consider whether the statues are historical or not. What have they done so far?
 
8.3 In this article, the last paragraph allows any Slav to make copies of whatever Greek they want (e.g., Sun of Vergina) and sell them anywhere. These copies can be in clothes, flags, etc. Its prohibition under Article 8.3 applies only to the government and any organizations affiliated with the Skopje government, either directly or indirectly. Unless I have missed something, it does not apply to the private sector. This means that the spread of Skopje can follow their own drummer.
 
8.4 This is standard practice in the official gazetteer. It is no longer Solun or Monastiri in official documents. But this is normal for all official documents. Names used in the interior of a country are preferred by names used abroad. These names will be used in the list of UN names, i.e., gazetteer.
 
As for Article 13, it deals with the former Serbian> former Yugoslavian> current Serbian Free Zone at the harbor of Thessaloniki. Greece has already passed part of the same Zone to Skopje.
 
Never mind the explanation of Article 7. Greek-Australians should prepare for the fight of their lives. Greece has ensured that they and their offspring will be fighting against the FYROM Slav diaspora for as long as they live. 
 
The negative side of this agreement is that the Greek diplomatic corps, following the official line of the Agreement, will assist the FYROM Slav diaspora, declaring that the Slavs are actually Macedonians and the Macedonian-Greeks are just Greeks who live in Macedonia. The Slavic diaspora is not interested in the agreement or the emphasis on different historical context and cultural heritage. This Agreement actually strengthens their effort to “explain” why they are Macedonians.
 
Until now, the FYROM Slav diaspora only had academics side against them. Even Badian and Borza were clearly stating that the modern “Macedonians” could not claim a historical continuity with the ancient Macedonians. Now they have the official political side stating that they can be called Macedonians, because they moved to Macedonia during the 6th-7th centuries, and their name comes from their habitation. It gives them a regional, not a sanguine disposition but it still gives them the historical name. It clearly states their Slavic origin and it does the same with their language and heritage. 
 
I’m assuming that according to Article 15, visitors from the FYROM to archaeological sites will follow the rules of the Ministry of Culture that only certified guides will explain any and all historical facts related to the site. This must apply especially to the students, who until now they had their own “learned” teachers to explain.
 
From the composition of the Agreement, it looks like after the negotiating teams finished their job, someone took a superficial glance over the Agreement and approved it, without considering possible redundancies or conflicting statements in different sections. To put it bluntly, the Agreement was rushed kicking the tin away for others to get the snake out of its den. Eventually, and I suspect sooner than later, the snake will prove to be a gargantuan komodo dragon with lethal saliva.
 
As it is, the Agreement needs many explanatory notes and exchange of official letters like the ones that accompanied the Interim Agreement, but very few people know about those letters.
 
When one regresses to 1822, the connection to issues associated with the problems that Greece has becomes apparent. Political expediency, along with ignorance of the real world outside of Athens, is the source of all evils created by Athens. Because the creators of the problems are either incapable or politically unwilling to solve them, they turn around and ask for foreign help, whilst simultaneously releasing their partisan henchmen to tacitly “inform” the public that the Germans or the Americans are behind all of Greece’s calamities. Of course, they are behind them – their own boss had asked them to help.
 
For the sake of Greece’s survival, the Greek MFA needs to understand that Greece is far beyond the real estate between Thebes, Sounion, and Corinth – Athens is not Greece; it is simply part of Greece. Greece includes all of us who expect guidance and enlightenment from our home country, but all we get is a luminous darkness of corruption, conceit, and indifference that amounts to political immaturity.
 
The way politicians govern Greece is reminiscent of the Phanariots of Wallachia and the kodzabashis of the Sultan. The Sultan is dead, but their spirit lives on in the Parliament of Greece.
 
They better go back and re-write this Agreement before it is too late to save Macedonia.
 
​If you were tasked with changing something in the Constitution of the Hellenic Republic, what would it be?
 
Oh, that’s easy. We have to try to at least keep the politicians honest:

1. Residence
All elected officials shall physically reside within the district they are elected and represent for at least 10 years before they register their candidacy. Such a clause shall apply to all elected officials including the leaders of all political parties in the Parliament without exception. They shall be Greek citizens by birth or naturalization. No elected official shall be allowed to hold any other nationality but Greek. It also applies to residents of the diaspora unless the law changes to allow representatives of the diaspora in the Greek Parliament.  

* Explanation: As it is today if a person from the diaspora wants to run for office in Greece this person will have to follow the same rules that apply to all residents of Greece who want to be elected in the Parliament.

2. Nationality
Civil servants no matter how high or how low in rank or position shall have only Greek nationality. Such a requirement shall apply to all and any military personnel with any kind of Security Clearance. If such personnel have dual or multiple nationalities, the same personnel shall renounce all foreign nationalities before they enter the service or force. As the New Testament states, "No one can serve two masters. Either you will hate the one and love the other, or you will be devoted to the one and despise the other.”

3. Referendum
a. The Parliament will decide on issuing a notice of a referendum concerning specific matters within its sphere of competence by a simple majority vote of the total number of Representatives. The decision of the majority of voters in a referendum shall be adopted on condition that more than half of the total number of registered voters had voted. 

b. The Parliament will be obliged to issue a notice of a referendum if one is proposed by at least, say, 5% of the registered voters. The decision made in such a referendum will be binding.     

4. The President of the Republic will be elected directly by the people
The President of the Republic will be elected in general and direct elections, by secret ballot, for a single six-year term. The President of the Republic shall physically reside for a minimum of ten years within Greece at the day s/he is elected to office. The President of the Republic shall be a national of the Hellenic Republic by birth and only of the Hellenic Republic even if she/he resides abroad.  A person may be elected President of the Republic if over the age of at least 40 on the day of the election. A person may not be elected President of the Republic if, on the day of the election, he/she has not been a physical resident of the Hellenic Republic at least ten years in a row. Owning property in Greece while physically living abroad does not qualify one as being a physical resident.  
 
Greeks in Greece and in the diaspora held rallies on the “Macedonia” name issue sporadically. Some of these rallies were quite large, but the question remains: was there a message attached to those rallies or did the outside world penalize the message and Greece along with it?
 
Many messages used in those rallies make sense only to Greeks; however, they give the wrong message to foreigners with no understanding of the issue. Either the organizers do not seem to care, or they feel like isolating people who genuinely care about Greece. People have to understand that what makes sense to us is not necessarily a useful tool to spread our message. ‘One message fits all’ is the wrong concept. We can satisfy our pride and our ego, but simultaneously sacrifice our message or play it smart and spread the right message without over-dramatization, sensationalism, and ultra-nationalism.
 
To foreigners, slogans such as “Macedonia is Greek” sounds like it hides an ultra-nationalistic message with an expansionist connotation against the FYROM. Strabo said, “Indeed, Macedonia is part of Greece”; however, one must consider that at his time Greece was only a geographical term under the Romans; it was not a country. The Hellenic Peninsula was divided into two administrative segments, one of which included Macedonia.
 
In my view, people who prepare advertising should take Strabo’s statement and present in a way that the word “Macedonia” does not refer to the FYROM in any way and form, but to Greece. Something like “Macedonia is already a part of Greece”; “No state with the name Macedonia”; “Macedonia IS in Greece”; something like that would be more effective and to the point. People should stop thinking emotionally and start thinking strategically. People in the advertising industry are genuinely creative.   
 
I love Greece, I truly do, but loving something or someone does not mean I have to be blind; it means I should face reality and distinguish between what is right and wrong. I cannot restrict my mind of the truth whilst ignoring facts. It is said that love is blind; however, it does not have to be senseless.
 
People have the right to hold rallies and they should. In a democracy, it is the right and obligation of the citizens to petition their government. However, the same demonstrators and especially their leadership must debilitate all elements who misdirect the tide of the demonstration whether they come from the extreme right or extreme left. Leaders are responsible for anything that takes place in protests. About ten years ago, I suggested that we demonstrate before Greek diplomatic missions, not in front of foreign government buildings but I was turned down flat. Ten years later, they decided to do it, but it's too late. Even when I had suggested it, it was late; now it is much worse.     

Australia, USA, and Canada are home to an extensive Greek diaspora. However, we are a diaspora divided especially on advocacy. Why is this?
 
We are divided because those in leadership not only undermine each other but also don’t know what they are doing.  Others accept bribes from subsequent Greek governments about 25 to 35 thousand U.S. dollars monthly under the guise of promoting Greek causes or advertisement. This is true for some well-known Greek NGOs and mass media of the Greek Diaspora. Since it is an issue pertaining to all Greeks, where is the voice from key Greek American NGOs? They are silent on the matter of Macedonia because they are probably on the take.  
 
In some cases, those who think of themselves as superior homeland patriots are in fact so irrational that they end up collaborating with the FYROM Slavs without even realising it. Some go as far as getting their supporters to troll both Greeks and Slavs online and to exchange absurd nonsense as if they were Karagiozis (Karagöz) and Hatzivatis (Hacivat). The fact is the Sultan hung them both. More recently these ‘patriots’ have even put people’s lives in danger by “outing” some of our FYROM Slav supporters in the diaspora who work for the Greek cause. These trolls consider these public outings as an “achievement.” However, it never occurred to them that the people they have outed may be providing very useful information to Greece. A nation cannot survive with such people and is doomed to fail.
 
How can the Greek diaspora create advocacy groups when they have such members? One does not find this kind of behavior in the FYROM Slav camp.
 
Ultimately, intelligent Greeks of the diaspora become non-inclined towards involvement in such destructive organizations.

How would you describe the FYROM Slav diaspora organizations and the methods they employ to get their message heard not only within their community but also in the public sphere?
 
From the efficiency of their work, they are very well-organized with discipline and attention directed toward their goal not at each other. Their lobby works under a strategy that employs professional experts in disciplines where the lobby needs to spread the word. Their experts are not FYROM Slavs and they often resort to proxy struggle just like the VMRO in the early 1900s.
 
Also, FYROM Slavs have money, and the methods they employ are put together professionally. The coordination of tactics as part of a strategic purpose is apparent.  Their community takes “guidelines” from both Skopje and Ankara - Turkey is helping them a lot and supports them unquestionably. Not one of the members of the various groups would dare disobey it. When it comes to “Macedonia” they face it with religious reverence. It is exactly why the FYROM is where it is. Additionally, they don’t troll each other, nor divulge or out their sources, or attack each other, because they take the issue seriously.

Going back to the Greek diaspora, you are an advocate for the creation of a Greek lobby. Many in the diaspora already believe that there are Greek lobby groups at work to protect the interests of both the diaspora and to lobby their respective governments. What are the facts on this issue?
 
The myth about the Greek lobby started after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. As I understand it, a couple of Greek restaurant owners went to the U.S. Congress to talk to their Congressman about the invasion. As they were leaving the office, someone asked who these men were; one of the present office workers said “the Greek lobby.” More or less, it is how the myth started.   
 
Well, if so many lobby groups existed, Greece would not have been continuously on the receiving end. Since Greece never had a lobby, most Greeks do not know what a lobby is, what it needs to operate, nor the amount of money involved. Greeks are also tribal. They do not have the national unity necessary to address domestic and national security issues. I have been attacked as a pro-Skopje Slav only because my last name is not Greek. If they take the telephone book of, say, Athens, they will be surprised how many so-called Greek names are Arabian, Persian, Turkish, Slavic, Albanian, etc. A name ending such as “-is” does not make a name Greek, by the way. A name ending in “-oğlu” which is a possessive genitive of oğul (son) cannot be purely Greek. Papazoğlu, for instance, is purely a Turkish name. The Greek word for a priest is “ἱερεύς,” not papas. Papas is remnant of Greece’s Ottoman past. In Turkish “papaz” means “Christian priest.”
 
Skopje has only ONE national issue, their survival as a state. They have Turkish-trained personnel on issues of lobbying and their experts listen to professional advice. In the United States, lobbyists for other powers are required to register as Foreign Agents (FARA). The President of the UMD is a designated Foreign Agent. Additionally, the Ministry of Culture of the government of the FYROM, has for 10 years now employed people full-time to work solely on articles published in Wikipedia promoting the “Macedonian Heritage” of the Slavs turned “ethnic Macedonians”. 
 
Greece on the other hand has five national security issues; (Macedonia, Northern Epirus, Thrace, EEZ, and Aegean Air Space) and two national topics (Cyprus, and the Greek Genocide). Each one of them needs a separate lobby. 
 
The reason why we don’t have a lobby is because the political establishment of Greece does not allow it and does everything possible to subvert, sabotage, and weaken any attempt for a valid and honest lobby. Secondly, those who want to lead a lobby do not have any idea what a real lobby entails – dreams don’t count. Lobby means M-O-N-E-Y and expertise (love for the homeland or I want to help are fine, but they do not count as expertise). Just to open its doors for example, an active lobby requires a minimum of three million U.S. dollars. The operating costs reduce as the organization depreciates its assets but salaries and other operational expenses need to be factored in. If this sum seems exorbitant, one must start working in a Cost Accounting manner and without discounting any costs. 
 
A lobby is a fully organized operation consisting of adequately staffed and equipped teams with a single scope tasking that does not lose its peripheral vision. A team is a group whose identity reflects the consensus of its members without suppressing their individuality.
 
A lobby needs teams of experts, groups of professionals with expertise in the specific cause they advocate without interference or meddling in the business of other teams.  The experts are dedicated to their field and they do not need to be of Greek descent.  Each of the lobby teams consist of experts on specific subject matters, as geologists, national security experts with a specialty in geostrategy, experts in avionics, attorneys specializing in international law, diagnosticians, analysts, strategists, tacticians, operationalists, a lot of full-time staffers; but most of all, a lobby needs famous spokespersons in the community they operate and FUNDING.
 
Lobbies are connected to foundations or nonprofit public policy organizations using all forms of mass and social media and mass communication to influence a government or individual politicians. They demonstrate that the public demands a particular action. Such is the advocacy side of the lobbies that works overtly through lectures and presentations. 
 
A real Greek lobby requires serious funding because our multiple causes have been neglected or marginalized for a long time. The number of personnel required for a lobby can be anywhere between twenty to thousands; it always depends on what the aim and objective is. A few years back, I met someone who worked for a lobby as a Human Resource Manager, but the lobby in my opinion was insignificant. Yet she still had close to 100 personnel on her payroll. Not only do we have no lobby in Washington, but we don’t have appropriate people to lead such a lobby. All those who lead numerous Greek organizations have no understanding what a true lobby is, no appropriate training, no suitable contacts, and lack leadership ability.
 
Lobbyists are naturally accountable to their supporters who usually remain anonymous; it is why professional lobbies work quietly and behind the scenes using covert techniques. 
 
On the public relations side, a simple garden party with a politician today will cost a lobby about US$400-500,000 in the United States. The only Greek-American firm registered in the United States as a public relations firm is Manatos and Manatos. This firm was charging US$300,000 for garden parties about ten years ago.  
 
Most organizations of the Greek diaspora that I’m aware of are organized under the scope of cultural, societal, or educational societies with appropriate by-laws. Their part-time leadership, boards, and sometimes paid employees, lack what it takes to undertake the duties of a lobbyist. Unfortunately, they seek ‘lobbyists’ among themselves, restricting any possible expertise in the realm of the Greek diaspora.  Such mentality hinders the achievement of goals. The people who believe they currently lead a lobby are unaware that they do not have the suitable skills and information to deliver what is required. Titles, academic standing, or military and social eminence do not provide what it takes to operate and lead a political or national security lobby group, nor do they provide appropriate methods and strategies to achieve set goals. 
 
Those involved, do not understand what a lobby is nor its definition. The most critical part of lobbying is an affinity for the cause, not lust for it. Affinity lends itself to using logic, but passion raises emotional ties which are counterproductive. What one loves to do does not mean that it is the right thing to do.  
 
However, the problem within the Greek diaspora is more profound.  When irresponsible people spread the news that they are lobbyists while they do nothing near lobbying, they raise expectations by throwing ashes into the eyes of those who hope that someone is doing something. If they were honest about it, people would not have such expectations, and they would take the issue seriously trying to do something to fill the gap instead of being complacent. 
 
Others believe that educated people know what they are doing. To begin with, it is a faulty assumption. Let us take a teacher. There is a difference between teaching a five-year-old from teaching a 60-year-old. It is worse when a teacher of English is trying to teach English as a Second Language to foreigners. In my Turkish language class, for example, there were three engineers from Turkey teaching us Turkish as a Second Language. It was a farce. 
 
Another way of looking at the knowledge and expertise required for an effective lobby is like this. The human body and a house use plumbing. The gastroenterologist and the plumber do similar jobs.  They both take care of the plumbing, the first one of the human body and the second one of the house. The question is simple; would you visit a plumber to perform a colonoscopy?
 
I remember a Greek Cypriot professor of Political Science who teaches in the UK claiming that he knew a lot about Turkey. When he read my paper on the Strategic Culture of Turkey, he said: “I did not know all these details.” I am sure others would have presented a different set of details on the same subject. A lobby needs eloquent people to control the ground, spin the media, have credibility, sponsor a think-tank, neutralize the opposition without criminal means, control the web, and have access to government offices.
 
Most of the issues Greeks have arisen from targeting the wrong audience. They keep preaching to the choir. The message to the Greeks and non-Greeks can never be the same. They make videos in Greek explaining to the Greek audience that the ancient Macedonians were Greeks. Why? If the Greek audience does not know that, why are we attacking the FYROM Slavs for their historical ignorance? Why don’t the same people make a video in the language that the FYROM Slavs understand? What about in Serbian or even Russian? I am sure there are a few of Slavic descent who are willing to do it for a fee. They can even dub the voice. They can just narrate without showing their faces. It is exactly why a true lobby needs money. But who has the intelligence to think about it? According to Mr. Philip Christopher, President of the International Coordinating Committee – “Justice for Cyprus” (PSEKA), Turkey has spent US$102 million to professional lobbying firms such as Gephard, Livingston, Dole, Wexler, etc. Turks seek experts regardless of their ethnic background. Greeks look for people of Greek background. That alone limits the choices that Greeks have.  
 
In saying this, I want to clarify that I am not a lobbyist and will never be one. I do not have what it takes to be a lobbyist. I can organize a lobby without any outside interference and I can task the necessary research with a team of true researchers; that is what I can do.
 
We cannot end this interview without discussing our organization. Why has the Macedonian League resonated with so many people young and old? We see it from the constant communication and the enthusiasm of our followers. We see it with foreign government officials who follow us seeking answers to the name issue. What does the Macedonian League offer that other Greek organizations don't?
 
We are a small group of professionals specializing in various disciplines. Since its inception, our website and social media has remained and will remain clear of sensationalist articles with unproven “facts.” We welcome articles from professionals that have something to do with Greece’s domestic and national security issues. All of them pass through the editorial board. We have several professional editors who check the accuracy and the tone of articles.
 
What people like is the thoughtfulness behind the maintenance of our website and our social media sites. It is why foreign governments and intelligence agencies are our followers. It is only for a mature following and for people who want to learn something. It is precisely why the Australian Institute of Macedonian Studies (AIMS) has honored us with the Research Fellowship. People have noticed that anything we do is based on facts and not rumors or hallucinations.
 
It also depends on your readership. We do not care about spreading nonsense to gain readership. From the beginning we decided to keep our website content of high quality caliber and we stayed focused on the national security of Greece. Quality is always better than quantity. From a personal perspective, I’ve had many opportunities in life to follow popular movements and webinars. I did not do it because of the people I had to deal with and the direction the webinars would take. My father fought against fascists, Nazis and Communists and I would not forgo his example. I would never allow myself to be used by people who seek my knowledge on the matter to promote their pre-existing beliefs or political ideology.
 
Marcus Templar, your closing thoughts. Seeing that the global Greek community is extremely unhappy with this ‘Agreement’, going forward, what is the best way to protect Greece’s national security interests, and undo some of the damage done so far?

Well in closing, I wish that the governments and the people of Greece had woken up in 1990 regarding the name issue. Some Greek politicians have a problem with Skopje taking the name “Macedonia” as part of its final name, but I wonder where they had been since then? The demagogues who now take advantage of the issue could easily create social and political upheavals in the country by using toxic populism.
 
Having said that, the following course of action will help undo damage done so far:

• Firstly, people whose education, employment and expertise have nothing to do with issues of political science (foreign affairs, national security, etc.) should stay out of these issues because they are unskilled in the craft. Imagine how senseless it would be if I got involved in their profession whether they were engineers, physicians, teachers of literature, etc? Serious issues are not for kafeneion discussion and Politicial Science is not kafeneion politics.

 

• Secondly, establish Professional Lobby groups; one to lobby Greek politicians and others to lobby governments of the countries they live in.

 

• Thirdly, hire a legal team of experts in international law to look into protesting and consequently annulling the present Agreement between Athens and Skopje under any or all of the following: 

 
                 – Ultra vires;
                 – Misunderstanding, fraud, corruption, coercion in accordance with Articles 46–53 of the Vienna
                    Convention on the Law of Treaties;
                 – Contrary to peremptory norms.

Then re-negotiate an Agreement based on the findings of the Legal Group and this time assign diplomatically relevant and politically competent negotiators instead of international nation-nihilistic organizations. The name of the multi-ethnic country must be Modern Yugoslavia or Yugoslavonia. The Nationality (which is a loose term of citizenship) must follow solely the name of the country and its Slav nationals should be designated as South Slavs speaking a South Slavic, with South Slavic Heritage. 

• Fourthly, employ full-time multilingual personnel, dedicated to maintaining Greek-related content on Wikipedia in more languages than Greek. Never underestimate the influence of Wikipedia on people especially on children.

​

• Finally, implement all the changes to the Greek constitution that were proposed in the report above.

 
Marcus Templar, The Macedonian League wishes to thank you for your genuine and in-depth analysis in presenting the causes and consequences of this serious national security issue.
 
Your academic and strategic insights are vital to the future direction and success of the Greek position on the Macedonian issue.

​--

About Marcus A. Templar
Professor Marcus A. Templar is a former U.S. Army Cryptologic Linguist (Language Analyst), Certified U.S. Army Instructor of Intelligence Courses, Certified Foreign Disclosures Officer, Certified Translator Interpreter of Serbo-Croatian, SIGINT / All-Source Intelligence Analyst. He is the Macedonian League's National Security Advisor.

​To read all his papers, please click here.

About the Macedonian League
We are an international professional Hellenic advocacy group. Our primary purpose is to advance our interests to informed and responsive governments on issues concerning Greece's national security and territorial integrity. 

The Macedonian League's main focus is on the “Macedonian name dispute”, as this dispute is a serious national security issue that threatens the territorial integrity of Greece.

The Macedonian League also focuses on exposing and combating anti-Hellenism and analyzing political developments in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

For more information, follow us on: Website, Facebook, Twitter

Department of Communications
Macedonian League 

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has announced the new ministers of his cabinet as Turkey officially switched to an executive presidency.

Erdoğan appointed Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar as the new defense minister and his son-in-law Berat Albayrak as the Treasury and Finance Minister in a 16-seat surprise cabinet with not much known bureaucratic figures, hours after he was sworn into office on July 9.

Erdoğan’s vice president is Fuat Oktay, former undersecretary of the office of the prime minister, who is regarded as one of the architects of the bureaucratic and administrative transformation after the governmental system has been shifted into presidency through last year’s referendum.

Erdoğan opted to continue with current Justice Minister Abdülhamit Gül, Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in the new cabinet.

These figures, along with Berat Albayrak, who will serve as the Treasury and Finance Minister, will have to resign from the Parliament to join the cabinet.

President’s choice as the Trade Minister Ruhsar Pekcan, a businesswoman who has been serving at Turkey’s largest trade chamber as the deputy head for the woman entrepreunership and at Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK).

Mustafa Varank, one of closest aides of Erdoğan, will serve as the Industry and Development Minister in the new cabinet.

Undersecretary of the Energy Ministry Fatih Dönmez is appointed as the Energy Minister while Cahit Turan, former head of the Directorate of Highways, will serve as the Transportation and Infrastructure Minister.

Education Minister Ziya Selçuk has long served at the Education Ministry but he is well-known as the owner of a private college in Turkey.

Full list of ministers

Erdoğan took his oath in parliament on July 9 after being elected as the country’s president in the June 24 elections, in which he garnered 52 percent of the votes.

After his swearing-in, the system change — stipulated by the constitutional amendment which was approved by last year's referendum — has gone into full effect.

Following an official inauguration ceremony at the presidential complex in Ankara on July 9, Erdoğan announced the full list of minister with a press conference as follows:

Vice President:
Fuat Oktay

Justice Minister: 
Abdülhamit Gül 

Foreign Minister:
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu

Interior Minister:
Süleyman Soylu

Defence Minister:
Hulusi Akar

Treasury and Finance Minister:
Berat Albayrak

Energy and Natural Resources Minister:
Fatih Dönmez

Industry and Development Minister:
Mustafa Varank

Commerce Minister:
Ruhsar Pekcan

Environment and Urban Minister:
Murat Kurum

National Education Minister:
Ziya Selçuk

Health Minister:
Fahrettin Koca

Transport and Infrastructure Minister:
Cahit Turan

Culture and Tourism Minister:
Mehmet Ersoy

Labor, Social Services and Family Minister:
Zehra Zümrüt Selçuk

Agriculture and Forest Minister:
Bekir Pakdemirli

Youth and Sports Minister:
Mehmet Muharrem Kasapoğlu

The ministers took their oaths on July 10, 2018.

The announcement came hours after Erdoğan issued the first presidential decree through which the new ministries were formed and presidential organizations were set under his authority.

Under the new government system of Turkey, the president is both the head of state and government, with the prime minister’s post abolished.

Turkish ministers will be reporting to the president, no longer to parliament as it was in the old system.

Bureaucratic cadres will be appointed after the new ministers take office.

Beside ministries, there will be a number of offices that will work under the president and will implement the presidency’s projects in the new system.

A total of 65 existing boards, commissions and committees established with laws and other regulations are merged under nine entities, namely Social Policies Council, Law Policies, Security and Foreign Policies, Local Governments, Health and Food, Economy, Education and Science/Technology/Innovation.

The president will chair the boards, but there will be an acting chair for each of them. The boards will propose policies, oversee the implementation of the policies and take macro decisions that are beyond the responsibilities of the ministers.

The eight directorates will include the Directorate of General Staff, Directorate of National Intelligence, and Directorate of Religious Affairs. The Directorate of Strategy and Budgeting will be launched for the first time. It will be in charge of preparing the budget and will be overseen by the president. The Directorate of Communication will organize all media and communication activities.

Source: Hürriyet Daily News

Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras on Wednesday hailed the “new dynamic” that has developed in the Balkans in the last year that will enhance the regions’s prospects. 

​Speaking at the fourth Quadrilateral Summit in Thessaloniki between the leaders of Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia, Tsipras said the positive outlook has been boosted by the recent name deal with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and the European Union’s decisions to start accession talks with Serbia and Montenegro – and with Albania and FYROM next year. 

He also expressed his support for the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania in the Schengen Treaty. 

In a parallel meeting, the infrastructure ministers of the four countries discussed ways to expedite infrastructure and energy projects in the region – namely rail links between Thessaloniki, Kavala, Alexandroupoli and Burgas, as well as the one connecting Thessaloniki, Skopje and Belgrade. 

The IGB gas pipeline which will connect Greece and Bulgaria was also discussed, as well as the prospects of upgrading ports in northern Greece and the Black Sea. 

Tsipras said this wide range of links will upgrade the significance of the western Balkans. 

The Thessaloniki meeting is seen as an effort to coordinate the four countries’ positions on a number of key issues ahead of a meeting of the leaders of China and the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans in Sofia on Saturday and the Western Balkans Summit of the Berlin Process, which will be held in London next week. 

During the summit at the Hyatt Hotel in Thessaloniki, there was a protest march by people that oppose the name deal between Greece and FYROM.

​Source: Ekathimerini